Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:99CV119-P-B
September 1, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause comes before the Court on motions to dismiss filed by the defendants. The Court has duly considered the motions and the parties' memoranda and is ready to rule.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This cause arises out of civil commitment proceedings involving Rickey George. On December 11, 1998, Michael Berthay submitted an affidavit urging the Chancery Court of Lee County to commit George to a psychiatric facility in view of his alleged threats of violence against various public officials. Following a hearing on December 18, 1998, Lee County Chancellor Charles D. Thomas signed a commitment order directing that George be committed to the Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield for a period of ninety (90) days. After George was committed, two of his "friends," Bill Cockrell and Harry Vinson, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on his behalf with the Lee County Chancery Clerk, Bill Benson. The pleadings suggest that none of the chancellors would agree to set the petition for a hearing.
Review of the parties' submissions reveals the basis for that refusal as Cockrell's and Vinson's lack of credentials — i.e., neither is an attorney admitted to practice before the courts of the State of Mississippi.
George then commenced the present civil action, seeking redress for his alleged injuries pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985(3). He seeks to recover money damages against the following defendants: Chancellors Charles D. Thomas, Jacqueline E. Mask and John C. Ross, Chancery Clerk Bill Benson and his bond holder, State Farm Insurance Company, Michael Berthay, and both Mississippi State Hospital and the G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery V.A. Medical Center, along with their respective administrators, James Chastain and Robert Miller. The defendants have all filed motions to dismiss in which they assert numerous grounds for dismissal. The analysis which follows does not address each of the grounds raised, not because any were found to be without merit, but rather because those set forth below are more than sufficient to warrant dismissal of the case without reference to the additional grounds raised by the various defendants.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if a party fails to state a claim under which relief can be granted. The allegation of the complaint must be accepted as true when the Court considers whether the Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action. See Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1991); cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3057, 112 S.Ct. 298, 116 L.Ed.2d 242 (1991). Only the complaint and allegations contained therein are to be considered in reaching a decision on a defendant Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claims which would entitle him or her to relief.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Judicial Immunity
An established tenet of our jurisprudence is judicial immunity. Brinkman v. Johnson, 793 F.2d 111, 112 (5th Cir. 1986); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357-59 (1978). Judges are absolutely immune from suits for damages stemming from actions taken pursuant to their judicial role; immunity may only be overcome where a plaintiff makes a showing that the judge acted in a non-judicial capacity or that the judge lacked jurisdiction. Stump at 356-57; Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-29 (1988). Based on the facts as set forth above, the Court determines that judges Thomas, Mask and Ross are entitled to judicial immunity from liability under the facts as alleged in plaintiff's Complaint.
Quasi-Judicial Immunity
William Benson, Lee County Chancery Clerk, also filed a Motion to Dismiss. He is being sued based on acts arising out of the performance of his official duties as chancery clerk. Like judges, court clerks are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken pursuant to their office. Boston v. Lafayette County, Mississippi, 744 F. Supp. 745, 750 (N.D.Miss. 1990), aff'd. 933 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1991) ("quasi-judicial immunity shields lower officials, such as clerks, who implement judicial orders."); Johnson v. Craft, 673 F. Supp. 191, 193 (S.D.Miss. 1987) ("Court clerks are immune from liability when performing official acts.").
Defendant Benson was acting within the scope of his duties as a chancery clerk when he accepted pleadings for filing in connection with the civil commitment proceeding against Rickey George. Plaintiff's allegations concerning Benson's failure to set a hearing on "George's" habeas petition also involves a purported failure to perform his official duties.
In addition to suing Benson, plaintiff also joined as a defendant State Farm Insurance Company, the insurance company acting as surety for the defendant clerk's bonds. The plaintiff's claim against bond surety State Farm arises solely from the actions of the Benson in his capacity as chancery clerk, i.e., its alleged liability is merely derivative of that of its insured. As defendant Benson acted within the scope of his professional duties and he is immune from liability, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the defendant surety. State Farm is entitled to dismissal of the claim against it.
C. Failure to Adequately Plead Conspiracy under §§ 1983 and 1985(3)
Defendants Michael Berthay, the G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery V.A. Medical Center, its administrator Robert Miller, Mississippi State Hospital and its administrator James Chastain all seek summary judgment based on the plaintiff's failure to adequately plead a conspiracy to violate George's civil rights under §§ 1983 and 1985(3). A private individual's conduct may support a claim under § 1983 if the individual is a "willing participant in a joint action with the state or its agents." Brinkman, 793 F.2d at 112; Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980). The essential elements of a civil conspiracy are:
In addition to the reasons set out below, defendants G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery V.A. Medical Center and its administrator, Robert Miller, are entitled to dismissal on the grounds of sovereign immunity. A suit against these defendants is tantamount to a suit against the United States itself, an action not permitted save by consent of the United States. Furthermore, neither a federal official acting in his official capacity nor the Department of Veterans Affairs are considered "persons" for purposes of a suit brought under the aegis of §§ 1983 and 1985(3).
an action which violates a right protected under § 1983;
actions taken in concert by the defendants with specific intent to violate the protected right.
Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 339 (5th Cir. 1999).
Conspiracy claims under either § 1983 or § 1985(3) require that the claimant relate specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations. Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1986); U.S. ex rel Simmons v. Zibilich, 542 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 566 (5th Cir. 1991); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (5th Cir. 1987). The operative facts of the conspiracy must be pled with particularity, not merely insinuated in broad, vague assertions. Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1370. Plaintiff has not alleged any specific facts which connect the individual defendants to a conspiracy with state actors to illegally deprive him of rights protected under the federal Constitution. Instead, he has concocted a mishmash of bald allegations insufficient to state a claim of conspiracy under §§ 1983 and 1985(3). As a result, the defendants referenced above are entitled to dismissal of the claims against them.
Plaintiff's claim under 1985(3) must also fail as a result of his abysmal failure to plead a class or race-based animus as the root of the alleged conspiracy. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971); United Brotherhood of Carpenters Joiners Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983); Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994).
D. Dismissal Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Were the foregoing reasons not in themselves sufficient, it is also evident that the plaintiff's claim is a poorly disguised effort to attack the state court's adjudication of the civil commitment proceeding against him. The United States Supreme Court has repudiated such efforts on the part of would-be claimants alleging the deprivation of constitutional rights. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 262 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies where 1) the plaintiff in a federal action is a party to a final judgment in state court judicial proceedings and had an opportunity to seek review in the United States Supreme Court and 2) the plaintiff's complaint seeks "what in substance would be an appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court."
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1006, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 2654, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994). Certainly George was at liberty to appeal the Chancellor's order of commitment, thereby permitting him to raise the alleged constitutional inadequacies by way of review before the Mississippi Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. See Miss. Code Ann. § 41-21-83 (providing for appeal of a civil commitment order by either party on the same terms as prescribed for appeals in civil cases). And, given that the entirety of plaintiff's case is built around the infirmities which attended the civil commitment proceeding, it appears that George's "constitutional claims . . . are inextricably intertwined with the state court's grant or denial of relief." Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 1315 n. 16). Therefore, dismissal of plaintiff's complaint insofar as it relates to the civil commitment proceeding in chancery court is likewise proper.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, defendants' motions to dismiss are well-taken and should be granted. An order will issue accordingly.