Opinion
CIVIL ACTION FILE No. 1:22-CV-02176-SCJ
2023-04-21
Sean GEORGE, Plaintiff, v. J. HORNE, et al., Defendants.
Amith Gupta, American Trial Law Litigators LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff. Mary T. Minter, Thomas M. Mitchell, Carothers & Mitchell, LLC, Buford, GA, for Defendants Officer Jabari Horne, Officer Patrick Deegan, Officer Terrean Moore. Erika Janae Harris, Michael R. Boorman, Watson Spence LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Officer Nico Flores.
Amith Gupta, American Trial Law Litigators LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff. Mary T. Minter, Thomas M. Mitchell, Carothers & Mitchell, LLC, Buford, GA, for Defendants Officer Jabari Horne, Officer Patrick Deegan, Officer Terrean Moore. Erika Janae Harris, Michael R. Boorman, Watson Spence LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Officer Nico Flores. ORDER STEVE C. JONES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter appears before the Court on Defendant Erika Shields' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. [50-1]), Defendant City of Atlanta's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. [51-1]), and Defendants Officer Antonio Clay and Sergeant Val Lester's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. [73-1]). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS all three motions to dismiss, and so DISMISSES the claims against Defendants Shields, City of Atlanta, and Officers Clay and Lester in this case.
All citations are to the electronic docket unless otherwise noted, and all page numbers are those imprinted by the Court's docketing software.
The docket indicates that Officer Clay's first name is "Antonia," but in his reply for his motion to dismiss, he corrects the spelling of his name to be "Antonio." Doc. No. [83], 1 n.1. The Court also acknowledges that Defendant Lester's official title is "Sergeant." Throughout this Order, however, the Court may refer to Defendant Lester as "Officer Lester," especially when speaking of him in conjunction with Officer Clay. The Court uses this designation only for conciseness and clarity and does not intend any offense.
I. BACKGROUND
For purposes of resolving the instant motions, the following facts are taken as true from Plaintiff's amended complaint. Doc. No. [44]. In May 2020, following the murder of George Floyd, protests against racial injustice occurred throughout the country. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. In Atlanta, however, on May 29, 2020, some of the protests devolved into unlawful and violent conduct. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. In response, the City of Atlanta's Mayor instituted a temporary 9:00 P.M. curfew order, starting on May 30, 2020. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. The City passed this curfew order to maintain order in the light of the unrest that had occurred the prior day. Id. ¶¶ 16-18.
City of Atlanta police chief, Defendant Erika Shields, encouraged the Mayor's curfew and further indicated that the "extreme violence" from the previous night with its "law-breaking elements" constitutes "a highly calculated terrorist organization [whose purposes was] to inflict harm [and] property damage." Id. ¶¶ 21-22. Defendant Shields warned that such "lawlessness" would not "happen twice," and that she was "ready to just lock people up." Id. ¶¶ 23-24.
Plaintiff participated in civil protests on May 30, 2023. Id. ¶ 30. Around 8:30 P.M., Plaintiff tried to leave, but discovered he had been blocked by the police. Id. ¶¶ 30-31, 35-36. Plaintiff alleges the police around this time were "harassing" protestors by "shining lights on them, yelling at them, and blocking off walkways . . . ." Id. ¶ 33. As Plaintiff was trying to leave, the Defendant Officers approached him. One handcuffed him, while the others kicked him and aggressively took him to the ground. Id. ¶¶ 40-41. One officer then tased Plaintiff while the others laughed. Id. ¶ 42. Another officer stomped on and broke Plaintiff's glasses, which had fallen off during the incident, one removed his facemask, and they confiscated his other personal belongings. Id. ¶¶ 43-47.
