Under this theory, G.M. Sign may sufficiently establish that Elm Street converted its property despite the fact that Elm Street did not ever physically possess the fax machine, the paper or the toner. See Savanna Group, Inc. v. Truan, No. 10 C 7995, 2011 WL 703622 at *2 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 22, 2011) (St. Eve, J.); G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Stergo, 681 F.Supp.2d 929, 932 (N.D.Ill.2009) (Zagel, J.); Stonecrafters, Inc. v. Foxfire Printing & Packaging, Inc., 633 F.Supp.2d 610, 613 (N.D.Ill.2009) (Kapala, J.). G.M. Sign's contention that Elm Street converted its employees' time falls short because a “person's time is not chattel over which plaintiff had the immediate and unconditional right to possess.” Stonecrafters, 633 F.Supp.2d at 613 n. 1.

Defendant cites to G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Stergo, 681 F. Supp. 2d 929 (N.D. Ill. 2009), and Centerline Equip. Corp. v. Banner Pers. Serv., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 768 (N.D. Ill. 2008), arguing the ICFA claim should be dismissed if the substantial injury factor is missing. In Stergo, the ICFA claim was dismissed because the second and third factors of the Robinson test weighed in favor of dismissal.

Courts have reached varying conclusions in determining whether the de minimis doctrine bars similar conversion claims where the damages allegedly consist of, inter alia, lost toner and paper. Compare Garrett v. Rangle Dental Lab., No. 10 C 1315, 2010 WL 3034709, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2010) (Bucklo, J.) (finding de minimis doctrine barred conversion claim); Paldo Sign Display Co. v. Topsail Sportswear, Inc., No. 08 C 5959, 2010 WL 276701, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2010) (Anderson, J.) (same); G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Stergo, 681 F. Supp. 2d 929, 932-35 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (Zagel, J.) (same); Stonecrafters, Inc. v. Foxfire Printing Packaging, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613-15 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (Kapala, J.) (same); Rossario's Fine Jewelry, Inc. v. Paddock Publ'ns, 443 F. Supp. 2d 976, 980 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (Shadur, J.) (same), with R. Rudnick Co. v. G.F. Protection, Inc., No. 08 C 1856, 2009 WL 112380, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2009) (Gottschall, J.) (finding de minimis doctrine did not bar conversion claim at motion to dismiss stage); Centerline, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 782 (same); Brodsky v. NIP Group, Inc., Case No. 08 CH 22051 (Cir. Ct. Cook County June 17, 2010) (same); Iverson v. Lily's Bridal Gifts, Inc., Case No. 08 CH 42957 (Cir. Ct. Cook County Jan. 2010) (same).

See, e.g., Green v. Anthony Clark Int'l Ins. Brokers, Ltd., No. 09 C 1541, 2009 WL 2515594, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2009) (Kennelly, J.); R. Rudnick Co. v. G.F. Protection, Inc., No. 08 C 1856, 2009 WL 112380 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2009) (Gottschall, J.); Centerline Equip. Corp. v. Banner Personnel Serv., Inc., 545 F. Supp.2d 768, 782 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (Pallmeyer, J.). Particularly instructive and persuasive is Judge Zagel's opinion in G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Stergo, 681 F.Supp.2d 929, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2009).

SeeGarrett v. Rangle Dental Lab. , No. 10 C 1315, 2010 WL 3034709, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 3, 2010) (holding that plaintiff's conversion claim failed because the alleged loss was de minimis and could be remedied by his TCPA claim); G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Stergo , 681 F.Supp.2d 929, 934–35 (N.D.Ill.2009) (holding that plaintiff's conversion claim was barred by the de minimis doctrine and noting that the TCPA provided a cause of action for the grievance alleged in that claim, which statute plaintiff had invoked accordingly in its first claim).

Some of the courts that have rejected conversion claims have cited the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex-the law does not concern itself with trifles. See, e.g., G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Elm St. Chiropractic, Ltd., 871 F.Supp.2d 763, 768 (N.D. Ill. 2012); G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Stergo, 681 F.Supp.2d 929, 932-35 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Rossario's Fine Jewelry, Inc. v. Paddock Publishing, Inc., 443 F.Supp.2d 976, 980 (N.D. Ill. 2006). But the de minimis rule is applied in cases of indefinite harm, where the injury-though not capable of being defined by a precise dollar amount-is miniscule.

Dolemba v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 213 F. Supp. 3d 988, 998 (N.D. Ill. 2016) ("an alleged violation of federal law, which must be taken as true for the purposes of this analysis, offends public policy."); G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Stergo, 681 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (finding that an unsolicited fax advertisement violates the TCPA and is thus presumptively against public policy). 2. Oppressive

To state a claim for conversion under Illinois law, one must allege "(1) unauthorized and wrongful control, dominion, or ownership by defendant over plaintiff's property; (2) plaintiff's right in the property; (3) plaintiff's absolute and unconditional right to the immediate possession of the property; and (4) a demand for possession of the property." G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Stergo, 681 F. Supp. 2d 929, 931 (N.D. Ill. 2009). Similarly, a partition claim requires that a claimant have an interest in the entity to be partitioned. Anderson v. Anderson, 42 Ill. App. 3d 781, 782, 356 N.E.2d 788, 789-90 (1st Dist. 1976) (observing "[t]he object of partition is to enable those who own property . . . to sever their interests"); Davis v. Davis, 128 Ill. App. 2d 427, 430, 262 N.E.2d 788, 790 (1st Dist. 1970).

To state a claim for conversion under Illinois law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) unauthorized and wrongful control, dominion, or ownership by defendant over plaintiff's property; (2) plaintiff's right in the property; (3) plaintiff's absolute and unconditional right to the immediate possession of the property; and (4) a demand for possession of the property. G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Stergo, 681 F. Supp. 2d 929, 931 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (citing General Motors Corp. v. Douglass, 206 Ill.App.3d 881, 151 Ill.Dec. 822, 565 N.E.2d 93, 97 (1990)). Opus contends that its earlier lawsuit filed in Bermuda constitutes a demand.

Here, Dolemba cannot meet any of these elements. Although violations of federal law offend public policy, see G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Stergo, 681 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935 (N.D. Ill. 2009), the Court has already concluded that Dolemba consented to receive phone calls from Kelly, meaning no TCPA violation occurred. Under the second factor, "[a] practice may be considered immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous if it imposes a lack of meaningful choice or an unreasonable burden on the consumer."