Opinion
No. 612, 2003.
Submitted: May 18, 2004.
Decided: July 8, 2004.
Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Sussex County, Cr. A. No. S03-06-0519I.
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices
ORDER
This 8th day of July 2004, it appears to the Court that:
(1) In October 2003, the defendant-appellant, Edward Gibbs, was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of Escape After Conviction. He was represented at trial by a public defender. In December 2003, prior to sentencing, Gibbs moved to dismiss his public defender on the ground of incompetence. The Superior Court denied Gibbs' motion on that basis, but, after a colloquy, permitted Gibbs to proceed pro se at sentencing and on appeal, with the public defender acting as standby counsel.
(2) Gibbs has now moved for the appointment of substitute counsel, claiming that his public defender "failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing" and "discussed [his] case with the prosecutor." He further claims that his case involves a number of complex issues, which he can not adequately address because he has limited access to the prison law library, has limited knowledge of the law and has only a 10th grade education.
(3) The transcript of Gibbs' sentencing hearing reflects that, prior to imposing sentence, the Superior Court judge permitted Gibbs to present his motion to dismiss his public defender. Gibbs stated that he was dissatisfied with his public defender's representation of him at trial because she did not come to see him to discuss his defense and did not subpoena a number of witnesses, including the judge. Gibbs also accused the prosecutor, the public defender and the judge of conspiring to have him convicted by an all-white jury. The public defender then explained her handling of Gibbs' case, including a chronology of the meetings she had with him and the letters she wrote to him during the period she represented him.
(4) Following the public defender's presentation, the judge ruled that there was no basis for Gibbs' complaints and denied Gibbs' motion to dismiss the public defender on the ground of incompetence. Following an extensive colloquy, the judge found that Gibbs had waived his right to counsel knowingly and intelligently and permitted him to proceed pro se. The judge then denied Gibbs' motion for a new trial, granted the State's motion to have Gibbs declared an habitual offender, and sentenced Gibbs to 20 years incarceration at Level V, with credit for time previously served.
(5) A defendant is not entitled to substitute counsel simply because he has some dissatisfaction with his appointed public defender. While a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel without a conflict of interest, he does not have a right to counsel who will not disagree with him about how to proceed with his case. Nor does a defendant have a constitutional right to a "meaningful relationship" with his counsel.
Lewis v. State, 757 A.2d 709, 712 (Del. 2000).
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983).
(6) We find no basis for granting Gibbs' motion for substitute counsel. The record provides no support for his claim that his public defender represented him incompetently. It is apparent that his public defender did not agree with him about how to proceed with his case, but that, in and of itself, does not provide a basis for the appointment of substitute counsel.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Gibbs' motion for the appointment of substitute counsel is DENIED.