Opinion
Civil No. A3-97-89.
March 24, 1999.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that defendants violated their constitutional rights while plaintiffs were incarcerated at the Cass County Correctional Center (CCCC) as pretrial detainees. (Doc. #3.) Currently before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. #57). Defendants' brief in support of their motion was served by mail on February 8, 1999. (Doc. #58.) Plaintiffs had until March 15, 1999 to file a response to defendants' motion, but as of the date of this memorandum, have failed to do so. As such, under Local Rule 7.1, the undersigned summarily recommends that defendants' motion be granted and plaintiffs' complaint be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The undersigned has reviewed plaintiffs' 92-page complaint and defendants' brief in support of their motion and finds that defendants' arguments are correct. Counts 1 and 11 allege that plaintiff Gibson was denied psychiatric treatment, that his psychiatrist's orders were not followed, and that his medications were improperly administered. Plaintiff does have a due process right to receive necessary medical care. See Haslar v. Megerman, 104 F.3d at 178, 180. However, to establish a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must show that defendants were "deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs." Logan v. Clarke, 119 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976)); Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151, 152 (8th Cir. 1993). "To show deliberate indifference, [plaintiff] must prove that [defendants] knew of, yet disregarded, an excessive risk to his health." Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Plaintiff was screened by a physician upon arriving at CCCC, and plaintiff was evaluated and/or examined on several occasions subsequent to his arrival at CCCC, including four examinations by a psychiatrist at Southeast Human Services. Although plaintiff alleges that his treatment was delayed and that his medications were not properly dispensed to him, plaintiff was never subject to "an excessive risk to his health." Plaintiff admits he was not suicidal, nor was he considered a danger to other inmates. Thus, plaintiff Gibson fails to state a claim for lack of medical care under § 1983.
The undersigned notes that Gibson was only incarcerated at CCCC from August 1996 to April 1997.
Plaintiffs also challenge the conditions of their confinement while at CCCC. Count 2 complains about the plumbing; Count 3 alleges that plaintiffs were denied adequate recreation; Count 5 alleges inmates were not given adequate food; Count 6 alleges inadequate heat and ventilation; Count 7 complains about the dilapidated condition of the concrete and paint in the cells; Count 9 complains that inmates were not given adequate cleaning supplies and that the cells and recreation areas were unsanitary; Count 10 complains about the noise level in the cell blocks. "Conditions of pretrial confinement are impermissible if they constitute punishment as determined by the due process standards of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau County, 88 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1996). Although the Eighth Amendment does not technically apply to claims of pretrial detainees, the Eighth Circuit has applied the same deliberate indifference standard when evaluating these claims under the Due Process Clause. Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 1994). Under this standard, an inmate must first show that he/she was deprived of the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Id. Thus, conditions of confinement are unconstitutional "`only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise.'" Id. (quoting Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989)). An inmate must also "show that correctional officers were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm posed by the [condition]." Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996). Although the undersigned recognizes the conditions at CCCC are far from ideal, plaintiffs have not alleged that they were deprived of a basic human need for a significant period of time. See Whitnack, 16 F.3d at 957 ("Conditions, such as a filthy cell, may be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months."); Leonard v. Norris, 797 F.2d 683, 685 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that 15 days without out-of-cell exercise was not unconstitutional). The undersigned finds that plaintiffs' complaints regarding the conditions at CCCC are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.
All three plaintiffs were pretrial detainees while housed at CCCC.
In Count 4, plaintiffs allege that they were denied their right to exercise their religion. Plaintiffs allege they were not allowed to attend religious services on four occasions and were not allowed to attend Bible study sessions with the jail's chaplain. However, to state a claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must show that their religious freedom was "substantially burdened." Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 1997). The undersigned finds that being excluded from religious services on four occasions and not being allowed to attend group Bible study does not substantially burden plaintiffs' religious practices.
In Count 8, plaintiffs allege that inmates at CCCC are not properly classified or supervised and that convicted inmates are housed together with pretrial detainees, thus exposing plaintiffs to a risk of being assaulted. Plaintiffs do not claim that they were in fact assaulted or even threatened by other inmates while incarcerated at CCCC. Plaintiffs do have a constitutional right to be protected from assaults. Falls v. Nesbitt, 966 F.2d 375, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1992). However, to prevail on this claim under § 1983, each plaintiff "must show the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights, either because they actually intended to deprive him of some right, or because they acted with reckless disregard of his right to be free from violent attacks by fellow inmates." Id. "To establish `reckless disregard' by prison officials, an inmate must show that he was faced with a `pervasive risk of harm' and that the prison officials failed to respond reasonably to that risk." Id. Since plaintiffs have not even alleged that they were threatened by other inmates, they cannot show they were subject to a pervasive risk of harm, and their claim must fail.
Counts 12 and 13 of plaintiffs' complaint essentially restate the claims made in Counts 1 through 11, and thus should be dismissed for the reasons articulated above.
Plaintiffs' complaint also contains a "First Amendment of Complaint." Plaintiffs allege more facts regarding the conditions at CCCC, allege that CCCC's grievance procedure was not followed, and that they were denied meaningful visitation. The additional allegations regarding the conditions at CCCC fail for the same reasons discussed above. The allegations regarding CCCC's grievance procedure fails because plaintiffs have not alleged any specific instance where they were not allowed to file a grievance or proper procedures were not followed by jail staff. The fact that plaintiffs' grievances were repeatedly denied does not create a Due Process violation. See Ellingburg v. King, 490 F.2d 1270, 1271 (8th Cir. 1974) ("Broad and conclusory statements unsupported by factual allegations are not sufficient to support a cause of action under § 1983.") With respect to visitation, plaintiffs do not allege they were denied any visitation; they merely complain about the scheduling and space provided for visitation. Given the number of inmates at CCCC and the limited space available for visitation, it is clear that CCCC's procedures regarding visitation are reasonable and legitimate, and thus do not amount to unconstitutional punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979). Therefore, plaintiffs' "amendment" to their complaint does not allege any additional facts that support a claim under § 1983, and should be dismissed.
In sum, plaintiffs' complaint fails to state cause of action under § 1983. As such, defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted and plaintiffs' complaint and cause of action dismissed. Since granting defendants' motion moots all of plaintiffs' pending motions, it is also recommended that these motions be denied.
IT IS RECOMMENDED:
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted. (Doc. #57.) Plaintiffs' complaint and causes of action should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
2. All of plaintiffs' pending motions should be denied as moot. (Doc. #44, 50-53.)
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(G)(5), any party may object to this recommendation within ten (10) days after being served with a copy thereof.
KAREN K. KLEIN United States Magistrate Judge