The Officer Defendants then required Plaintiff to walk a mile, in tight handcuffs, to a temporary detention location. Id. ¶¶ 48, 50-51. They held Plaintiff at this location for 4-5 hours without food, water, or access to a bathroom. Id. ¶¶ 52-53. He was then transferred to another temporary detention location and kept under the same conditions. Id. ¶¶ 57-58. Hours later, the Officers moved Plaintiff to the Atlanta Detention Center, where they removed his handcuffs, and later gave him expired food. Id. ¶¶ 59-62. They released Plaintiff on May 31, 2020. Id. ¶ 64. Eventually the authorities dropped the sole charge against Plaintiff, but his physical, emotional, and psychological harm persisted. Id. ¶¶ 68-84.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the City of Atlanta, Police Chief Shields, and Officers Horne, Deegan, Flores, and Moore on May 31, 2022. Doc. No. [1]. Plaintiff also named two "John Doe" Officers, who had been part of the incident, but whose names he did not know at the time of filing. Id. Plaintiff moved for expedited discovery to determine the names of these "John Doe" Officers, as well as the full names and identifying location of the other Defendant Officers for purposes of serving them. Doc. No. [6]. The Court granted this limited discovery. Doc. No. [7]. Plaintiff was able to identify Defendants Clay and Lester as the "John Doe" Defendants and moved to amend his complaint accordingly (Doc. No. [32]), which the Court allowed (Doc. No. [43]). The Amended Complaint (Doc. No. [44]) is now the operative complaint in this case.
Plaintiff also filed a series of three motions to extend the time for service of process given difficulties fully identifying the Defendant Officers (and "John Doe" Officers) and their relevant contact information. Doc. Nos. [9]; [20]; [31]. Over Defendants' objections, the Court granted, at least in part, each of these extensions, which enabled Plaintiff to serve all named Defendants. Doc. Nos. [10]; [26]; [34].
Four Defendants then filed three motions to dismiss: (1) Defendant Shields (Doc. No. [50-1]), (2) Defendant City of Atlanta (Doc. No. [51-1]), and (3) Defendant Officers Clay and Lester (Doc. No. [73-1]). Defendant Officers Horne, Deegan, Moore, and Flores all answered the amended complaint, but did not file motions to dismiss. Doc. Nos. [55]; [56]; [57]; [59]. While the Court entered a Scheduling Order in this case, it also stayed that order—for all the Parties, not just the Defendant Movants—pending resolution of the motions to dismiss. Doc. Nos. [71]; [81].
With this factual and procedural background in mind, the Court now turns to resolving the three pending motions to dismiss.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Pleadings do not require any particular technical form and must be construed "so as to do justice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1), (e).
A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court accepts the factual allegations made in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Speaker v. U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010).
As the purpose of Rule 8(a) is simply to provide notice to the defendants of the nature of the claims and the grounds on which those claims rest, pleadings are generally given a liberal reading when addressing a motion to dismiss. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if the facts as pled do not state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
To state a plausible claim, a plaintiff need only plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Notice pleading does not require "the pleader allege a specific fact to cover every element or allege with precision each element of a claim" but does require a complaint "contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Fin. Sec. Assur., Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). As long as the facts alleged create a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elements, a plaintiff's suit should be allowed to continue. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955; Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2007).
III. ANALYSIS
Again, four Defendants have filed three motions to dismiss. Doc. Nos. [50-1]; [51-1]; [73-1]. As far as the merits are concerned, the motions to dismiss address Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims brought for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants—through the promulgation and enforcement of the curfew order—infringed his rights to protest and to be free from false arrest, as well as conducted an improper retaliatory arrest and selectively enforced the curfew order. All Movant Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's complaint is a shotgun pleading.
The motions to dismiss do not raise any argument about Plaintiff's claims involving the excessive force used in the arrest (Count I), unlawful seizure of property (Count IV), and most of the Georgia tort claims (Count V). But see supra note 10.
