Thus, the Alaska statutes do not allow the nondependent sibling of a wrongful death victim to assert a wrongful death claim for nonpecuniary harm. AS 09.55.580(a); Gillispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Alaska 1992) ("When the decedent is not survived by dependents, the statute limits recovery to pecuniary loss,").Cf.

Adsuna argues that, because the policy only refers specifically to "damages for care and loss of services," the per passenger limit does not apply to his claims for loss of society of a minor child, which in Alaska is a cause of action arising under a different statute than the one that allows spouses and dependents to recover for loss of consortium. SeeGillespie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992) (holding that parent could not recover loss of society damages for death of child under Alaska's wrongful death statute, Alaska Stat. § 09.55.580, but could recover under statute providing for suits by parents of deceased minor children, Alaska Stat. § 09.15.010). This argument is unpersuasive, given that the policy language refers to "all damages, including damages for care and loss of services" caused by the accident.

Jackson was insured by Allstate, which paid one $50,000 liability policy limit, plus add ons, to the Estate of Heather Dowdy to settle its claims for wrongful death, and one $50,000 liability policy limit, plus add ons, to the Dowdys to settle their claims for NIED, loss of society, and punitive damages. The Dowdys assert their NIED claim under Beck v. State, 837 P.2d 105, 109-11 (Alaska 1992), their loss of society claim under Gillispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992), and their punitive damages claim under State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 26 P.3d 1074, 1079-81 (Alaska 2001). This petition for review requires that we consider whether the claims should be arbitrated or judicially tried, not to assess the merits of the liability claims.

But most courts recognize the inconsistency in permitting parental consortium claims but denying those for filial consortium. See, e.g., Gillispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Alaska 1992) ("We have already held that a wife has the right to sue for loss of 'care, comfort, companionship and solace' resulting from an injury to her husband, and that a child is entitled to loss of consortium damages when his parent is tortiously injured. To now hold that a parent is not entitled to recover loss of society for the death of his or her child would run counter to this line of precedent."); Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Ky. 1997); Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 434 (Mich. 1981) (Levin, J., dissenting); Pence v. Fox, 813 P.2d 429, 433 (Mont. 1991); Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (Ohio 1993).

See generally Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d 356, 365 (Alaska 1987).See AS 09.15.010; Gillispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Alaska 1992) (AS 09.15.010 creates parental cause of action for loss of child separate from wrongful death action brought by child's estate). In negotiating the Wolds' claims, then, Allstate recognized and accepted that the Wolds were asserting each of their claims against both Smith's liability and UM/UIM policies: Allstate thus assumed that the estate could potentially recover $100,000 plus add-ons (attorney's fees and interest) on its wrongful death claim under each of Smith's policies and that Cynthia could potentially recover an additional $100,000 plus add-ons on her bystander NIED claim under each of those policies.

While the majority view currently appears the be the rule advocated by the defendants, see Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 133 (Jefferson, J., dissenting), a growing number of states have joined the progressive trend in recognizing filial consortium claims. See, e.g., Gillispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Alaska 1992); Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 578 (Haw. 1989); United States v. Dempsey, 635 So.2d 961, 964-65 (Fla. 1994); Gallimore, 617 N.E.2d at 1057 (Ohio); Shockley, 225 N.W.2d at 501 (Wisconsin). Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, however, the instant proceedings are still at a relatively early stage.

Doc. 46 at 16. 842 P.2d 1272 (1992). AS § 09.15.010.

See Iowa Code Ann. § 613.15A (West 2018); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 231, § 85X (LexisNexis 2009); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1055 (West 2015); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-41 (c) (2012); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 1492 (b) (Cum. Supp. 2024); Wn. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.010 (West Cum. Supp. 2025); see also Gillispiev. Beta Construction Co., 842 P.2d 1272, 1273-74 (Alaska 1992) (construing § 09.15.010 of Alaska Statutes); Haywardv. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 425, 242 P.2d 971 (1952) (construing §§ 5-310 and 5-311 of Idaho Code). We have included in this category states that have recognized a cause of action for loss of filial consortium arising from the wrongful death of a child but have not resolved the question of whether there is a cause of action for parents of an injured child.

See, e.g., Sizemore, 422 N.W.2d at 674 n. 27; Powell v. American Motors Corp., 834 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1992); McCaskill v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 419 Pa. Super. 313, 615 A.2d 382, 386 (1982); Boucher, 850 P.2d at 1186.See Idaho Code § 5-310; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231 § 85X; R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-41; Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.010; Gillispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992) (Alaska Stat. § 09.15.010 creates separate parental cause of. action that includes right to recover loss of society damages); Madison v. Colby, 348 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 1984) (recognition of claim of loss of filial consortium based on Ia. R. Civ. P. 8). Jurisdictions that have judicially adopted the claim view the adoption of consortium claims as within the responsibility of judicial authority.

Those states that have adopted a cause of action for parents for the loss of a childs consortium include die following in reverse chronological order. United States v. Dempsey, 635 So.2d 961 (Fla. 1994); Jameson v. Hawthorne, 635 A.2d 1167 (R.I. 1994); Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.App. 1994); Pino v. Gather, 633 So.2d 638 (La App. 1993); Gallimore v. Childrens Hospital Medical Center, supra, 67 Ohio St.3d 244; Gillispie v. Beta Construction Co., 842 P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992); Masaki v. General Motors, 71 Haw. 1, 780 P.2d 566 (1989); Davis v. Elizabeth General Medical Center, 228 N.J. Super. 17, 548 A.2d 528 (1988); Jacobs v. Anderson Building Co., 430 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1988); Frank, M. C., P.C. v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955 (1986); Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis.2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975); Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952); see also Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231, § 85X (Law. Co-op. Sup. 1994); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.010 (West 1988). The courts in Illinois are divided: compare Barkei v. Delnor Hospital, 176 Ill. App.3d 681, 531 N.E.2d 413 (1988) (no cause of action) with Dymek v. Nyquist, 128 Ill. App.3d 859, 469 N.E.2d 659 (1984) (recognizing cause of action).