Opinion
No. 2201 C.D. 2011
05-21-2012
Kristy A. George, Petitioner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY
Kristy A. George (Claimant) appeals from the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review's (UCBR) October 14, 2011 order affirming the Referee's decision denying benefits under Sections 401 and 4(u) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law). Claimant presents three issues for this Court's review: (1) whether the UCBR erred in finding that Claimant was employed through August 16, 2011 under Sections 401 and 4(u) of the Law; (2) whether the Board's ruling is in violation of Section 303(a) of the Social Security Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. § 503(a); and, (3) whether the UCBR erred in failing to order a remand. We affirm.
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex.Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 801 and 753(u).
Claimant was employed by West Mifflin Area School District (Employer) as a full-time teacher beginning in June 2008. On May 3, 2011, Employer notified Claimant by letter that her employment would be suspended effective June 30, 2011. During her employment, Claimant's wages were paid out over a 12-month period. On June 13, 2011, Employer advised Claimant that her contract was ended and she would receive her wages in a lump-sum, rather than being paid over the summer. Claimant subsequently applied for unemployment compensation (UC) benefits.
On July 11, 2011, the Indiana UC Service Center found Claimant ineligible for benefits under Sections 401 and 4(u) of the Law. Claimant appealed, and on August 5, 2011, a hearing was held by a Referee. On August 10, 2011, the Referee mailed her decision affirming the UC Service Center's determination. Claimant appealed to the UCBR. On October 14, 2011, the UCBR affirmed the Referee's decision, adopted and incorporated the Referee's findings and conclusions, and denied Claimant's request for a remand. Claimant appealed to this Court.
This Court's review is limited to determining whether the findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, whether constitutional rights were violated, or whether errors of law were committed. Johnson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 869 A.2d 1095 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). --------
Claimant argues the UCBR erred in finding that Claimant was employed through August 16, 2011 under Sections 401 and 4(u) of the Law. We disagree.
Section 401 of the Law states in relevant part: "Compensation shall be payable to any employe[e] who is or becomes unemployed . . . ." Section 4(u) of the Law specifically defines unemployed as follows:
An individual shall be deemed unemployed (I) with respect to any week (i) during which he performs no services for which remuneration is paid or payable to him and (ii) with respect to which no remuneration is paid or payable to him, or (II) with respect to any week of less than his full-time work if the remuneration paid or payable to him with respect to such week is less than his weekly benefit rate plus his partial benefit credit.This Court has consistently held that a teacher who is paid over a 12-month period and either receives payment over the summer or receives a lump-sum, is not unemployed during the summer months. Kandala v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 489 A.2d 293 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985); Partridge v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 430 A.2d 735 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981). As Claimant was paid over a 12-month period and received a lump-sum payment for the summer, remuneration was paid through the summer. Thus, she is not considered unemployed until the end of the summer.
Claimant next argues that the Board's ruling is in violation of Section 303(a) of the Act. Specifically, Claimant contends that because other teachers were furloughed at the same time she was furloughed and they received UC benefits, the denial of her benefits is a violation of Section 303 of the Act. We disagree.
Section 303 of the Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Provisions required(Emphasis in original). Claimant contends that the words "such methods of administration" refer to the appeal process, and the fact that Claimant did not prevail on appeal indicates that said appeal process is not reasonably calculated to "insure full payment of unemployment compensation due." Id. As explained above, Claimant did not receive UC benefits for the summer months because she was not unemployed as that term is defined in the Law. Because the "other teachers" who were also furloughed are not before this Court, we cannot address their specific circumstances. Clearly, the fact that Claimant is not entitled to UC benefits, explains why she did not win on appeal. Hence, there is no violation of the Social Security Act.
The Secretary of Labor shall make no certification for payment to any State unless he finds that the law of such State, approved by the Secretary of Labor under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act . . . includes provision for--
(1) Such methods of administration . . . as are found by the Secretary of Labor to be reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unemployment compensation when due . . . .
Claimant further argues that the UCBR erred in failing to order a remand. Specifically, Claimant contends that because material facts on which the Referee and the UCBR relied in making their decisions are missing from the record, and because several conclusions are unsupported by the record, the matter should be remanded for an additional hearing. We disagree.
"Under Pennsylvania law, the [UCBR] has the discretion to decide whether to grant a request for remand. Section 504 of the Law, 43 P.S. § 824. Therefore, we will not reverse a decision denying a request for remand absent an abuse of discretion." Fisher v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 696 A.2d 895, 897 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).
Claimant maintains that because the Referee found as a fact that Claimant had an option of being paid over a 9-month period or a 12-month period and opted for a 12-month period, and that fact is not supported by the record, the matter should be remanded for evidence on that issue. However, whether Claimant had an option of receiving her pay over a 9-month period or 12-month period is not at issue. The fact that she received her pay over a 12-month period is the relevant fact. As that fact is undisputed, there is no need for a remand on that issue.
Similarly, Claimant contends that because the Referee concluded that she was entitled to salary and benefits through August 16, 2011, and there is no evidence that Claimant continued to receive benefits, the matter should be remanded for evidence on that issue. However, in affirming the denial of UC benefits to teachers in the same situation as Claimant, this court has specifically held that
the claimants were not 'unemployed' for the purposes of receiving unemployment compensation benefits for the
summer months because they were to receive wages during that time; the decisions were not based on the fact that the claimants in those cases might also have been continuing to receive employee fringe benefits during the summer months.Kandala, 489 A.2d at 294. Thus, whether Claimant was receiving benefits is irrelevant. Accordingly, there is no need for a remand on this issue.
Finally, Claimant asserts that although the Referee found as a fact that her furlough was to begin June 30, 2011, the evidence establishes that Claimant's employment with the school ended June 13, 2011, so the matter should be remanded for evidence on this issue. Again, the UCBR properly concluded that Claimant was employed through August 16, 2011. Hence, whether her furlough began June 13th, or June 30th, 2011, is irrelevant. Thus, there is no need for a remand on this issue. Accordingly, the UCBR did not abuse its discretion in denying Claimant's request for a remand.
For all of the above reasons, the UCBR's order is affirmed.
/s/_________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 21st day of May, 2012, the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review's October 14, 2011 order is affirmed.
/s/_________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge