Opinion
8:22-cv-03158-DCC-JDA
01-05-2024
Chad Austin Gibson, Plaintiff, v. Oconee County Sheriff's Office, School District of Oconee County, Jesus De Luna Soto, Robert Sparkman, James Freeman Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant School District of Oconee County (the “School District”). [Doc. 35.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff filed this action, asserting various claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of his encounter with law enforcement in Seneca, South Carolina, on September 16, 2020, as well as several state law claims arising out of the same facts. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on December 16, 2022, and a Second Amended Complaint on August 3, 2023. [Docs. 6; 29.]
On August 17, 2023, the School District filed a motion to dismiss the two claims in which it was named as a defendant, which are state law claims for false imprisonment and civil conspiracy. [Doc. 35.] Plaintiff filed a response and the School District filed a reply on August 31 and September 7, 2023. [Docs. 37; 38.] The motion is now ripe for review.
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from the Second Amended Complaint. [Doc. 29.]
On September 16, 2020, Plaintiff attended a football game at Seneca High School, which the School District operates. [Doc. 29 ¶ 19.] Because Plaintiff was not wearing a mask, School District employees informed him, pursuant to the School District's COVID-19 policy, that he would need to leave the game if he did not put one on. [Id. ¶¶ 24, 26.] Plaintiff decided to leave. [Id. ¶ 28.] School District employee Carson Isaac Lecroy told Oconee County Sheriff's Office (“OCSO”) employee Defendant Jesus De Luna Soto that Plaintiff “yelled an expletive upon leaving the stadium.” [Id. ¶¶ 4, 24, 31, 142.] Accordingly, Lecroy “ordered [Soto] to detain Plaintiff and issue a no-trespass on Plaintiff while on the premises.” [Id. ¶ 142; see id. ¶ 32.]
South Carolina Code section 16-11-620 makes it a crime for a person “who, without legal cause or good excuse,” to “enter[] . . . on the premises of another person after having been warned not to do so.”
Soto and OCSO employee Defendant Robert Sparkman then followed Plaintiff to the parking lot to issue the no-trespass notice and yelled at him to stop. [Id. ¶¶ 8, 34-37.] Plaintiff refused to stop and “yelled at [the deputies] to leave him alone.” [Id. ¶¶ 36, 40.] Soto and Sparkman then “attempted to force Plaintiff to the ground by kicking his legs out from beneath him” and then a third OCSO employee, Defendant James Freeman, struck Plaintiff in the chest, causing him to fall, resulting in a torn labrum in Plaintiff's right shoulder. [Id. ¶¶ 12, 43-46.] The men placed Plaintiff in a double set of handcuffs. [Id. ¶ 47.]
Plaintiff, who is legally blind, did not realize that the individuals following him were members of law enforcement. [Doc. 29 ¶ 39.]
The OCSO charged Plaintiff with resisting arrest although the charge was subsequently dismissed. [Id. ¶¶ 150-51.] At the time of the incident at issue, there was active video surveillance on the school buildings in the area where Plaintiff was seized. [Id. ¶ 155.] When Plaintiff's attorney requested surveillance video during OCSO's prosecution of Plaintiff for resisting arrest, the School district turned over surveillance video of the entrance gate but refused to turn over other video that “would have negated his arrest for resisting arrest.” [Id. ¶ 159; see id. ¶¶ 155-58.]
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges 21 claims, 12 of which are pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights relating to the seizure of his person and the force used against him [id. ¶¶ 53-79, 87-104, 111-23], and nine of which are state law claims [id. ¶¶ 80-86, 105-10, 124-60]. The School District is named in only two claims, those being a state law false imprisonment claim that is asserted against all Defendants [id. ¶¶ 139-45], and a state law civil conspiracy claim that is asserted against the School District and OCSO [id. ¶¶ 154-60]. As his remedy, Plaintiff requests money damages and any other appropriate relief. [Id. at 19.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Motion to Dismiss Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court “need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts” nor “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cnty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
With respect to well-pleaded allegations, the United States Supreme Court explained the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations omitted); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than a bare averment that the pleader wants compensation and is entitled to it or a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action.”).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.. The plausibility standard reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)-the pleader must plead sufficient facts to show he is entitled to relief, not merely facts consistent with the defendant's liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”'” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
DISCUSSION
The School District argues that this Court has no independent jurisdiction over the claims against it and that the Court can consider the claims only by exercising its supplemental jurisdiction. [Doc. 35-1 at 3.] The School District contends that this Court should refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims because “they raise novel issues of state law and ‘the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity' weigh in favor of declining jurisdiction.” [Id. (quoting City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)); see id. at 3-8.] Alternatively, the School District argues that if the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction, the Court should dismiss the claims under Rule 12(b)(6). [Id. at 8-10.] The Court disagrees both with the School
District's argument that Plaintiff's case raises novel issues and with its argument that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the School District for false imprisonment. However, the Court agrees with the School District that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the School District for civil conspiracy. The Court will discuss the two claims separately.
