Opinion
C/A 6:23-cv-04680-DCC-KFM
11-21-2023
Demetrius Glenn, Plaintiff, v. Ms. Bryan, Brian Stirling, Kenneth Nelson, Lt. Williams, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
The plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on September 18, 2023 (doc. 1). By order filed October 10, 2023, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring his case into proper form for judicial screening (doc. 8). The plaintiff complied with the court's order, and the case is now in proper form for judicial screening. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a state prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and housed at Broad River Correctional Institution (“Broad River”), filed this action seeking damages from the defendants (doc. 1). The plaintiff alleges that his First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights have been violated (id. at 4). He contends that he asked Lt. Williams for access to a phone to call his attorney, but Lt. Williams denied his request (id. at 6). He contends that Lt. Williams also told other inmates to attack him in August 2021 (id.). The plaintiff alleges that Lt. Williams has denied him access to the courts, recreation, showers, meals, and medical treatment (id.).
The plaintiff seeks damages from Warden Nelson and Dir. Stirling because they allow inmates to be assigned to the Structured Living Unit (“SLU”) (id. at 6). He contends that his confinement there limits his ability to work and earn money, he cannot visit the law library, he cannot attend religious services, has limited outside recreation, his meals are always delivered cold, and his showers are limited (id.). He contends that the solitary confinement is not fit for human habitation because it is loud, he does not have access to programs (such as educational programming, vocational training, or other constructive activities), and does not have enough physical exercise (id. at 7). In February 2022, the plaintiff requested that his custody classification be changed, but his request was refused (id.). The plaintiff alleges that after he complained about Ms. Bryan not changing his custody classification, Ms. Bryan retaliated against him by changing his custody status (id.).
The plaintiff alleges that the denied mental health treatment has worsened his anxiety and depression, that the lack of proper ventilation has made his asthma worse, and that he has headaches and isn't sleeping (id. at 8). For relief, the plaintiff seeks release from solitary confinement and money damages (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c) and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” Id. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Conditions of Confinement Claims
The Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment regarding the conditions of his confinement, a prisoner must prove that he was deprived of a basic human need and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The first prong of the Strickler analysis requires an objective showing that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, such that significant physical or emotional injury resulted from it, while the second prong is a subjective test requiring evidence that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
Here, the plaintiff's complaint contains a litany of vague and conclusory allegations about alleged unconstitutional conditions in the SLU, including limited interaction with other inmates, showers only once a week, limited outdoor recreation, not being able to work for money, no access to law library, being served cold meals (that are at times bug infested), lacks ventilation, loud noises, that there are no events or educational programs, no physical exercise, and no vocational training (see generally doc. 10). The plaintiff's conclusory allegations, however, fail to plausibly state a claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (noting that “a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”) (citing Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007)). As recognized by the Supreme Court, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Id. Further, the plausibility standard requires more than “‘an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.'” Griffith v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., C/A No. 2:12-cv-00239-DCN, 2012 WL 2048200, at *1 (D.S.C. June 6, 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Further, even if properly alleged, the majority of the complained-of conditions do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989) (finding no liberty interest in canteen, telephone, or visitation privileges); Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298) (noting that the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only deprivations which deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to provide the basis of a § 1983 claim); Thompson v. Brown, C/A No. 3:11-cv-318-TMC-JRM, 2011 WL 6012592, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2011) (rejecting conditions of confinement claim where the plaintiff claimed “his mattress and blanket were confiscated for six days, he was not allowed to have any toilet tissue for six days, his clothes were taken away from him for six days, his cell was cold, he had no running water in his cell, and he was forced to sleep on a steel cot for six days”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 6012550 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2011). Indeed, with respect to the plaintiff's claims regarding vocational training and educational programming, the law is well settled that “inmates have no constitutional right to rehabilitation or educational programs.” Garrett v. Angelone, 940 F.Supp. 933, 942 (W.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 107 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (noting that deprivation of rehabilitation and educational programs does not violate Eighth Amendment)). Moreover, an inmate's ability to work while incarcerated is within the discretion of SCDC; thus, the plaintiff is not entitled to work or earn money while incarcerated. Sanders v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., C/A No. 6:03-cv-01127-25AK, 2004 WL 3671283, at *9 (D.S.C. May 24, 2004). Similarly, being served cold food (that sometimes has bugs) does not allege a claim because while prison officials have a duty to provide inmates with “adequate food,” only extreme deprivations are actionable under § 1983. See Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 234 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). Additionally, to the extent the plaintiff, in passing, alleges violations of his rights based on Lt. Williams purportedly telling other inmates to attack the plaintiff, “[m]ere threats or verbal abuse by prison officials, without more, do not state a cognizable claim under § 1983”. Henslee v. Lewis, 153 Fed.Appx. 178, 180 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979)); Morrison v. Martin, 755 F.Supp. 683, 687 (E.C. N.C. 1990), aff'd917 F.2d 1302 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that “[w]ords by themselves do not state a constitutional claim, without regard to their nature” (internal citation omitted)).
