Opinion
Case Number 02-10144-BC.
December 19, 2002
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE
The plaintiff, Stephen H. Glagola, has filed a complaint for himself and on behalf of his three sons alleging that the defendants in various ways have interfered with his "constitutional rights" to raise his children. The Magistrate Judge, pursuant to an order of reference for general case management, directed the plaintiff to file amended pleadings because of the difficulty in discerning the plaintiff's claims from his initial filings. The latest iteration of the pleading is a Second Amended Supplemental Complaint and Information of Civil Rights Violations and Criminal Offenses. On June 24, 2002, after two previous requests were rejected, this Court granted the plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees and authorized the United States Marshall to effectuate service of the summons and complaint. The order of reference for general case management was entered the following day.
The plaintiff's latest pleading — the Second Amended Supplemental Complaint — contains 313 numbered paragraphs in 56 pages. He lists as defendants his former wife, her divorce lawyer, her parents, sister and friends, Cook County circuit judges, court-appointed "child representatives," the Flossmoor Public School District and certain of its employees, the Village of Flossmoor Police Department and certain police officers. The gravamen of the complaint is that the defendants have not allowed the plaintiff to enjoy his rights to custody and visitation which were allegedly awarded to him in his Illinois divorce, and his efforts to enforce those rights through the police and courts in Cook County, Illinois have been spurned by the public officials who have the authority to grant him the relief he seeks. The plaintiff alleges discrimination on the basis of disability and that various defendants violated his Fourth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
The plaintiff contends that this Court has jurisdiction to hear his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 3631; 42 U.S.C. § 2000a; 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 14141; 50 U.S.C. § 1809; and PL 93-579. The Magistrate Judge has filed a report and recommendation concluding otherwise. During the course of screening for merit, which is required for all cases in which the plaintiff is allowed to proceed without prepayment of fees, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997); Floyd v. U.S. Postal Service, 105 F.3d 274, (6th Cir. 1997), overruled in part by Callihan v. Schneider, 178 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 1999), the Magistrate Judge concluded that this Court lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the "domestic relations exception" to federal jurisdiction.
The plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation, filed on November 15, 2002, are contained in 200 numbered paragraphs on 42 pages. He contends that the Magistrate Judge has not adequately reviewed the plaintiff's voluminous submissions; the United States Marshall improperly refused to serve process on the defendants; the Magistrate Judge's determination that this case involves a child custody dispute mis-characterizes the plaintiff's claims, which are really based on his right to associate with his children and to exercise his liberty interest to raise and educate them as he sees fit, as the Supreme Court recognized in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); the Magistrate Judge's report contains errors concerning the number and nature of the plaintiff's filings, plaintiff's efforts to maintain contact with his children, and erroneous citations to statutory authority; the Magistrate Judge has not appreciated that the central focus of this case is on the deprivation of the plaintiff's civil rights under color of law, and is not merely a review of an adverse custody determination by a state court. The plaintiff also complains that he may not be able to adequately present his claims because of his disability (he alleges that he suffers from ADHD, or attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder) and his lack of legal training, and reminds the Court that he has requested the appointment of counsel.
The Court has conducted a de novo review of the pleadings in light of the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and the objections filed by the plaintiff, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). In conducting this review, the Court is mindful that a pro se litigant's complaint is to be construed liberally, Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 100 (6th Cir. 1991), and is held to "less stringent standards" than a complaint drafted by counsel. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nonetheless, such complaints still must plead facts sufficient to show a redressable legal wrong has been committed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Dekoven v. Bell, 140 F. Supp.2d 748, 755 (E.D.Mich. 2001).
The screening mandated by Congress in § 1915(e)(2) includes the obligation to dismiss civil complaints if they "fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); McGore, 114 F.3d at 604. Basic to the Court's ability to grant relief is jurisdiction to do so; "jurisdiction" is "a court's constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a case." United States v. Rayborn, No. 01-5632, 2002 WL 31728861, at ___ (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 2002). Jurisdiction is always a consideration throughout a federal lawsuit "[b]ecause lack of jurisdiction would make any decree in the case void and the continuation of the litigation in federal court futile." Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 864-65 (3d Cir. 1996). See also Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 339 (6th Cir. 1989).
