Opinion
C. A. 1:23-4686-SAL-SVH
07-10-2024
Walter William Glass, Plaintiff, v. Jessica Lecompte, Program Director; MHO Edger; MHO Bridgman; Sgt. Holmes; and Lt. Blackburn, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges, United States Magistrate Judge
An inmate brings claims against employees at Perry Correctional Institution (“Perry”), claiming he was not kept safe from another inmate, leading to an assault. Jessica Lecompte (“Lecompte”), mental health officer Edger (“Edger”), mental health officer Bridgeman (“Bridgeman”),Sgt. Holmes (“Holmes”), and Lt. Blackburn (“Blackburn”) (collectively “Defendants”) seek dismissal of Plaintiff's claims.
Defendants have informed the court concerning the correct spelling of Bridgeman. The court employes the correct spelling and directs the clerk of court to modify the docket accordingly.
Walter William Glass (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this case on September i8, 2023, and asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § i983 alleging Defendants violated his Constitutional rights. This matter is before the court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 32]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendants' motion. [ECF No. 33]. Having been briefed [ECF No. 39], the motion is ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this matter has been referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. After carefully considering the record, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Plaintiff's Allegations
In his unverified amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on September 27, 2022, at approximately 11:00 a.m., he informed Holmes that another inmate, Paul Robinson (“Robinson”), was drinking and had threatened Plaintiff. [ECF No. 14 at 16]. Plaintiff alleges Holmes thereafter spoke to Robinson but then she and the other correction officers (“COs”) left the unit. Id. Plaintiff alleges that at approximately 2:00 p.m., Robinson stabbed him eight times in the head and left shoulder. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that he and Robinson were both in the Step-Down Program and that Robinson should not have been in the program because he had been caught with a knife a few months prior to the September 27, 2022 incident. Id. at 17.
As a general rule, when one party files a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant cannot merely rely on matters pleaded in the complaint, but must, by factual affidavit or the like, respond to the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In this Circuit, verified complaints by plaintiffs proceeding pro se are to be considered as affidavits when the allegations contained therein are based on personal knowledge. See Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991). However, neither Plaintiff's complaint nor his amended complaint is verified, and Plaintiff has failed to otherwise proffer any evidence. [See ECF Nos. 1, 14, 19, 39]. The court includes Plaintiff's allegations above for background purposes.
Video evidence submitted by Defendants and referenced by Plaintiff, discussed below, contradicts Plaintiff's repeated assertions that prior to the altercation with Robinson, Holmes and other COs left the unit.
Plaintiff has also submitted an inmate grievance form where he stated the following:
On September 27, 2022 at approx. 2pm I was assaulted-stabbed 8 times by Paul Robinson in the unit, and no one tried to stop the assault. Why didn't anyone (the Cos) try to stop this assault. Why was Robinson allowed to stay in the unit after he had been caught . . . with a knife.Id. at 10.
B. Defendants' Evidence
Defendants have submitted evidence in support of the following: On September 27, 2022, Holmes was assigned to security in the Step-Down Program, which is a very non-violent program and unit. [ECF No. 32-5 ¶ 2]. She was in the control room when the relevant incident occurred. Id. The A side contains 48 single cell rooms. Id. ¶ 3. The A side was not full at that time. Id. It contained approximately 30 inmates. Id.
According to the interview of Plaintiff after the subject incident, he had confronted Robinson about $5.00 that was allegedly owed to him, and they exchanged words. [See ECF No. 32-11 (video interview with Plaintiff), see also ECF No. 32-6 (investigative report)]. After the confrontation over the money, Plaintiff began pacing, making laps around the room. [See ECF No. 32-5 at 4 (exhibit 1, video recording of incident, at 11:15 into video, 13:41:15 on timestamp)]. Robinson and Plaintiff both threw punches at the same time. Id. at 12:42 into video, 13:42:42 on timestamp. A fight subsequently ensued, and Plaintiff was injured. See id.
Edger was upstairs in unit Q4A unlocking a door for another inmate, and on the unit as the first punches were thrown. [ECF No. 32-7 ¶¶ 2, 8, 10]. He was engaged with another inmate on the top floor of the unit and did not observe any problems until the fighting began. Id. He immediately called for an A-Team response, which is the security team trained to handle inmate fights and insurrections such as this one. Id. He subsequently ran downstairs and unlocked the A-side door for the A-Team to enter.
As Holmes arrived at unit Q4A, she personally observed Plaintiff falling backwards down the stairs near cell A-110 and observed him bleeding. [ECF No. 32-5 ¶ 11]. She immediately entered the unit. [See ECF No. 32-5 at 4 (exhibit 1, video recording of incident, at 13:07 into video, 13:43:07 on timestamp)]. Holmes engaged Plaintiff and his assailant, separating the two of them. [ECF No. 32-5 ¶¶ 12-14, ECF No. 32-5 at 6 (exhibit 3, subsequent video), ECF No. 32-5 at 7 (incident report), ECF No. 32-5 at 8 (exhibit 5, Holmes interview following incident)]. She escorted Plaintiff off the unit and separated the assailant from Plaintiff as he attempted to reengage Plaintiff, and the A-Team arrived shortly thereafter. See id.