As noted, the School District argues that this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in that the two claims asserted against the School District because those claims raise novel issues of state law and because “‘the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity' weigh in favor of declining jurisdiction.” [Doc. 35-1 at 3-8 (quoting City of Chicago, 522 U.S. at 172-73).] It is true that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if it “raises a novel or complex issue of State law” or if “in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), (4). However, the Court concludes these claims do not present any novel issue. Nor does the Court conclude that there are any other compelling reasons for declining to exercise jurisdiction. The School District cites the fact that this is a fairly early stage of the proceedings, that many of the issues involved in this case “are irrelevant to” the two claims asserted against the School District, and that comity interests weigh in favor of a state court resolving the state-law claims asserted against the School District. [Doc. 35-1 at 7-8.] None of the issues the School District identifies amount to exceptional circumstances. The undersigned therefore recommends that the Court reject the School District's request that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Civil Conspiracy
In South Carolina, “[t]o state a civil-conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) the combination or agreement of two or more persons, (2) to commit an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means, (3) together with the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the agreement, and (4) damages proximately resulting to the plaintiff.” Doe 9 v. Varsity Brands, LLC, No. 6:22-cv-3509-HMH, 2023 WL 4191782, at *17 (D.S.C. June 26, 2023) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that “[u]nder information and belief,” additional video surveillance existed that showed Plaintiff's arrest and that the School District, “at the direction of Defendant OCSO,” refused to provide Plaintiff with that footage. [Doc. 29 ¶¶ 156-57.] Plaintiff also alleges that the School District and OCSO “destroyed” this potential evidence, which Plaintiff alleges “would have negated his arrest for resisting arrest.” [Id. ¶ 159].
The School District argues that the allegations fail to state a claim insofar as they neither allege a reason why the School District's actions were unlawful nor do they explain how the actions injured Plaintiff, who was able to obtain dismissal of the charge against him even without the video that the School District allegedly withheld. [Doc. 35-1 at 4 (citing Doc. 29 ¶ 151).] Also, the School District contends that South Carolina courts would not recognize a cause of action for civil conspiracy based on these facts because South Carolina courts have declined to recognize a cause of action for spoliation. [Id. at 4-5 (citing Cole Vision Corp. v. Hobbs, 714 S.E.2d 537, 541-42 (S.C. 2011).] The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to state a civil conspiracy claim.
First, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that the School District's actions were unlawful. Indeed, in his response, Plaintiff does not even suggest any reason why the actions may have been unlawful. [Doc. 37.] Nor does Plaintiff plausibly allege that the withholding of the video proximately caused him damages. Plaintiff argues that “[a]s pled, the resisting arrest charge was dismissed after two (2) years and not at the onset of the criminal charges.” [Id. at 6.] However, the Second Amended Complaint actually does not allege when the charge was dismissed, nor does it allege that it would have been dismissed earlier had the School District turned over the video in question or that Plaintiff was injured by such a delay.
For both of those reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a civil-conspiracy claim. The Court therefore recommends that the School District's motion to dismiss be granted as to the civil conspiracy claim.
Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a civil conspiracy claim for these reasons, the Court declines to address the School District's alternative argument.
False Imprisonment
Under South Carolina law, the tort of false imprisonment is simply “a deprivation of a person's liberty without justification.” Caldwell v. K-Mart Corp., 410 S.E.2d 21, 23 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991). To establish a cause of action for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: “(1) the defendant restrained the plaintiff, (2) the restraint was intentional, and (3) the restraint was unlawful.” Huffman v. Sunshine Recycling, LLC, 826 S.E.2d 609, 614 (S.C. 2019). Additionally, a private person can be liable for false imprisonment if he “induces an officer by request, direction or command to unlawfully arrest another.” Id. at 615 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the School District does not appear to dispute that Plaintiff plausibly alleged that the officers restrained him, that they did so intentionally, and that they did so unlawfully. Rather, the School District appears to assert that the allegations were insufficient regarding Lecroy's conduct. [Doc. 35-1 at 9-10.] The Court disagrees. The Second Amended Complaint plainly alleges that Lecroy “ordered [Soto] to detain Plaintiff.” [Doc. 1 ¶ 142.] See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 45A (1965) (explaining that “[o]ne who instigates . . . the unlawful confinement of another is subject to liability to the other for false imprisonment” and that “[i]nstigation consists of words or acts which direct, request, invite or encourage the false imprisonment itself” such that “[i]n the case of an arrest, it is the equivalent, in words or conduct of, ‘Officer, arrest that man.'”). The School District emphasizes that Plaintiff does not allege that Lecroy told the officer that Plaintiff committed any crime or that he should be arrested for a crime. [Doc. 35-1 at 6.] However, the key action here regarding the School District's possible liability is not that Lecroy lied to Soto about the facts but that he specifically told him to take an action that was not justified on the facts, namely, to detain Plaintiff. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 45A illus. 1 (explaining that because it is unlawful for an officer to arrest a suspect without a warrant for a misdemeanor that was committed outside the officer's presence, a person who instructs an officer to make a warrantless arrest for such a misdemeanor may be subject to liability for false imprisonment).
The School District contends that “Plaintiff fails to allege why requesting that a notrespass notice be issued is unlawful.” [Doc. 35-1 at 9.] However, it is not the request for issuance of a no-trespass notice that gives rise to liability. Rather, it is the request that Soto detain Plaintiff either in addition to giving him the notice or as part of giving him the notice. [Doc. 1 ¶ 142.] The School District may be suggesting that it cannot be liable for Lecroy's ordering Soto to detain Plaintiff when Soto should have realized that detention would not be warranted based on the facts that Lecroy described. However, it is no defense to a false imprisonment claim that the officer should have known that the direction to detain the individual was unlawful. On this point, the Supreme Court of South Carolina's decision in Wingate v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Co., 30 S.E.2d 307 (S.C. 1944), is instructive. That case was one for damages against a business (“the Business”) for false arrest that resulted in a plaintiff's verdict. Id. at 308. The issue before the Supreme Court of South Carolina concerned whether the trial judge erred in refusing the Business's motions for a nonsuit and directed verdict. Id. As is relevant here, the plaintiff presented evidence that an employee of the Business (“the Victim”) had complained that one night four men in a car had followed him and attempted to take a telegram from him that he was carrying; the Victim informed the manager of the Business (the “Manager”); and the Manager told him to go to the police station and “‘have the car picked up, and the people'”; that the Victim went to the police station, reported the incident, provided the car's license number, and told the detective he spoke to that the four men should be arrested; that the next day a police officer spotted the car with the license plate in question, which was driven by a woman-the plaintiff; and that the officer required the plaintiff to drive to the police station “to straighten [the situation] out.” Id. at 309-10. The Business “argued that the police authorities knew that the [Victim's] complaint . . . was directed only to men and that the arrest of a woman was wholly unauthorized by anything said or done by the employees of the” Business. Id. at 311. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining:
The direction given by the manager to “have the car picked up and the people” is . . . susceptible to the construction that [the Manager] intended for the officers to apprehend the car and whoever happened to be in it, so that such occupants might be detained and interrogated for the purpose of securing information which would lead to the identity of the men who molested the [Victim].... We think the possibility that some innocent person might be in the car could have been reasonably anticipated. While the police officers may have been negligent, the jury could have reasonably inferred [the Business] set the proceedings in motion which culminated in the unlawful arrest of [the plaintiff] and that such arrest was a proximate result of the initial conduct of [the Business].Id.
The School District contends that “Lecroy did not tell deputies to tackle and handcuff Plaintiff, and the deputies were not fulfilling his request when they did so.” [Doc. 35-1 at 10.] Plaintiff's claim, however, is based not merely on the method by which he was detained but on the fact that he was detained at all. Because the School District's employee allegedly instructed Sato to detain Plaintiff, Plaintiff states a valid false imprisonment claim against the School District.
The School District argues that the officers actually detained Plaintiff because of his “conduct in their presence and based wholly on their independent judgment of his actions toward them.” [Doc. 35-1 at 7; see id. at 10.] As support for this assertion, the School District argues that if the officers had been “acting on Lecroy's behest when they tackled and handcuffed Plaintiff, they would have issued the no-trespass notice, as directed,” but that “[t]hey apparently did not.” [Doc. 35-1 at 7; see id. at 10.] The School District's arguments find no basis in the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, which plainly alleges that the officers “stopped Plaintiff to issue a no-trespass, not to make an arrest.” [Id. ¶ 143.]; see Mylan, 7 F.3d at 1134 (When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.”). On the subject of whether the officers eventually issued a no-trespass notice, the Second Amended Complaint is silent.
In sum, for all of the reasons discussed, the Court recommends that the School District's motion to dismiss based on failure to state a claim be denied as to Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that the School District's motion to dismiss [Doc. 35] be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Court recommends that the Court deny the School District's request for this Court to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the two claims asserted against the School District; grant the School District's motion to dismiss the civil conspiracy claim as against the School District for failure to state a claim; and deny the School District's motion to dismiss the false imprisonment claim as against the School District for failure to state a claim.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.