Further, to the extent the plaintiff seeks damages based upon his custody classification, asserting that he should not be held in the SLU, the claim is subject to dismissal because prisoners generally do not have a constitutionally recognized liberty interest in a particular security classification or prison placement. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (finding no constitutional right under the due process clause to a particular security classification or prison placement), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Indeed, as noted by the Supreme Court, a change in a prisoner's conditions of confinement only gives rise to a federally-protected liberty interest if it “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483, 485 (finding no liberty interest when inmate placed in segregated confinement). As set forth above, none of the conditions alleged by the plaintiff rise to the level of an atypical or significant hardship. See Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding no atypical or significant hardship despite claims of vermin-infested cells, human waste in cells, leaking toilets, unbearable heat, less food, reduced access to clean clothes and linens, reduced out-of-cell time, no outdoor recreation time, and no educational or religious services). Further, to the extent the plaintiff seeks an order from this court instructing SCDC to transfer him out of the SLU, he requests relief this court cannot grant because the decision about where to house inmates is generally committed to the discretion of state officials. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976) (noting that “federal courts do not sit to supervise state prisons”). Thus, the plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims are subject to summary dismissal.
Denial of Access to the Courts Claims
The plaintiff's assertion that he has been denied access to the courts because he could not call his attorney on one occasion and does not have access to a law library (doc. 1 at 7) are also subject to summary dismissal. First, the Constitution guarantees a right to reasonable access to the courts - not to legal research or a law library. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Additionally, a claim for denial of access to the courts must be pled with specificity. Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996). Further, in order to state a constitutional claim for denial of access to the courts, a prisoner must show actual injury. Id.; see Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. The actual injury requirement can be satisfied by demonstrating that a non-frivolous legal claim was frustrated or impeded by some actual deprivation of access to the court. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 352-53. Here, the plaintiff's complaint contains no allegations of injury relating to his inability to call his attorney on one occasion and inability to visit the law library. The plaintiff's filings in this court also belie his claim that his lacks access to the courts. See Glenn v. Warden, C/A No. 6:23-cv-00674-DCC-KFM (D.S.C.) (pending habeas case); Glenn v. Ruffin, et al., C/A No. 6:22-cv-01320-DCC-KFM, 2022 WL 17718814 (D.S.C. Dec. 15, 2022), aff'd 2023 WL 3144555 (4th Cir. 2023); Glenn v. Jackson, etal., C/A No. 6:18-cv-03179-DCC, at doc. 122 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2021). As such, the plaintiff's denial of access to the courts claims are subject to summary dismissal.
Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs Claim
Liberally construed, the plaintiff - in passing - asserts that he has been denied adequate medical care (see doc. 1 at 8). Not “every claim by a prisoner [alleging] that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the [Constitution].” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). The government is required to provide medical care for incarcerated individuals. Id. at 103. However, to establish deliberate indifference, the treatment “must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
In order to state a claim, a plaintiff must show a serious medical need as well as that the defendant “knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed.” DePaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218-20 (4th Cir. 2016); Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-11 (4th Cir. 2017)). A “serious medical need” is a condition “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Heyer, 849 F.3d at 210 (citation omitted). “Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by either actual intent or reckless disregard. A defendant acts recklessly by disregarding a substantial risk of danger that is either known to the defendant or which would be apparent to a reasonable person in the defendant's position.” Miltier, 896 F.2d at 851-52 (citation omitted). “It is only such indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. Moreover, disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care do not state a Section 1983 claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir.1985).
Here, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. For example, the plaintiff's claims regarding inadequate medical care are vague and conclusory in nature - alleging a denial of care without any additional information (see doc. 1 at 8). However, as noted above, the plausibility standard requires more than “‘an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.'” Griffith, 2012 WL 2048200, at *1 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Further, the plaintiff's passing reference to medical indifference because he asked for unspecified medical care and had to buy medicine from other inmates, also fail to plausibly allege actions by the defendants in denying treatment required for a serious medical need. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the constitution.”). As such, the plaintiff's medical indifference claim also fails to state a claim for relief and should be dismissed.
Retaliation Claim
To the extent the plaintiff alleges that Lt. Williams retaliated against him by changing his custody status, the plaintiff's claim is subject to summary dismissal. Where a plaintiff alleges that an act was taken in response to the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, the plaintiff must allege that (1) he engaged in “protected First Amendment activity, (2) [the defendant] took some action that adversely affected [his] First Amendment rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between [his] protected activity and [the defendant's] conduct.” Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 499 (4th Cir. 2005)). Because conduct that “tends to chill the exercise of constitutional rights might not itself deprive such rights,” a plaintiff can plausibly allege a retaliation claim without alleging an actual deprivation of his First Amendment rights. Constantine, 411 F.3d at 500. With respect to causation, a plaintiff must plausibly allege knowledge by the defendant of a plaintiff's protected activity as well as that the retaliation took place within some “temporal proximity” of that activity. Id. at 501; see Germain v. Bishop, C/A No. TDC-15-1421, 2018 WL 1453336, at *14 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2018). A prisoner must present more than conclusory accusations of retaliation, and must provide facts that show the exercise of his constitutional right was a substantial factor motivating the retaliation. See e.g., Adams, 40 F.3d at 74-75; Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1318 (4th Cir. 1996).
Here, it is unclear what protected activity the plaintiff alleges he engaged in. Indeed, the plaintiff's request for a transfer or attempt to complain to a supervisor, absent more, may not qualify as protected activity. However, even presuming the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, the plaintiff has not plausibly alleged the other elements necessary to bring a retaliation claim. Further, the plaintiff's vague, conclusory allegations regarding causation fail to show that the exercise of his constitutional rights was a substantial factor motivating the purported retaliation. Indeed, the plaintiff's claim that his custody status was changed in 2022 solely due to retaliation is belied by his inmate disciplinary history, which indicates that the plaintiff had two disciplinary infractions during this same time. See South Carolina Department of Corrections Incarcerated Inmate Search, https://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/ (enter the plaintiff's first and last name) (last visited November 20, 2023). As such, the plaintiff's retaliation claim is also subject to dismissal.
Supplemental Jurisdiction
To the extent the plaintiff seeks damages based upon negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress (which he asserted in passing) (doc. 1 at 4), the court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over such state law claims. Here, the plaintiff's state law claims can only be considered by this court through the exercise of “supplemental jurisdiction,” which allows federal courts to hear and decide state law claims along with federal claims. Wis. Dep't of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998); 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, federal courts are permitted to decline supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Here, as noted above, the plaintiff's federal claims are subject to dismissal. Thus, this court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants.”).
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending his complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 49 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”).
The plaintiff is warned that if the United States District Judge assigned to this matter adopts this report and recommendation, the dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim could later be deemed a strike under the three-strikes rule. See Pitts v. South Carolina, 65 F.4th 141 (4th Cir. 2023).
The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).