Holmes has submitted affidavit evidence that Plaintiff never expressed any concerns to her about his safety and no officers under her command advised her of any concerns Plaintiff had for his safety. [ECF No. 32-5 ¶ 4]. If such a concern had been expressed, Plaintiff would have been provided an Evaluation of Protective Concerns form to complete. Id. He never requested or completed the form. Id.
Bridgeman and Lecompte were not present when the incident occurred. [ECF No. 32-8 ¶¶ 3-5, ECF No. 32-9 ¶¶ 3-5]. Plaintiff never expressed any concerns about his safety to Bridgeman or Lecompte. See id.
Blackburn was a supervisor at the time of the subject incident. [ECF No. 32-10]. He was not directly involved with the subject incident and was not present when it occurred. Id. He appeared on the unit after the fight was over as uninvolved inmates were being locked down in their cells. Id. Blackburn took immediate action when he heard the radio call about the altercation. Id. He had the assailant enter the sallyport to be restrained for escort to medical and subsequently the Restrictive Housing unit. Id. Plaintiff never expressed any concerns to Blackburn about his safety and no officers under Blackburn's command advised him of any concerns Plaintiff had for his safety. Id.
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Motion for Summary Judgment
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Gratuitously allowing the beating . . . of one prisoner by another serves no legitimate penological objective, any more than it squares with evolving standards of decency.” Odom v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 349 F.3d 765, 770 (2003) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. 833).
However, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To establish a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must satisfy two elements. “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.'” Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, a prisoner must present evidence that the prison officials had a “‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.'” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). That is, that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference.
To be deliberately indifferent, a prison official must “know of and disregard an objectively serious . . . risk of harm.” Rish v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997). “[T]he official must be both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a possibility of harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. A showing of mere negligence does not qualify as deliberate indifference. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986); Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999).
Additionally, under the qualified immunity defense, “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity ensures that “[o]fficials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.” Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992). Whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity is a question of law for the court and, when there are no relevant disputed material facts, a court should rule on the qualified immunity issue at the summary judgment stage. Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 558 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Ordinarily, the question of qualified immunity should be decided at the summary judgment stage.”).
To resolve a qualified immunity defense, the court must (1) determine whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Courts may address the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis in whichever order is appropriate in light of the circumstances of the particular case at hand. Id.
Here, the parties agree that an altercation occurred on September 27, 2022, and Plaintiff suffered physical harm. However, Defendants have submitted evidence that at no time did Plaintiff inform any of the Defendants that he was concerned for his safety prior to the incident. Although Plaintiff argues otherwise [see ECF No. 39 at 2], he has offered no evidence in support of his argument that he informed Holmes prior to the relevant altercation that he feared for his safety.
Additionally, Defendants argue:
It is important to note that Mr. Glass did not allege that he had reported to Sgt. Holmes that Mr. Robinson had threatened him when he was interviewed in the hospital after the subject incident, he did not make any grievance about this alleged notice, and he did not allege that he gave Sgt. Holmes notice in his original Complaint. Mr. Glass only made this allegation in his Amended Complaint after it appears he was advised that his Complaint was deficient and would be dismissed if an Amended Complaint did not contain such an allegation ....[ECF No. 32-1 at 5 (citations omitted))].
The court also notes that Plaintiff, without supporting evidence, alleges in his amended complaint that he informed Holmes that Robinson was drinking and had threatened Plaintiff [ECF No. 14 at 16], but in his response to Defendants' pending motion, he alleges he informed Holmes that Robinson had a knife and had threatened Plaintiff. [ECF No. 39 at 2].
The Supreme Court has held that “a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. In other words, “a prison official's subjective actual knowledge can be proven through circumstantial evidence showing, for example, that the substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known' about it.” Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). As the Fourth Circuit reasoned, “prison officials may not simply bury their heads in the sand and thereby skirt liability.” Id. However, the “heavy” burden of showing deliberate indifference lies with the prisoner. Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 325 (1986)).
Plaintiff has failed to carry the heavy burden showing that Defendants buried their heads in the sand or otherwise ignored an obvious risk to Plaintiff. The instant case stands in contrast, for example, to Cox v. Quinn, 828 F.3d 227, 239 (4th Cir. 2016), where the Fourth Circuit affirmed denial of qualified immunity based on the following evidence:
Plaintiff cites Harper v. Dourrette, 107 Fed.Appx. 444, 445 (5th Cir. 2004), where the court noted, in denying qualified immunity, “for purposes of this appeal, Harper's factual allegation must be taken as true that as the result of his oral request for protection, the appellants possessed the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” However, in Harper, unlike here, evidence was submitted in support of plaintiff's factual allegations.
Cox repeatedly informed the appellants that he was being threatened and robbed and that he feared for his safety, and his concerns were corroborated by other inmates. But the only action the correctional officers took in response to this information- despite the instructions of their sergeant-was to do the one thing Cox specifically warned them would increase the risk to his safety. And when confronted with Cox's concerns again, Miles just threw up his hands and walked away.Id.
Here, because there is no constitutional violation-much less a clear constitutional violation-Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion as to Plaintiff's claims against them.
Given the recommendation above, the court need not address Defendants' arguments concerning Eleventh Amendment immunity as to claims Plaintiff brings against them in their official capacities.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 32].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk united States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); united States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).