Thus Plaintiff's “suspicions constitute only speculation and conclusory assertions,” which “do not rise to the level . . . that would justify jurisdictional discovery.” Gillison v. Lead Express, Inc., No. 3:16CV41, 2018 WL 6537151, at *7 (E.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2018).
Putting aside the form of Plaintiff s request, the Court will nevertheless deny Plaintiffs request on the merits, because it finds that such a general demand for jurisdictional discovery to be overbroad and unsupported by "specific and substantive" allegations of the relationship between Defendant and the forum state. Compare Gillison v. Lead Express, Inc., 2018 WL 6537151, at *7 (E.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2018) (in FCRA case, denying plaintiffs request for all contracts pertaining to obtaining or selling plaintiffs credit information as overbroad, because the request lacked specificity), with Mamo v. BP P.L.C., 2006 WL 572327, at *2 (Mar. 7, 2006 E.D. Va.) (permitting jurisdictional discovery when plaintiff made "specific and substantive" allegations regarding personal jurisdiction and submitted a declaration and documents discussing some of the defendant's contacts with forum state).
Federal courts exercise personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed under state law for the state in which they sit. See New Wellington Fin. Corp. v. Flagship Resort Dev. Corp, 416 F.3d 290, 294 (4th Cir. 2005); Gillison v. Lead Express, Inc., No.3:16cv41, 2018 WL 6537151, *5 (E.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2018). Personal jurisdiction must comport with both state law and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
His contention that the defendants, "both individually and acting as conspirators in concert and together ... participated in ... electronically communicating and/or mailing a damaging defamatory and tortious letter and email" to Virginia Tech is factually unsupported. See Gillison v. Lead Express. Inc., No. 3:16CV41, 2018 WL 6537151, at *4 (E.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2018) (citing Machulsky v. HaIl, 210 F.Supp.2d 531, 537 (D.N.J. 2002) for the proposition that "[a]t no point may a plaintiff rely on the bare pleadings alone in order to withstand a defendant's ... motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction" (citation omitted) ). Indeed, Edwards concedes that the Letter only "may have ... been saved on and distributed from other defendants' computers."