Each motion additionally raises specific arguments relating to the complaint's deficiencies for each Movant. Defendant Shields specifically argues that Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded that she can be held liable for any constitutional violation by the Defendant Officers' under the supervisor liability doctrine. Doc. No. [50-1], 11-14. Defendant City of Atlanta argues that it cannot be liable for any constitutional violation because Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded municipal liability. Doc. No. [51-1], 10-15. Finally, Defendants Clay and Lester argue that the constitutional claims against them are time-barred because the amended complaint does not relate back the addition of them as Parties to the date of the original complaint. Doc. No. [73-1], 10-21.
Thus, the motions present a variety of issues relating to procedure, merits, and immunity. The Court will proceed by first addressing the procedural issues relating to shotgun pleading and Defendants Clay and Lester's statute of limitations arguments. The Court will then turn to whether Plaintiff's pleaded any cognizable basis to hold liable Defendant Shields and Defendant City of Atlanta for the constitutional violations alleged. In short, the Court determines that each Movant is entitled to dismissal from this case for Plaintiff's failure to state a claim against them—and thus, the Court declines to further discuss in this Order the merits of Plaintiff's constitutional claims or any qualified immunity defense.
A. Shotgun Pleading
Each motion to dismiss argued that Plaintiff's complaint ought to be dismissed as an improper shotgun pleading. Doc. Nos. [50-1], 20-22; [51-1], 18-21; [73-1], 24. The Court disagrees.
"Shotgun pleadings make it virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief." Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. College, 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotations and citation omitted). In short, shotgun pleadings "fail to . . . give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests." Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). Different manifestations of shotgun pleadings include (1) "a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts," (2) a complaint "replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action," (3) a complaint that fails to "separat[e] into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief," and (4) a complaint "asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against." Id. at 1321-23.
Plaintiff's complaint does not constitute a shotgun pleading. He does not assert counts merely adopting preceding counts. He does not make conclusory, vague, or immaterial statements. He generally specifies which Defendants are named for each claim, acts, or omissions.
The Movants argue that Plaintiff has failed to specify whether a Defendant is being sued in their individual or official capacities. Doc. No. [50-1], 22; [51-1], 20-21; [73-1], 24. However, "plaintiffs are not required to designate with specific words in the pleadings that they are bringing a claim against defendants in their individual or official capacities, or both." Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 529 F.3d 1027, 1047 (11th Cir. 2008). There is no such requirement because "the course of proceedings typically indicates the nature of the liability sought to be imposed." Id. (quoting Jackson v. Ga. Dep't of Trans., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994)).
The Movants also argue that Plaintiff fails to specify which Defendant Officers were specifically involved in the incident as described. Doc. Nos. [50-1], 22; [51-1], 20; [73-1], 24. Plaintiff's amended complaint, however, states that the following "officers [were] involved in the arrest of [Plaintiff]": Horne, Deegan, Flores, Moore, Clay, and Lester. Doc. No. [44], ¶¶ 4-9 (emphasis added). Plaintiff immediately thereafter alleges, "All Arresting Officer Defendants acted in concert and conspiracy, where jointly and severally liable, and, at all relevant times, acted under color of state law." Id. ¶ 10 (emphasis added). Thus, by the Court's reading, Plaintiff clearly asserts which officers were personally involved in his arrest.
The only potential defect in Plaintiff's complaint is that two of Plaintiff's "Counts" contain multiple claims. See Doc. No. [44], ¶¶ 121-32 (Count III alleging false arrest, retaliatory arrest, and selective enforcement), 137-146 (Count V asserting Georgia tort claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress). While it would have been preferable for Plaintiff to separate each of these distinct claims into a separate count, the Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations are specific enough as to each cause of action for Defendants to be on notice of Plaintiff allegations. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 143 ("Arresting Officer Defendants' use of excessively tight handcuffs against [Plaintiff], tasing him, kicking him, knocking him to the ground, and forcing him to walk constituted assault and battery against him."), 145 ("Where Arresting Officer Defendants knew that they had no probable cause to arrest [Plaintiff] and the arrest resulted in months of criminal charges and prosecution against [Plaintiff], Arresting Officer Defendants' actions constituted malicious prosecution."). Consequently, Plaintiff has not filed a shotgun pleading.
