Those states that have adopted a cause of action for parents for the loss of a childs consortium include die following in reverse chronological order. United States v. Dempsey, 635 So.2d 961 (Fla. 1994); Jameson v. Hawthorne, 635 A.2d 1167 (R.I. 1994); Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.App. 1994); Pino v. Gather, 633 So.2d 638 (La App. 1993); Gallimore v. Childrens Hospital Medical Center, supra, 67 Ohio St.3d 244; Gillispie v. Beta Construction Co., 842 P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992); Masaki v. General Motors, 71 Haw. 1, 780 P.2d 566 (1989); Davis v. Elizabeth General Medical Center, 228 N.J. Super. 17, 548 A.2d 528 (1988); Jacobs v. Anderson Building Co., 430 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1988); Frank, M. C., P.C. v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955 (1986); Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis.2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975); Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952); see also Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231, § 85X (Law. Co-op. Sup. 1994); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.010 (West 1988). The courts in Illinois are divided: compare Barkei v. Delnor Hospital, 176 Ill. App.3d 681, 531 N.E.2d 413 (1988) (no cause of action) with Dymek v. Nyquist, 128 Ill. App.3d 859, 469 N.E.2d 659 (1984) (recognizing cause of action).

See, e.g., Sizemore, 422 N.W.2d at 674 n. 27; Powell v. American Motors Corp., 834 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1992); McCaskill v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 419 Pa. Super. 313, 615 A.2d 382, 386 (1982); Boucher, 850 P.2d at 1186.See Idaho Code § 5-310; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231 § 85X; R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-41; Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.010; Gillispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992) (Alaska Stat. § 09.15.010 creates separate parental cause of. action that includes right to recover loss of society damages); Madison v. Colby, 348 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 1984) (recognition of claim of loss of filial consortium based on Ia. R. Civ. P. 8). Jurisdictions that have judicially adopted the claim view the adoption of consortium claims as within the responsibility of judicial authority.

Recovery is permitted pursuant to statutory language (i.e. "general loss" or "pecuniary loss") in the following states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Vermont. See Gillispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992); Frank v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 955 (Ariz. 1986); Perry v. Medina, 237 Cal.Rptr. 532 (5th Dist. 1987); Checketts v. Bowman, 220 P.2d 682 (Idaho 1950); Bullard v. Barnes, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (Ill. 1984); Vincent v. Morgan's L. T.R. S.S. Co., 74 So. 541 (La. 1917); Fussner v. Andert, 113 N.W.2d 355 (Minn.

Adsuna argues that, because the policy only refers specifically to "damages for care and loss of services," the per passenger limit does not apply to his claims for loss of society of a minor child, which in Alaska is a cause of action arising under a different statute than the one that allows spouses and dependents to recover for loss of consortium. SeeGillespie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992) (holding that parent could not recover loss of society damages for death of child under Alaska's wrongful death statute, Alaska Stat. § 09.55.580, but could recover under statute providing for suits by parents of deceased minor children, Alaska Stat. § 09.15.010). This argument is unpersuasive, given that the policy language refers to "all damages, including damages for care and loss of services" caused by the accident.

Recovery is permitted pursuant to statutory language (i.e. "general loss" or "pecuniary loss") in the following states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Vermont. See Gillispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992); Frank v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955 (1986); Perry v. Medina, 192 Cal.App.3d 603, 237 Cal.Rptr. 532 (5th Dist. 1987); Checketts v. Bowman, 70 Idaho 463, 220 P.2d 682 (1950); Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill.2d 505, 82 Ill.Dec. 448, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (1984); Vincent v. Morgan's L. T.R. S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961); Louisville N.R. Co. v. Whisenant, 214 Miss. 421, 58 So.2d 908 (1952); Davis v. Smith, 152 Mont. 170, 448 P.2d 133 (1968); Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686 (1973); Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980); Saguid v. Kingston Hosp., 213 A.D.2d 770, 623 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y.App. Div. 1995), appeal dismissed, 87 N.Y.2d 861, 639 N.Y.S.2d 312, 662 N.E.2d 793, leave to appeal dismissed by 88 N.Y.2d 868, 644 N.Y.S.2d 686, 667 N.E.2d 337 (1996); Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85 (N.D. 1988); Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297 (1950); Anderson v. Lale, 88 S.D. 111,

See generally Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d 356, 365 (Alaska 1987).See AS 09.15.010; Gillispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Alaska 1992) (AS 09.15.010 creates parental cause of action for loss of child separate from wrongful death action brought by child's estate). In negotiating the Wolds' claims, then, Allstate recognized and accepted that the Wolds were asserting each of their claims against both Smith's liability and UM/UIM policies: Allstate thus assumed that the estate could potentially recover $100,000 plus add-ons (attorney's fees and interest) on its wrongful death claim under each of Smith's policies and that Cynthia could potentially recover an additional $100,000 plus add-ons on her bystander NIED claim under each of those policies.

But most courts recognize the inconsistency in permitting parental consortium claims but denying those for filial consortium. See, e.g., Gillispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Alaska 1992) ("We have already held that a wife has the right to sue for loss of 'care, comfort, companionship and solace' resulting from an injury to her husband, and that a child is entitled to loss of consortium damages when his parent is tortiously injured. To now hold that a parent is not entitled to recover loss of society for the death of his or her child would run counter to this line of precedent."); Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Ky. 1997); Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 434 (Mich. 1981) (Levin, J., dissenting); Pence v. Fox, 813 P.2d 429, 433 (Mont. 1991); Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (Ohio 1993).

When a word or phrase has previously been legislatively defined or judicially construed in a particular way, we are to presume (in the absence of evidence to the contrary) that later-enacted statutes carry forward the existing meaning of that word or phrase.Gillispie v. Beta Construction Co., 842 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Alaska 1992); see City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201, 207-08 (Alaska 1962); Patterson v. State, 708 P.2d 712, 716 (Alaska App. 1985); and see Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651, 659 (Alaska App. 1985). Second, to the extent that the meaning of "treatment" remains ambiguous, we must interpret it in favor of the defendant and against the State.

Jackson was insured by Allstate, which paid one $50,000 liability policy limit, plus add ons, to the Estate of Heather Dowdy to settle its claims for wrongful death, and one $50,000 liability policy limit, plus add ons, to the Dowdys to settle their claims for NIED, loss of society, and punitive damages. The Dowdys assert their NIED claim under Beck v. State, 837 P.2d 105, 109-11 (Alaska 1992), their loss of society claim under Gillispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992), and their punitive damages claim under State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 26 P.3d 1074, 1079-81 (Alaska 2001). This petition for review requires that we consider whether the claims should be arbitrated or judicially tried, not to assess the merits of the liability claims.

Doc. 46 at 16. 842 P.2d 1272 (1992). AS § 09.15.010.