{¶ 38} In fact, making charity available only to a specific group may be essential to the core activity of the charitable institution, or it may be unavoidable due to the charity's lack of resources. A decision by the Girl Scouts of America, for example, to restrict membership to females would not lead us to question its status as a charitable institution, see Girl Scouts–Great Trail Council v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 24, 2007-Ohio-972, 862 N.E.2d 493, ¶ 20 ; nor does a food pantry such as the Mid–Ohio Foodbank lose its charitable exemption because it limits its charity to the poor and needy rather than opening its doors to the general public. {¶ 39} The majority reasons that residential use of property is necessarily a private, noncharitable use.
By contrast, where an institution that engages in charitable activity has sought to exempt its administrative offices, we have typically recognized a charitable exemption for those offices even if it appears that some portion of the institution's charitable activity takes place off premises. See Community Health Professionals, Inc. v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 432, 2007-Ohio-2336, 866 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 2-4, 23 (charitable institution that provides home healthcare could exempt its administrative offices consistently with R.C. 5709.121); Girl Scouts-Great Trail Council v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 24, 2007-Ohio-972, 862 N.E.2d 493, ¶ 2 (recognizing an exemption for a building containing regional administrative offices of the Girl Scouts); Herb Soc. of Am., Inc. v. Tracy (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 643 N.E.2d 1132 (organizational headquarters of a society engaged in charitable diffusion of knowledge to the public constituted the exempt offices of a charitable institution). {¶ 12} In order to avoid the more limited scope of the public-worship exemption, COGNO seeks exemption solely under R.C. 5709.12(B).
See Cincinnati v. Testa, 143 Ohio St.3d 371, 2015-Ohio-1775, 38 N.E.3d 847, ¶ 24 (minor surplus in fund for city golf course “does not constitute ‘profit’ that would violate the limitation of R.C. 5709.121(A)(2) ”); South–Western City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Kinney, 24 Ohio St.3d 184, 186, 494 N.E.2d 1109 (1986) (renting of apartment on public golf course, operation of pro shop, and operation of snack shop did not violate “view to profit” limitation); Girl Scouts–Great Trail Council v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 24, 2007-Ohio-972, 862 N.E.2d 493, ¶ 17–18 (store in Girl Scout headquarters selling scout-related items at slight profit did not violate “view to profit” criterion).{¶ 45} Instructive here is the discussion in Girl ScoutsofBowers v. Akron City Hosp., 16 Ohio St.2d 94, 243 N.E.2d 95 (1968), in support of its holding that the mere generation of a profit does not necessarily defeat the claim of exemption.
The fact that the DCI lease generates revenue for Rural Health does not by itself destroy Rural Health's status as a charitable institution. See Girl Scouts–Great Trail Council v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 24, 2007-Ohio-972, 862 N.E.2d 493, ¶ 17 ; Community Health Professionals, Inc. v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 432, 2007-Ohio-2336, 866 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 23. • The commissioner points out that Rural Health has no employees of its own and that it uses the employees of its member institutions.
To be sure, we have held that charitable activities may generate incidental revenue and still qualify as charitable. Community Health Professionals, Inc. v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 432, 2007-Ohio-2336, 866 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 23; Girl Scouts-Great Trail Council v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 24, 2007-Ohio-972, 862 N.E.2d 493, ¶ 17. But that does not mean, as Northeast appears to suggest, that all income-producing activities will qualify as charitable merely because their proceeds are applied to charitable purposes.
Id. at 130, 6 O.O.3d 343, 370 N.E.2d 465. Similarly, in Am. Chem. Soc. v. Kinney (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 167, 23 O.O.3d 197, 431 N.E.2d 1007, we concluded that the BTA, in failing to grant a real estate tax exemption, had "ignored the integral connection which has been shown to exist between [the charitable institution's] use of the land in question and [its] purpose for existence." Id. at 171, 23 O.O.3d 197, 431 N.E.2d 1007; see, also, Girl Scouts-Great Trail Council v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 24, 2007-Ohio-972, 862 N.E.2d 493. {¶ 22} We acknowledge the position of the Tax Commissioner that CHP does not use its property in furtherance of or incidently to its charitable purposes, because it charges patients for services rendered, accepts payment from private and government sources, writes off unpaid amounts, and does not offer its services free of charge or in accordance with a sliding scale.
Accordingly, "the standard of review for a matter appealed from the BTA is whether the decision 'is reasonable and lawful.' " Girl Scouts - Great Trail Council v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 24, 2007-Ohio-972, ¶ 9. {¶ 7} We initially consider arguments raised under the third, fourth, and sixth assignments of error of appellant's pro se brief.
{¶ 12} The fact that Craftsmen generates revenue from some uses of its property does not necessarily defeat its claim for charitable status. See Girl Scouts–Great Trail Council v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 24, 2007-Ohio-972, 862 N.E.2d 493, ¶ 20. At the same time, an organization does not qualify as charitable merely because the revenue from its income-producing activities is applied to charitable purposes.
In contrast, the Commissioner argues that statutes conferring administrative jurisdiction must be strictly construed. {¶ 11} In Girl Scouts-Great Trail Council v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 24, 2007-Ohio-972, 862 N.E.2d 493, the Supreme Court of Ohio articulated the following standard of review for appeals of BTA decisions: R.C. 5717.04 sets forth the appropriate standard of review for matters on appeal from the Board of Tax Appeals: "If upon hearing and consideration of [the] record and evidence the court decides that the decision of the board appealed from is reasonable and lawful it shall affirm the same * * *."
Further, we acknowledged in Ameritech Publishing, Inc. v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 114, 2006-Ohio-5337, 855 N.E.2d 440, that "'[t]he BTA is responsible for determining factual issues and, if the record contains reliable and probative support for these BTA determinations,' this court will affirm them." Id. at ¶ 5, quoting Am. Natl. Can Co. v. Tracy (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 150, 152, 648 N.E.2d 483. Girl Scouts-Great Trail Council v. Levin, 113 Ohio St. 3d 24, 25, 2007-Ohio-972, 862 N.E.2d 493, 495, ¶ 9. {¶ 40} We initially note that contrary to Johnson's assertions, the BOR issued a decision on his complaint in that it decided to maintain the Auditor's valuation.