Opinion
No. 673 C.D. 2013
11-07-2013
Jason Glavach v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Appellant
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER
The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles (Bureau) appeals from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County (trial court) sustaining the statutory appeal of Jason Glavach (Glavach) from the three-month suspension of Glavach's vehicle registration imposed by the Bureau for failure to maintain motor vehicle financial responsibility on his 2005 Chevrolet sedan, pursuant to Section 1786(d) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (Law), 75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d). Because the lapse in Glavach's vehicle coverage lasted more than 30 days and there is no de minimis exception to Section 1786(d)(2)(i), we reverse the Order of the trial court.
By Order dated September 19, 2013, this Court precluded Glavach from filing a brief in this matter after he failed to comply with this Court's prior Order of August 19, 2013, directing him to file a brief within 14 days.
Section 1786(d)(1) of the Law provides that the Bureau shall suspend the registration of a vehicle for three months if the vehicle lacks insurance. 75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d)(1).
On October 16, 2012, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) terminated Glavach's vehicle coverage. (Trial Ct. Op. at 1.) In response, the Bureau issued a letter to Glavach, dated December 16, 2012, informing Glavach that the Bureau was suspending his vehicle registration effective January 20, 2013. (Official Notice, Hr'g Ex. A-1, R.R. at 19a.) Glavach filed a timely appeal. The trial court held a hearing on Glavach's appeal on March 18, 2013. At the hearing, the Bureau introduced certified documents indicating that Glavach's vehicle was of a type that is required to be insured and that State Farm notified the Bureau that Glavach's coverage was cancelled on October 16, 2012. (Hr'g Tr. at 3-5, R.R. at 11a-13a; Hr'g Exs. A-2, A-3, 1, R.R. at 22a-23a, 25a.) Glavach testified on his own behalf and stated that his coverage lapsed because he fell behind on his payments. (Hr'g Tr. at 5, R.R. at 13a.) He stated that his coverage was reinstated on November 21, 2012, but admitted that this was a lapse of more than 30 days. (Hr'g Tr. at 5-6, R.R. at 13a-14a.) The trial court continued the hearing until the end of the day to give Glavach an opportunity to introduce evidence of the reinstatement of his coverage, which he did. (Hr'g Tr. at 7-8, R.R. at 15a-16a; Hr'g Ex. 1, R.R. at 25a.)
The trial court sustained Glavach's appeal and the Bureau appealed to this Court. In its Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court held that the Bureau met its prima facie burden under Section 1786(d). (Trial Ct. Op. at 3.) The trial court found, however, that Glavach was without coverage for his vehicle for only 36 days, and that the difference between the length of this lapse and the period permitted by Section 1786(d)(2)(i) was a de minimis violation given Glavach's financial situation. (Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4.)
Section 1786(d)(2)(i) provides that an owner or registrant may avoid suspension of his vehicle registration for failure to maintain financial responsibility if:
(i) The owner or registrant proves to the satisfaction of the department that the lapse in financial responsibility coverage was for a period of less than 31 days and that the owner or registrant did not operate or permit the operation of the vehicle during the period of lapse in financial responsibility.75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d)(2)(i).
On appeal to this Court, the Bureau argues that the trial court erred in sustaining Glavach's appeal because the Law does not give the trial court the discretion to set aside a registration suspension on the basis of hardship or other equitable factors and Glavach did not prove any of the exceptions set forth in Section 1786(d).
This Court's "review is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion." Greenfield v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 67 A.3d 198, 200 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
Section 1786(d)(1) provides that the Bureau "shall suspend the registration of a vehicle for a period of three months if it determines the required financial responsibility was not secured." 75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d)(1). If the registrant appeals such a suspension, the Bureau has the burden of making a prima facie showing that: (1) the vehicle is registered or required to be registered under the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §§ 101 - 9805; and (2) the Bureau has been notified that the required financial responsibility on the vehicle has lapsed or that the registrant was required to show proof of financial responsibility and failed to do so. 75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d)(3)(i)-(ii). Such a showing raises the presumption that the vehicle lacked the necessary financial responsibility. 75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d)(3)(ii). The burden then shifts to the registrant to show either that he continuously maintained financial responsibility for the vehicle or that he "fits within one of the three statutorily defined defenses outlined in Section 1786(d)(2)(i)-(iii)" of the Law. Fell v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 925 A.2d 232, 238 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
In this case, the trial court held that the Bureau met its prima facie burden and the record supports this holding. (Trial Ct. Op. at 3; Hr'g Ex. A-2, A-3, R.R. at 22a-23a.) Thus, the burden shifted to Glavach to show either that his vehicle coverage did not lapse or that one of the statutory exceptions applied. Section 1786(d)(2)(i) provides that a registrant may avoid a registration suspension by showing that "the lapse in financial responsibility coverage was for a period of less than 31 days and that the owner or registrant did not operate or permit the operation of the vehicle during" the lapse. 75 Pa. C.S. § 1786(d)(2)(i) (emphasis added). Glavach admitted that the lapse in coverage was more than 30 days. (Hr'g Tr. at 6, R.R. at 14a.) Glavach's evidence, a reinstatement notice from State Farm, indicated that his vehicle coverage was reinstated on November 21, 2012, 36 days after it lapsed on October 16, 2012. (Reinstatement Notice, R.R. at 25a.) Thus, because the lapse in Glavach's vehicle coverage was not for a period of less than 31 days, he did not satisfy the exception found at Section 1786(d)(2)(i).
There is no argument in this case that the exceptions at Section 1786(d)(2)(ii) (applying to members of the armed services) or Section 1786(d)(2)(iii) (applying to seasonal registrations) applied.
The trial court, however, held that the five days by which the lapse in Glavach's vehicle coverage exceeded the period allowed by Section 1786(d)(2)(i) was de minimis given Glavach's financial situation and the fact that he did not drive the vehicle while it was without coverage. (Trial Ct. Op. at 4.) However, Section 1786(d) does not permit such equitable considerations. There is no de minimis exception to Section 1786(d)(2)(i); this provision cannot apply if the lapse in coverage is for a period of 31 days or more. Greenfield v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 67 A.3d 198, 201 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013); Burton v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 973 A.2d 473, 474-75 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). Likewise, "trial courts do not have the discretion to consider hardship or other equitable factors when deciding whether a suspension is mandated under Section 1786(d)." McGonigle v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 37 A.3d 1273, 1275 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (citing Banks v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 856 A.2d 294, 296-97 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)). Because the lapse in Glavach's vehicle coverage was for a period of more than 30 days, we are constrained to hold that the trial court erred in sustaining his appeal.
The lapse in Glavach's coverage lasted 36 days, which is actually six days longer than the maximum of 30 days permitted by Section 1786(d)(2)(i). See Burton v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 973 A.2d 473, 475 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (holding that Section 1786(d)(2)(i) did not apply where coverage was reinstated on the thirty-first day). --------
For these reasons, we reverse the Order of the trial court.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge ORDER
NOW, November 7, 2013, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County in the above-captioned matter is hereby REVERSED.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge