Opinion
No. 17-CV-3684 (CS)
03-26-2018
LLEWELLYN S. GEORGE, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER ROBERTS, Defendant.
Appearances David H. Chen Westchester County Attorney White Plains, New York Counsel for Defendant
OPINION & ORDER
Appearances
David H. Chen
Westchester County Attorney
White Plains, New York
Counsel for Defendant
Seibel, J.
Before the Court is Defendant's unopposed motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 13.) For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
I accept as true the facts, but not the conclusions, set forth in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (See Doc. 12 ("AC").) Plaintiff Llewellyn S. George brings this suit against Defendant Christopher Roberts, a corrections officer at the Westchester County Department of Correction. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that on April 25, 2017, while he was incarcerated at the Westchester County Jail in Valhalla, New York, Defendant Roberts conducted a disciplinary hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff was found guilty of all charges and Defendant imposed a penalty of thirty days of cell confinement. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he was not notified of the date and time of the disciplinary hearing, was not present for it, and was not provided with an explanation for why he was not allowed to be present. (Id.) Plaintiff became aware of the hearing when he was served with Defendant's disposition hours after it was held. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's failure to notify him of the disciplinary hearing violated his rights under the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 2.)
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed his original complaint on May 15, 2017, naming the County of Westchester and Westchester County Department of Correction as Defendants. (Doc. 2 at 1-2.) In addition to his claim that he was not informed of the April 25, 2017 disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff also alleged that his constitutional rights were violated because he was not permitted to present evidence or witnesses at, or record, the disciplinary hearing. (See id. at 3-4.) On June 5, 2017, the Westchester County Department of Correction was dismissed as a Defendant, and service on the County of Westchester was ordered. (Doc. 6.) On June 27, 2017, the County of Westchester filed a letter seeking a pre-motion conference in anticipation of a motion to dismiss, (Doc. 7); Plaintiff responded on July 7, 2017, (Doc. 11); and both parties appeared for a pre-motion conference on July 12, 2017, (Minute Entry dated July 12, 2017). At the conference, I reviewed Defendant's grounds for dismissal with the parties and allowed Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint to address the potential deficiencies in his original pleading. (See Doc. 18.)
On September 5, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint, which removed the County of Westchester as a Defendant and added Defendant Roberts. (See AC.) Plaintiff never obtained a summons for Roberts or served him with the Amended Complaint. Defendant filed the instant motion on September 28, 2017. (Doc. 13.) Plaintiff failed to oppose the motion, and Defendant filed a reply brief on November 16, 2017. (Doc. 19.) Defendant argues that (1) Plaintiff's claims against Roberts in his individual capacity cannot proceed because he has not been served, (2) Plaintiff failed to plead a policy or custom necessary to sustain claims against Roberts in his official capacity, and (3) Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed with prejudice. (See Docs. 14 ("D's Mem."), 19 ("D's Reply").)
On October 4, 2017, Defendant filed a letter alerting the Court to a letter Plaintiff filed in other matters. (Doc. 16.) Plaintiff's letter stated that he was "tending to several personal issues that [we]re interfering with [his] obligations to pursue" three cases, each captioned George v. County of Westchester et al., with docket numbers 17-CV-3632 (NSR), 17-CV-4364 (VB), and 17-CV-4217 (VB), and requested that those cases be dismissed without prejudice. (Id. Ex. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff's letter also noted a change of address. (See id. at 2.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), a defendant may move to dismiss a case for "insufficient service of process." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). "The plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and complaint served within the time allowed by Rule 4(m) and must furnish the necessary copies to the person who makes service." Id. 4(c)(1). Rule 4(m) requires that a defendant be served within ninety days or else the court must dismiss the action without prejudice or order that service be made within a specified time. "When a defendant raises a Rule 12(b)(5) challenge to the sufficiency of service of process, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving its adequacy." Mende v. Milestone Tech., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d 246, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pro se plaintiffs are not excused from compliance with Rule 4. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 61-63 (2d Cir. 2012).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). While Rule 8 "marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, . . . it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
In considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court "begin[s] by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth," and then determines whether the remaining well-pleaded factual allegations, accepted as true, "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679. Deciding whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not 'shown' - 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "If a complaint is sufficient to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the plaintiff's failure to respond to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not warrant dismissal." McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 323 (2d Cir. 2000).
Complaints made by pro se plaintiffs are to be examined with "special solicitude," interpreted "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest," Shibeshi v. City of N.Y., 475 F. App'x 807, 808 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted), and "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," and district courts "cannot invent factual allegations that [the plaintiff] has not pled." Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010).
Copies of all unpublished decisions cited in this Opinion & Order are attached.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Individual Capacity
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff's claims against him in his individual capacity should be dismissed because he was not served with the summons and complaint. (D's Mem. at 4-5.) Defendant filed his motion to dismiss only three weeks after Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint naming Roberts, so at the time of the motion, the time for service had not yet run. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). As of the date of this Opinion & Order, however, the docket reflects that no summons for Roberts has been issued and he still has not been served.
To sustain claims against a municipal officer in his individual capacity, a plaintiff has ninety days from filing the complaint to serve the summons and the complaint on the individual. See id.; Jones v. Westchester Cty., 182 F. Supp. 3d 134, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2), service upon an individual must be accomplished by (1) "delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally," (2) "leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or" (3) "delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(A)-(C). Rule 4(e)(1) also allows for service in accordance with the law of the state in which the district is located. Under New York law, a plaintiff has additional options, including leaving the summons with a person of suitable age and discretion at the Defendant's actual residence or place of business and following up with a mailing to the individual's last known residence or actual place of business. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(2) (McKinney).
The only proof of service in this case indicates that the former Defendant, the County of Westchester, was served with the original complaint at the County of Westchester Law Department at 148 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York, on June 19, 2017. (See Doc. 10.) Nothing in the record indicates that this is or was Roberts's actual place of business, or that the Amended Complaint was ever served. Nor is there any indication that Plaintiff ever requested that the United States Marshals Service serve Defendant, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c), or requested an extension of time to effect service, see id. 4(m); Meilleur, 682 F.3d at 63. Therefore, because there is no proof that Plaintiff served Roberts, all claims against him in his individual capacity are dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5). See Norwood v. Salvatore, No. 12-CV-1025, 2013 WL 1499599, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2013) (dismissing claims against municipal officer in individual capacity for failure to serve).
In fact, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint would suggest that Roberts's actual place of business is the Westchester County's Department of Correction, which is located at 10 Woods Road, Valhalla, New York.
Plaintiff was aware of his obligation to ensure timely service and request an extension if necessary, because that requirement was explained in the Court's Order of Service of the original complaint, (Doc. 6), and in similar orders issued in some of the approximately twenty other cases brought by Plaintiff in this Court, (see, e.g., Order of Service, George v. Cty. of Westchester, No. 17-CV-3632 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2017), ECF No. 6; Order of Service, George v. Cty. of Westchester, No. 13-CV-4511 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2013), ECF No. 4).
B. Official Capacity
Defendant next seeks to dismiss the Amended Complaint against Roberts to the extent he is sued in his official capacity. (D's Mem. at 5-6.) Suits against a municipal officer in his official capacity are, "in all respects other than name, suits against a government entity." Shabazz v. Coughlin, 852 F.2d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 1988); accord Rossi, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47198, at *26 ("Official capacity suits are effectively suits against a governmental entity.").
It is not clear that Plaintiff intended to bring a claim against Defendant in his official capacity. Plaintiff is seeking compensatory and punitive damages and addressed how Roberts was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations, suggesting that Plaintiff sought to bring the claims against Roberts only in his individual capacity. See Rossi v. Stevens, No. 04-CV-1836, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47198, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2005). In an excess of caution, however, I will address Defendant's arguments.
Municipalities may be sued pursuant to § 1983, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), but they cannot be held liable for acts of their employees "by application of the doctrine of respondeat superior," see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478 (1986); accord Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (municipality may not be found liable simply because one of its employees committed a tort). "To hold a city liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its employees, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right." Wray v. City of N.Y., 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2009) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). To allege such a policy or custom, a plaintiff may assert:
(1) the existence of a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken or decisions made by municipal officials with final decision making authority, which caused the alleged violation of plaintiff's civil rights; (3) a practice so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a custom of which constructive knowledge can be implied on the part of the policymaking officials; or (4) a failure
by policymakers to properly train or supervise their subordinates, amounting to 'deliberate indifference' to the rights of those who come in contact with the municipal employees.Betts v. Shearman, No. 12-CV-3195, 2013 WL 311124, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 751 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is devoid of facts that could plausibly support any of the above theories. The sole allegations in the Amended Complaint describe Defendant Roberts's conduct surrounding Plaintiff's April 25, 2017 disciplinary hearing. (See AC at 3-4.) Plaintiff does not point to an ongoing official policy or custom that led to Defendant's alleged failure to notify him of his disciplinary hearing, nor is there any indication that Roberts has final decision making authority. As Defendant correctly points out, (D's Mem. at 5-6), "a single incident alleged in a complaint, especially if it involved only actors below the policy-making level, does not suffice to show a municipal policy." Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991); see Plair v. City of N.Y., 789 F. Supp. 2d 459, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (collecting cases). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff sought to bring his claims against Roberts in his official capacity, they are dismissed.