In this case, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's characterization of the plaintiff's claims, that is, that he is attempting to obtain from this Court relief that apparently was denied him by the domestic relations judges in Illinois. He has not stated a claim in the nature of those considered by the Supreme Court in Pierce and Yoder. In those cases, parents challenged the authority of the state to interfere in family matters. Those cases did not involve disputes between custodial parents. Rather, in this case, the plaintiff complains that his former wife (and the mother of his sons) is not allowing him to be a parent to his children, either because she has the ear of Illinois state court judges, or because she is flouting their orders. Either way, the plaintiff's remedy is with the Illinois domestic relations court. It is not a dispute amenable to this Court's power and authority to adjudicate. "Even when brought under the guise of a federal question action, a suit whose substance is domestic relations generally will not be entertained in a federal court." Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981).
In order to grant the plaintiff the relief he seeks, this Court would also have to alter or amend the judgment and parenting agreements approved by the Illinois state courts. However, as explained by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to take such action.
The Sixth Circuit recently reviewed the foundation of this rule which has come to be known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine:
In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), the Supreme Court held that federal court review of state court proceedings is jurisdictionally limited to the Supreme Court of the United States by 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See also Patmon v. Michigan Sup.Ct., 224 F.3d 504, 506 (6th Cir. 2000). We refer to this doctrine as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). The Feldman Court stated that "United States District Courts . . . do not have jurisdiction . . . over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional. Review of those decisions may only be had in this Court." Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303. Tropf v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 936 (6th Cir. 2002).
Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine stands for the "simple . . . proposition that lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review a case litigated and decided in state court; only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments." Anderson v. Charter Township of Ypsilanti, 266 F.3d 487, 492 (6th Cir. 2001). The doctrine applies in two situations: (1) a direct attack of the substance of a state court decision and (2) a challenge to the procedures used by the state court to arrive at its decision. Id. at 493. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine includes cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of the "full faith and credit" given to state judicial proceedings. Gottfried v. Med. Planning Servs., Inc., 142 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1998).
Although the plaintiff's complaint alleges the violation of several federal statues, the gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint, as mentioned, is that various Illinois state courts and other individual actors conspired against him and wrongfully denied him custody and visitation rights with his children. This Court could not hear this case and grant the plaintiff the relief he seeks without declaring that the state court order was wrongly decided. See Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th Cir. 1998) ("Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment"). The plaintiff's claim in this Court for relief is inextricably intertwined with the state court's order and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the complaint.
The plaintiff's other objections do not affect the validity of these jurisdictional limitations. As noted above, the Court's obligation to screen pro se cases in which the plaintiff is allowed to proceed without prepayment of fees is well-established, and the fact that the Marshall has not served the pleadings does not alter that obligation. The Court also finds that the Magistrate Judge has adequately reviewed the plaintiff's filings, and any mistakes in the recitation of the facts in the Report and Recommendation are not material. Finally, the plaintiff does not have an absolute right to be represented by counsel in civil proceedings. See Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep't of Corrs., 65 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1995). "`[A]ppointment of counsel in a civil case is . . . a matter within the discretion of the court. It is a privilege not a right.'" Childs v. Pellegrin, 822 F.2d 1382, 1384 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting U.S. v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965)). Moreover, despite his alleged disability, the plaintiff has demonstrated in abundance his ability to formulate and present filings which articulate the issues he seeks to present to the Court.
The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge has correctly characterized the plaintiff's claims and has applied the correct law to the facts. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [dkt # 31] is ADOPTED.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiff's motions for the order of writ of habeas corpus with mandamus and protection [dkts # 8, 13] are DENIED as moot.