B. Timeliness of Claims Against Defendants Clay and Lester
The Court now turns to Defendant Officers Clay and Lester's argument that they should be dismissed because Plaintiff's claims against them are untimely. Doc. No. [73-1], 10-21. Defendants Clay and Lester contend (1) Plaintiff filed the original complaint outside the statute of limitations period and (2) even if the original complaint was timely, the amended complaint's allegations against them do not "relate back" to the date of the initial complaint. Doc. No. [73-1], 10-21. Plaintiff responds that his original complaint was timely and that the claims against Officers Clay and Lester relate back because the Court extended the deadlines for service of process. Doc. No. [82], 5-6.
Defendants Clay and Lester also argue that any corporate conspiracy claim asserted against them should be dismissed. Doc. Nos. [73-1], 22-23; [83], 5-6. The Court, however, does not read Plaintiff's amended complaint to assert a claim for corporate conspiracy, but rather to plead that the officers acted together to violate his constitutional and state law rights, and thus are all liable for all the violations that occurred. Doc. No. [44], ¶ 10 ("All Arresting Officer Defendants acted in concert and conspiracy, were jointly and severally liable, and, at all relevant times, acted under color of state law."); cf. also Williams v. Sirmons, 307 F. App'x 354, 360 (11th Cir. 2009) ("[A] police officer with the ability to do so must intervene to stop another police officer's use of excessive force." (citing Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 924-25 (11th Cir. 2000))).
Ultimately, the Court determines that Defendants Clay and Lester failed to show that the original complaint was filed outside the limitations period, but that they are still entitled to dismissal because the amended complaint adding them as Defendants does not relate back to the original filing date and thus is untimely.
The Court previously granted Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint, specifically to add Defendants Clay and Lester as Parties. Doc. No. [43], 10-11. While it may have been judicially expedient for the Court to have denied Plaintiff's motion to amend as frivolous and untimely under the relation back rules, the Court maintains its reasoning for granting Plaintiff's motion to amend: it was unopposed at the time, the case was "still in its infancy," and the addition of Defendants Clay and Lester would (and did) "assist both [P]arties and the Court" in resolving the motions to dismiss. Id. at 11.
1. The Original Complaint's Untimeliness Under the Statute of Limitations
Defendants Clay and Lester first argue that the complaint should be dismissed because it was originally filed outside the statute of limitations. Doc. No. [73-1], 10-14. The Court disagrees.
Plaintiff's claims against Officers Clay and Lester arise under Section 1983 and Georgia torts. "Federal courts apply their forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff's claims are subject to Georgia's two-year limitations period for personal injury actions. Id. The limitations period begins to run when "the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights." Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
Here, no one contests that Plaintiff became aware of the violation to his rights on the date of the alleged incident. While Plaintiff maintains that his arrest occurred on May 30, 2020 (Doc. No. [44], ¶¶ 30-49), the incident report shows that the arrest occurred on May 31, 2020 (Doc. No. [44-1], 5-9). Regardless of when it began, Plaintiff's arrest, in fact, was not completed until the morning of May 31, 2020. Doc. Nos. [44], ¶ 64; [41-1], 9. The Court must make all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, and given these facts, the Court determines that, at this time, Defendants Clay and Lester have not sufficiently shown that Plaintiff's original complaint was untimely brought. Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1292 (11th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 130 S.Ct. 1784, 176 L.Ed.2d 582 (2010) (stating that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, which the Party asserting it carries the burden of proof).
2. Relation Back of Claims Against Added Defendant Officers Clay and Lester
Officers Clay and Lester alternatively argue that, even if the original complaint was timely brought, the allegations against them as named Defendants—asserted for the first time in the amended complaint—do not relate back to the date of the original complaint. Doc. No. [73-1], 14-21.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) allows for the relation back of amendment to a pleading that adds or amends the name of a party either when it is allowed under the state law providing the statute of limitations or by Rule 15 itself.