C. Leave to Amend and Dismissal With or Without Prejudice
Leave to amend a complaint should be freely given "when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). It is "within the sound discretion of the district court to grant or deny leave to amend." McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007). "Leave to amend, though liberally granted, may properly be denied for: 'undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.'" Ruotolo v. City of N.Y., 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
Plaintiff has already amended once after a conference at which Defendant's motion was discussed. Plaintiff has not asked to amend again or otherwise suggested he is in possession of facts that would cure the deficiencies regarding the claims against Roberts in his official capacity. Accordingly, the Court declines to grant leave to amend sua sponte. See TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc., 758 F.3d 493, 505 (2d Cir. 2014) (plaintiff need not be given leave to amend if he fails to specify how amendment would cure the pleading deficiencies in his complaint); Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 2011) (district court did not err in dismissing claim with prejudice in absence of any indication plaintiff could or would provide additional allegations leading to different result); see also Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 797 F.3d 160, 190 (2d Cir. 2015) (denial of leave to amend would be proper where "request gives no clue as to how the complaint's defects would be cured") (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice, pointing to Plaintiff's letter that he filed in other, unrelated cases, (see Doc. 16), and Plaintiff's failure to fix deficiencies in his Amended Complaint as discussed at the July 12, 2017 pre-motion conference. (D's Reply at 2-3.)
First, Plaintiff's October 2, 2017 letter should not be construed to apply here. The letter refers to three specific cases and states that Plaintiff was unable to pursue "the above-referenced cases" due to personal issues. (Doc. 16 Ex. 1 at 1.) Nowhere in the letter does Plaintiff ask that all pending cases in which he is a plaintiff be dismissed without prejudice.
If it did, however, Plaintiff's letter could be construed as a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) or a request to dismiss without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). Under Rule 41(a)(1), a "plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing . . . a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A). A dismissal under that subsection is without prejudice unless stated otherwise. See id. 41(a)(1)(B). Courts have consistently held that "a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 does not terminate the right of dismissal by notice," and thus a plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order even if the defendant has already filed a motion to dismiss. See Ardnt v. UBS AG, 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (alteration omitted) (collecting cases). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) may ripen into one for summary judgment for purposes of Rule 41(a)(1) "when matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court." Nat'l Cement Co. v. Mead Corp., 80 F.R.D. 703, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). But Defendant's motion under Rule 12(b)(6) does not present matters outside Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for consideration, and a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction does not preclude dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1). See Plains Growers, Inc. v. Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, Inc., 474 F.2d 250, 254 (5th Cir. 1973.) Nor has Defendant filed an answer. Thus, if Plaintiff's letter were filed in this case, I could have considered it as a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1), which would operate as an automatic dismissal without prejudice and with no conditions. See Thorp v. Scarne, 599 F.2d 1169, 1171 n.1 (2d Cir. 1979); Horton v. Trans World Airlines Corp., 169 F.R.D. 11, 14-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
Defendant does not specify whether Plaintiff's letter should be viewed under Rule 41(a)(1) or Rule 41(a)(2), but the cases to which Defendant cites refer to Rule 41(a)(2). (See D's Reply at 2-3.)
Rule 41(a)(2) provides that, "[e]xcept as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). If I construed Plaintiff's letter as a request to dismiss without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), as Defendant suggests, I could not grant a dismissal with prejudice. The Second Circuit has explicitly held that if a plaintiff moves under Rule 41(a)(2) for dismissal without prejudice, the Court cannot grant a dismissal with prejudice without giving the plaintiff "an opportunity to withdraw the motion rather than accept onerous conditions of a voluntary dismissal." Gravatt v. Columbia Univ., 845 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has been given no such opportunity here.
