Gibson v. Phillips

Full title: CURTIS GIBSON Petitioner, v. WILLIAM E. PHILLIPS, Respondent

Court: United States District Court, S.D. New York

Date published: Apr 3, 2006

05 Civ. 3739 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2006)

Opinion

05 Civ. 3739 (AKH).

April 3, 2006

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

ALVIN HELLERSTEIN, District Judge

By Order dated March 14, 2006, I denied on the merits this petition pursuant to Section 2254, Title 28, United States Code for a writ of habeas corpus. In the March 14 Order, however, I also issued a certificate of appealability ("COA") granting petitioner the right to appeal my decision to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. I limited the COA to one specific issue: petitioner's claim that a statement he made to police on October 14, 1997, without prior waiver of his Miranda rights and while incarcerated in state prison, was improperly admitted into evidence by the trial court in violation of his constitutional rights. Respondent now requests that I reconsider issuance of the COA. For the reasons stated below, I deny respondent's motion.

A COA may issue in a habeas case "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Supreme Court teaches that "[a] petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (citing Slack, 529 U.S. at 484).

Respondent claims that petitioner has failed to meet this standard because petitioner failed to challenge the admission into evidence of his October 14, 1997 interview with police on direct appeal. Respondent argues that petitioner has no prospect of succeeding on the merits due to his failure to exhaust state claims and consequent procedural default. While petitioner's brief on direct appeal specifically disavowed the claimed constitutional breach because, at that time, petitioner did not believe the October 14 statement was inculpatory, the COA is still appropriate. Reversing my decision to issue a COA would only raise the prospect of a further claim that petitioner's appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the October 14 statement. It is more appropriate to allow the Court of Appeals to review all of these matters and make a final determination of petitioner's claims.

I therefore deny respondent's motion to reconsider my March 14 Order.

SO ORDERED.