Under the Federal Rules, when the amendment relates to the same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" from the original complaint and the added party "received . . . notice of the action" during the service of process period and "knew . . . the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity" then the claims against the added parties can relate back to the date of the original complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). Georgia law similarly allows relation back if, "within the statute of limitations period, the new party had received such notice of the action that he will not be prejudiced, and that the new party knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him." Presnell v. Paulding Cty., 454 F. App'x 763, 768 (11th Cir. 2011); see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c). Under Georgia law, the amended allegations must also involve the same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" as the original complaint. Meredith v. McKesson Med.-Surgical, Inc., No. 1:20-CV-3280-MLB, 2021 WL 5140987, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 4, 2021).
Thus, "Georgia's law governing relation back is very similar to [Rule 15(c)(1)]." Castle v. Cobb Cty., No. 1:19-CV-01406-JPB, 2022 WL 1569705, at *4 (N.D. Ga. May 18, 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Presnell, 454 F. App'x at 767). The Georgia Supreme Court has recently confirmed that "[t]he language of OCGA § 9-11-15(c) is modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), and the slight differences between the two are not [always] material." Oconee Cty. v. Cannon, 310 Ga. 728, 733, 854 S.E.2d 531, 536 (2021) (alteration in original) (quotation and citation omitted). To relate back an amended complaint to the date of the original complaint that names or amends a Party, the Georgia and Federal Rules require the same essential showings: (1) the allegations against the added party involve the same transaction or occurrence as those in the original complaint, (2) the added party had timely notice of the action, and (3) the added party had knowledge that the action might have been brought against them but for Plaintiff's mistake.
While it seems likely that the first and second requirements have been satisfied here, the Court cannot conclude that Clay and Lester had knowledge that they would have been named as Defendants but for Plaintiff's mistake. Plaintiff's reason for not including Clay and Lester as named Defendants in the original complaint was that he did not know the names of the two "John Doe" officers involved in his arrest until after a limited preliminary discovery. Doc. No. [32].
The actions alleged against Officers Clay and Lester arise from the same incident as the original complaint's allegations, and Officers Clay and Lester would seemingly have had notice of the pending action given that their names were included in Plaintiff's incident report and that the other Officers involved were named as Defendants in the original complaint.
"Mistake," however, does not mean "lack of knowledge" for purposes of relating back added parties to an action. Meredith, 2021 WL 5140987, at *3 (quoting Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1103 (11th Cir. 1999)). While Rule 15 "permits an amendment to relate back [ ] where there has been an error made concerning the identity of the proper party . . . it does not permit relation back where [ ] there is a lack of knowledge of the proper party." Powers v. Graff, 148 F.3d 1223, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256 (7th Cir. 1993)); see also Bloodworth v. United States, 623 F. App'x 976, 979 (11th Cir. 2015) ("A plaintiff's amendment to identify parties previously designated as 'John Doe' defendants in the complaint does not relate back to the filing of the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 because the amendment is made to correct the plaintiff's lack of knowledge about whom to sue, not a mistake by the defendant in identifying the proper party."). The same has been said about Georgia's relation back rule. Perdomo v. CF MH II SF LLC, No. 1:20-CV-4763-TCB, 2021 WL 3046897, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 15, 2021) ("Generally, a plaintiff's lack of knowledge as to the identities of fictitious parties does not constitute 'mistake' under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c).").
The Georgia Supreme Court recently provided more clarity to the Georgia relation back rule's third requirement. Cannon, 310 Ga. at 734, 854 S.E.2d at 537. Cannon, however, did not opine on Georgia law's interpretation of what constitutes a "mistake" for relation back purposes. The Georgia Supreme Court did, nevertheless, reaffirm that it "look[s] for guidance" in Federal Rule 15(c) to interpret the Georgia relation back provision—and federal law is clear that naming "John Doe" defendants is not a mistake for relation back purposes. 310 Ga. at 733, 854 S.E. 2d. at 536.
