The joinder of Mr. Edwards, with respect to whom the circuit court clearly has jurisdiction, with Mercury will not confer subject matter jurisdiction to the circuit court as to Mercury. In Gibbs v. Young, 242 S.C. 217, 130 S.E.2d 484 (1963), this Court was presented with a situation identical to that presented by Mr. Hawkins' action against Mercury and Mr. Edwards. In Gibbs, supra, plaintiff a resident of California, brought suit in Chesterfield County to recover for personal injuries sustained in an accident that took place in Georgia.
It is clear, and the South Carolina Supreme Court has so held, that this statute prevents a nonresident of South Carolina from suing a foreign corporation on a foreign cause of action in the circuit courts of the state, even though the foreign corporation is constitutionally within reach of state service of process. See Nix v. Mercury Motor Express, Inc., 270 S.C. 477, 242 S.E.2d 683 (1978); Gibbs v. Young, 242 S.C. 217, 130 S.E.2d 484 (1963); Hodges v. Lake Summit Co., 155 S.C. 436, 152 S.E. 658 (1930). Thus, the door to the state circuit court is firmly closed to the instant plaintiff by ยง 15-5-150; the question here is whether the door to the federal court is similarly shuttered.
See Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 718 [4th Cir. 1961]. Nor does the decision of Gibbes v. Young, 242 S.C. 217, 130 S.E.2d 484, compel a conclusion contrary to that reached here. Further, the Congress has specifically enunciated the policy this Court shall follow, by indicating that a Federal District Court, in diversity cases, shall be available wherever the foreign corporation is doing business.
The jurisdiction of a court or of a particular judge over the subject matter of a proceeding depends upon the authority granted by the Constitution and laws of the state, and is fundamental. Lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be waived even by consent and therefore such lack can and should be taken notice of by this Court ex meromotu. American Agr. Chemical Co. v. Thomas, 206 S.C. 355, 34 S.E.2d 592; McCullough v. McCullough, 242 S.C. 108, 130 S.E.2d 77; Gibbs v. Young, 242 S.C. 217, 130 S.E.2d 484; City of Columbia v. S.C. PublicService Commission, 242 S.C. 528, 131 S.E.2d 705, 707. Since the order appealed from was a complete nullity for lack of jurisdiction, the appeal presents no issue for consideration or decision by this Court and the appeal is, accordingly,
Defendant Bowman contends that it is entitled to an Order dismissing the complaint as to it on the ground that under Section 10-214 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter. (See Gibbs v. Young et al., S.C. 130 S.E.2d 484.) However, it has long been settled that a dismissal of an action on the sole grounds that the Court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit is not an adjudication of the merits of the case and will not bar another action for the same cause. Turner et al. v. Walker, 110 S.C. 155, 96 S.E. 481; Gault v. Spoon, 168 S.C. 160, 167 S.E. 299; Whetsell v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 188 S.C. 106, 198 S.E. 153; Langford v. State Board ofFisheries, 217 S.C. 118, 60 S.E.2d 59.