See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (the Due Process Clause protections are at least as great as those under the Eighth Amendment); 1 M.B. Mushlin, Rights of Prisoners § 2.02 (2d ed. Supp. 2001) (same). An alleged Eighth Amendment violation is analyzed according to the framework laid out in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), as further explicated in Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1999), and Calderón-Ortiz v. LaBoy-Alvarado, 300 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2002). Prison officials have a responsibility not to be deliberately indifferent to the risk to prisoners of violence at the hands of other prisoners.

307 F.3d at 9. There, we noted that we vacated summary judgment in the defendants' favor in Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1999), where "jail officials inexplicably introduced a person posing a known danger, another inmate who had repeatedly threatened Giroux, into the holding cell where Giroux was being kept." Burrell, 307 F.3d at 9.

By contrast, a similarly placed official may not be found liable if he "'respond[s] reasonably to the risk,'" whether or not the harm is avoided. Giroux v. Somerset Cnty., 178 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844). The First Circuit's application of Farmer provides guidance as to how the deliberate indifference standard applies in situations similar to this case.

This standard is analogous to “the standard for criminal recklessness.” Giroux v. Somerset Cnty., 178 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir.1999); see also Alsina–Ortiz v. Laboy, 400 F.3d 77, 82 (1st Cir.2005) (“Willful blindness and deliberate indifference are not mere negligence; these concepts are directed at a form of scienter in which the official culpably ignores or turns away from what is otherwise apparent.”). In Farmer, the Supreme Court further explained that “[w]hether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.”

Prison officials, therefore, have a duty to ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take "reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates."Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). Not every deprivation, however, gives rise to an Eighth Amendment claim.

More specifically, it was clearly established law that prison officials were constitutionally required to "take reasonable measures to guarantee inmates' safety from attacks by other inmates." Calderón-Ortiz, 300 F.3d at 64; see also Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1999); Ayala Serrano v. Gonzalez, 909 F.2d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]t is well established that prison officials have a constitutional duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners" (citations and internal quotations omitted)). The First Circuit has vacated a summary judgment decision where "jail officials inexplicably introduced a person posing a known danger, another inmate who had repeatedly threatened [the plaintiff], into the holding cell where [the plaintiff] was being kept."

Establishing an Eighth Amendment violation by prison officials based upon conditions of confinement requires proof that the conditions presented a "substantial risk of serious harm," and that the official has "a sufficiently culpable state of mind described as deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety." Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1999). a. Conditions of Confinement Claim

Conditions of confinement and the treatment afforded sentenced prisoners is subject to the Eighth Amendment restraints against "cruel and unusual punishments". Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 128 L.Ed.2d 811, 822 (1994);Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1999). Pretrial detainees, on the other hand, "are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth amendment; however, the standard to be applied is the same as that used in Eighth Amendment cases."

To state a constitutional prison conditions violation, Mandeville must demonstrate that he was subjected to a deprivation that was objectively "sufficiently serious," and that the official who caused the deprivation was "deliberately indifferent" to his needs. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 303 (1991); Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1999). A challenged condition of housing may be objectively "sufficiently serious" standing alone or in combination with other conditions, if it deprives the inmate of an identifiable, human need.

To the extent that Ulmann is objecting to the adequacy of the nutritional value of the diet he was given, rather than a religiously based objection to the diet MCHC provided to him, jail officials have a duty to provide inmates with adequate food because inmates are not in a position to provide it themselves. See Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1999). Further, there is no legitimate penological justification for inadequate portions of food. O'Connor v. Huard, 117 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1047 (1998).