Giugni v. United States

7 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Bryant

    671 F.2d 450 (11th Cir. 1982)   Cited 23 times
    Finding no basis for defendant's claim of prejudice in joint peremptory challenge procedure where "[c]ounsel were informed prior to the beginning of voir dire of the procedure to be used and voiced no objection"

    As noted in the text, however, we need not decide in this case whether the statute as reenacted in 1948 applies to any United States vessel regardless of its connection, or lack of it, with commercial activity, because the SCHERZO was carrying cargo at the relevant time. Cf. Giugni v. United States, 127 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1942) (statute applies to "any vessel of foreign registry" whether or not it is engaged in or usable for foreign commerce). We hold, therefore, that § 2275 at least encompasses any vessel engaged in, or capable of being used in, commerce whether or not the vessel was designed and/or registered as a commercial ship.

  2. United States v. Hensel

    711 F.2d 1000 (11th Cir. 1983)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that trial court did not err in allowing witness with extensive background in arson investigation to testify as an expert on admiralty arson although most of his experience involved fires on land

    This argument was acknowledged and rejected over forty years ago. See Marchese, supra, 126 F.2d at 676 (5th Cir. 1942); Guigni v. United States, 127 F.2d 786, 791 (1st Cir. 1942). In Marchese we stated:

  3. United States v. Franicevich

    465 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1972)   Cited 6 times
    In Franicevich, similarly, the defendant used the admitted "commission of the substantive offense by six other persons both as [an attack on] the credibility of the four of those who testified, and as an orderly way of narrating the evidence."

    In United States v. Scaleggeri, 3 Cir. 1942, 126 F.2d 1023, that Circuit expressed itself as "in entire agreement with the reasoning" of the Fifth Circuit in Marchese and also as agreeing with the Fourth Circuit in Bersio. In Giugni v. United States, 1 Cir. 1942, 127 F.2d 786, 790, Judge Woodbury wrote: "There remains to be considered the question of whether or not the defendants harbored the specific criminal intent required for conviction under the statute.

  4. O'Malley v. United States

    227 F.2d 332 (1st Cir. 1955)   Cited 5 times

    In view of the concurrent sentences, these appeals must necessarily fail if the conviction of each of the defendants may be sustained as to either of the counts on which a verdict of guilty was returned. See Claassen v. United States, 1891, 142 U.S. 140, 12 S.Ct. 169, 35 L.Ed. 966; Sinclair v. United States, 1929, 279 U.S. 263, 299, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692; Jarvis v. United States, 1 Cir., 1937, 90 F.2d 243, 246-247; Giugni v. United States, 1 Cir., 1942, 127 F.2d 786, 792. Early in 1950 Hingham Management Corporation took possession of the Naval Industrial Reserve Shipyard at Hingham, Mass., with the personal property therein, under a lease from the government, at a nominal rental, for a term of five years, with an option in the lessee of extension, upon notice, for two additional terms of five years each.

  5. Gaunt v. United States

    184 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1951)   Cited 64 times
    In Gaunt v. United States, 184 F.2d 284, 291 n. 4 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 917, 71 S.Ct. 350, 95 L.Ed. 662 (1951), we approved a jury instruction that wilfulness was not proven where defendant was negligent or even grossly negligent.

    See Jarvis v. United States, 1 Cir., 1937, 90 F.2d 243, 246-247. Giugni v. United States, 1 Cir., 1942, 127 F.2d 786, 792.

  6. Polonio v. United States

    131 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1942)   Cited 2 times

    Second, that another section of the same statute, (Title II, Sec. 3, 50 U.S.C.A. § 193), specifically applies to the officers and members of the crew who cause or permit the destruction or injury of their vessel and, consequently, the general word "whoever" in T. III, Sec. 1, must yield to the more specific words "owner", etc., in T. II, Sec. 3. Each of these arguments has been considered and determined adversely to the appellants by the Circuit Courts of Appeals of the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits. In the First Circuit, Giugni v. United States, 127 F.2d 786; Third Circuit, in United States v. Scaleggeri et al., 126 F.2d 1023; Fourth Circuit, in Bersio v. United States, 124 F.2d 310; Fifth Circuit, in Marchese v. United States, 126 F.2d 671. "Title II. Vessels in ports of the United States. * * *

  7. State v. Hale

    463 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1971)   Cited 13 times
    In Hale, the police found the defendant and another person hooking a tow cable to a stranded car in an attempt to tow it away. Hale, 463 S.W.2d at 870.

    Keefe v. Donnell, 92 Me. 151, 42 A. 345, 348. "Tamper" has been used in federal statutes making it an offense to tamper with the motive power or instrumentalities of navigation of certain vessels. See Giugni v. United States, 1st Cir., 127 F.2d 786, 790; Bersio v. United States, 4th Cir., 124 F.2d 310, 314 (holding "tamper" means "any sort of improper interference with the machinery"); see other cases cited in 41 Words and Phrases 147, and State v. Ridinger, 266 S.W.2d l. c. 630, which stated a Webster Dictionary definition of "tamper" as "to interfere improperly." Under § 560.175(2) certain acts of trespassing in a car or around it are made a misdemeanor.