Opinion
C/A No. 5:16-3395-JMC-KDW
02-28-2017
James Franklin Gilbert, III, Plaintiff, v. Cpt. Tucker Lauren County Johnson Detention Center Laurens County, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
(partial summary dismissal)
This is a civil action filed pro se by a state prison inmate. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the district court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e); 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal). I. Factual Background
James Franklin Gilbert, III ("Plaintiff") formerly was detained at the Laurens County Johnson Detention Center ("LCJDC") and raises several claims that arose there between July 11, 2016 and September 7, 2016 and was "still happening." ECF No. 1 at 9. Plaintiff alleges that he was not allowed to have writing and mail supplies, was not allowed any hygienic supplies, and was not allowed to get haircuts during his detention. Id. at 4-5, 7. According to Plaintiff, he was told that it was the jail's policy to disallow writing and hygienic supplies because of the level of his custody status. Id. at 7. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered mental anguish and had to begin taking medication for stress for the first time while he was housed under the alleged conditions. Id. at 8. Plaintiff requests damages and injunctive relief. Id. II. Standard of Review
Records of the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC") indicate Plaintiff began serving his sentence at an SCDC facility on October 27, 2016. http://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2017). See Jeandron v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Md., 510 F. App'x 223, 227 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating the court may take judicial notice of information on a web site, "so long as the web site's authenticity is not in dispute.").
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's pro se Complaint filed in this case. This review has been conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 630 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Even under this less stringent standard, the Complaint filed in this case is subject to partial summary dismissal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). III. Discussion
Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant LCJDC because the detention center is not a person. It is well settled that only "persons" may act under color of state law; therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a "person." See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (noting that for purposes of § 1983 a "person" includes individuals and "bodies politic and corporate"). For example, several courts have held that inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds do not act under color of state law. See Preval v. Reno, 57 F. Supp. 2d 307, 310 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a 'person,' and therefore not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1989) ("Claims under § 1983 are directed at 'persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit."). Additionally, use of the term "staff" or the equivalent as a name for alleged defendants, without the naming of specific staff members, is not adequate to state a claim against a "person" as required in § 1983 actions. See Barnes v. Baskerville Corr. Cen. Med. Staff, No. 3:07CV195, 2008 WL 2564779 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2008). Here, Defendant LCJDC is a building or group of buildings and, as such, it does not qualify as a person subject to suit under § 1983. Thus, no plausible claim is stated as to this Defendant.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleging problems with the conditions of his confinement in a county jail is properly before this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private civil cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badges of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails. No other basis for this court to exercise jurisdiction over this case is evident on the face of the pleading.
With respect to Defendant Laurens County, Plaintiff has presented no allegations to show that the county was responsible for alleged policy at issue or that Laurens County even had any control or jurisdiction over LCJDC. This lack of allegations results in failure to state a plausible § 1983 claim against the county. A plaintiff must show that a county itself has somehow violated federal rights. A single act or isolated incident does not provide causation sufficient to hold a county or municipality liable on the basis of custom or usage. Nelson v. Strawn, 897 F. Supp. 252, 259 (D.S.C. 1995); see also Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1994). In order to maintain a § 1983 municipal-liability claim, a plaintiff must affirmatively establish that the alleged constitutional violation was directly caused by an official practice, policy, or custom of the municipality. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Because there are no allegations that the county had any control over the detention center policies of which Plaintiff complains, there is no showing that the constitutional violations of which Plaintiff complains were directly caused by an official practice, policy or custom of the municipality. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible cause of action against this Defendant. IV. Recommendation
Accordingly, it is recommended that the district court partially dismiss the Complaint in this case without prejudice as to Defendants Laurens County Johnson Detention Center and Laurens County. See Brown v. Briscoe, 998 F.2d 201, 202-04 (4th Cir. 1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal). The Complaint should be served on Defendant Tucker.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. February 28, 2017
Florence, South Carolina
/s/
Kaymani D. West
United States Magistrate Judge
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
"Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).