Giles appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment in a published opinion, stating that if an occupant of a house maintains it "for immediate or rapid habitation;" inhabits it "on a usual or periodic basis;" and, in periods of absence, "intend[s] to return to the house within a usual or periodic time," the house is a dwelling house under Code § 18.2-89. Giles v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 449, 458-59, 658 S.E.2d 703, 708 (2008). The Court of Appeals concluded that a person may have multiple dwelling houses so long as each house has "humans sleep in it and engage in other functions typically associated with habitation."

"The act of choosing carefully some words necessarily implies others are omitted with equal care." Kerns v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 296 Va. 146, 156, 818 S.E.2d 779 (2018) (quoting In re: Brown , 295 Va. 202, 223, 810 S.E.2d 444 (2018) ). "Although we strictly construe penal statutes against the Commonwealth, ... ‘we will not apply "an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute that would subvert the legislative intent expressed therein." ’ " Giles v. Commonwealth , 51 Va. App. 449, 453, 658 S.E.2d 703 (2008) (quoting Armstrong v. Commonwealth , 263 Va. 573, 581, 562 S.E.2d 139 (2002) ), aff'd , 277 Va. 369, 672 S.E.2d 879 (2009). "[T]he word ‘occupying’ ‘denotes a physical presence in or on a place or object.’ "

1985); State v. Albert, 426 A.2d 1370, 1374 (Me. 1981)). We took a narrower view of dwelling house in Giles v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 449, 458-59, 658 S.E.2d 703, 708 (2008). Though our holding was affirmed, the Virginia Supreme Court expressly rejected our view that a house must be "regularly used" and that "the temporal aspect of habitation is a significant factor in the analysis whether a structure is a dwelling house."

“ ‘When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts are bound by the plain meaning of that language and may not assign the words a construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly did not mean what it actually stated.’ ” Giles v. Commonwealth, 51 Va.App. 449, 452–53, 658 S.E.2d 703, 705 (2008) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “ ‘[t]he rule is that when one statute speaks to a subject in a general way and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more specific manner, the two should be harmonized, if possible, and where they conflict, the latter prevails.’ ”

However, given the previous review by the Virginia appellate courts, "dwelling house" has a more limited meaning. The Commonwealth claims on brief that "Virginia courts have not had occasion to address the narrow question presented here" and cites a footnote in this Court's previous decision in Giles v. Commonwealth, 51 Va.App. 449, 453, 658 S.E.2d 703, 705 (2008), aff'd on alt. gds., 277 Va. 369, 672 S.E.2d 879 (2009). Technically, the Commonwealth may be correct, as the Virginia appellate courts have only addressed the definition of "dwelling house" in the context of convictions under a different burglary statute — Code § 18.2-89 — not Code § 18.2-91, under which appellant was convicted here.