Defendant cites two out-of-circuit district court cases for the proposition that I may dismiss with prejudice even if the request was to dismiss without prejudice. (D's Reply at 2-3 (citing Smith v. Sabol, No. 11-CV-1697, 2013 WL 2371193 (M.D. Pa. May 30, 2013), and Bauer v. City of Rossford, No. 16-CV-722, 2017 WL 1179053 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2017), appeal filed, No. 17-3498 (6th Cir. 2017)).) But the Second Circuit has given clear instructions that a court must grant the plaintiff the opportunity to withdraw the motion for voluntary dismissal before dismissing the case with prejudice. Moreover, Defendant's citation to Republic of Columbia v. Diageo North America, Inc., No. 04-CV-4372, 2011 WL 4828814 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011), is also unpersuasive as there the merits of the plaintiff's claims had been litigated, see id. at *3. Thus, I cannot grant Defendant's request under Rule 41(a)(2).
Defendant has not made an application under Rule 41(b) to dismiss for failure to prosecute, which if granted would operate as a dismissal on the merits and could justify dismissal with prejudice. Rule 41(b) states that "[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). "[W]here a plaintiff has failed to take any specific and concrete action over a length of time," a court may dismiss his complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute. West v. City of N.Y., 130 F.R.D. 522, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Courts within this Circuit have found that a plaintiff's inactivity for a period of six months to almost two years is sufficient to dismiss a complaint for failure to prosecute. See id. (collecting cases). When deciding whether to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute, the Court must consider five factors: (1) the duration of Plaintiff's failure to comply with the Court's orders, (2) whether Plaintiff was on notice that failure to comply would result in dismissal, (3) whether Defendant is likely to be prejudiced by further delay in the proceedings, (4) a balancing of the Court's interest in managing its docket with Plaintiff's interest in receiving a fair chance to be heard, and (5) whether the Court has adequately considered a sanction less drastic than dismissal. See Baptiste v. Sommers, 768 F.3d 212, 216 (2d Cir. 2014). Plaintiff has not failed to comply with any Court orders, as none have been issued regarding his failure to prosecute; he has only failed to oppose Defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff was not on notice that failure to comply with the motion to dismiss briefing schedule would result in dismissal. While Defendant would be prejudiced if Plaintiff brought an action at a later date, this case has not proceeded into discovery, and thus Defendant has likely expended few resources. While Plaintiff's history suggests he is cavalier in terms of judicial resources, his conduct in this case has not had a particularly deleterious effect on the undersigned's docket management. Finally, instead of dismissing Plaintiff's claims with prejudice, I could dismiss without prejudice. Thus, even if Defendant had moved under Rule 41(b), which his counsel certainly knew how to do if intended, dismissal with prejudice would not be appropriate.
Defendant also argues that dismissal should be with prejudice because Plaintiff failed to address in the Amended Complaint the issues discussed at the July 12, 2017 pre-motion conference. (D's Reply at 2.) But Plaintiff in his Amended Complaint implemented most, if not all, of the changes suggested by Defendant and the Court. At the pre-motion conference, I informed Plaintiff that some of his objections to the disciplinary hearing process likely would not rise to constitutional violations, and that to sue the County of Westchester, Plaintiff had to allege a policy, custom, or decision by a policymaker, or else he should add a different defendant. Plaintiff made responsive changes in his Amended Complaint. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff sought to sue Defendant Roberts in his official capacity (which I am not convinced that he did), Plaintiff was not told that a suit against a municipal officer in his official capacity operates as a claim against the municipality itself.
Accordingly, the dismissal of the individual-capacity claims is without prejudice regardless of whether Plaintiff's letter, (Doc. 16), applies here.
Under Rule 4(m), "[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court - on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff - must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Because Plaintiff has not participated in this case since he filed his Amended Complaint nearly six months ago, I will not sua sponte grant Plaintiff more time to properly serve the summons and Amended Complaint on Defendant Roberts.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED without prejudice. To the extent Plaintiff intended to bring a claim against Defendant in his official capacity, it is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the pending Motion, (Doc. 13), and close the case. The Clerk of Court is also respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Opinion & Order, with the attached cases, to Plaintiff.
Throughout the pendency of this case, Plaintiff has had multiple addresses. Mail was returned to the Court after it was sent to 86 E. Post Road, White Plains, NY 10601. In his original and Amended Complaint, Plaintiff listed his address as 25 Operations Drive, Valhalla, New York 10595. (See AC at 1.) In his October 2, 2017 letter, Plaintiff lists his address as C.H.O.I.C.E., 200 E. Post Road, White Plains, New York 10601. (See Doc. 16 Ex. 1 at 2.) In an excess of caution, the Clerk of Court should mail a copy of this Opinion & Order to each of the aforementioned addresses.
SO ORDERED
Dated: March 26, 2018
White Plains, New York
/s/_________
CATHY SEIBEL, U.S.D.J.