Indeed, Plaintiff (a) filed the original complaint on the last day of the limitations period, and (b) appeared to have some knowledge of Clay and Lester's role in his arrest—the incident report attached to the original complaint (Doc. No. [1-1]) included Officers Clay and Lester's names—and yet still did not name them in the original complaint. These considerations reinforce the Court's conclusion that Plaintiff's failure to name Clay and Lester in the original complaint was not a mistake. Thus, Plaintiff, by failing to articulate any mistake leading to the omission of Officers Clay and Lester in the original complaint, has not met the relation back requirements. Defendants Clay and Lester's motion to dismiss is granted. All claims against Defendants Clay and Lester are hereby dismissed as time barred.
Because the Court dismisses all claims against Defendants Clay and Lester as being outside the statute of limitations period, the Court will not address Clay and Lester's malicious prosecution arguments. Doc. No. [73-1], 23-24. Defendants Clay and Lester's motion to dismiss is the only motion presented to the Court that specifically contests this state law cause of action and the Court's dismissal renders the request moot.
C. Defendant Shields' Supervisor Liability
In her motion to dismiss, Defendant Shields argues that Plaintiff has failed to adequately assert supervisor liability against her for the actions taken by the Defendant Officers. Doc. No. [50-1], 11-15. Thus, the Court must determine if Plaintiff adequately pleaded Defendant Shields can be liable for any constitutional violation as the Defendant Officers' supervisor.
For Section 1983 claims, supervisor liability requires more than respondeat superior. Braddy v. Fla. Dep't of Lab. & Emp. Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801-02 (11th Cir. 1998). Instead Plaintiff must allege that Shields personally participated in the unlawful acts or that there was a causal connection between her (as Defendant Officers' supervisor) and the constitutional deprivation at issue. Id. This causal connection can be shown through: (1) a history of the deprivation being "obvious, flagrant, rampant, [and] continued" such that Shields was on notice of the unconstitutional conduct, id., (2) a custom or policy that showed deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 2014), or (3) an inference that Shields directed the Defendant Officers to act unlawfully or knew that the Officers would act unlawfully and failed to stop them, id. Holding a supervisor liable under this standard is "extremely rigorous." Stalley v. Cumbie, 586 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1247 (M.D. Fla. 2022) (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003)). The Court concludes that Plaintiff's complaint does not meet these "extremely rigorous" requirements for stating a constitutional claim against Defendant Shields.
Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant Shields "was responsible for the implementation of a curfew that went into effect the night of [Plaintiff's] arrest and has supervisory authority over Arresting Officer Defendants." Doc. No. [44], ¶ 11. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant Shields and the City's Mayor were both present at the announcement of the curfew. Doc. No. [44], ¶ 16. At this announcement, Plaintiff alleges that Shields made inflammatory comments "expand[ing] on her department's thinking and intentions" with the curfew imposed. Id. ¶¶ 19, 22. Specifically, Defendant Shields called the prior rioting "terrorist" activities, "emphasized the need for harsh responses," and indicated that she was "ready to just lock people up." Id. ¶¶ 22-24. Plaintiff also recounts Defendant Shield's description of the curfew's purpose of "distinguish[ing]" those pursuing lawful activities from those with violent or criminal intent. Id. ¶ 25.
Plaintiff makes no suggestion in these allegations that there was a historical policy or custom of violating people's First, Fourth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights as specified in his complaint. Plaintiff must therefore have asserted that Defendant Shields had a custom or policy showing deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, or that she directed the Defendant Officers to act unlawfully or failed to stop the Officers' unlawful actions (of which she was aware). Taking Plaintiff's allegations and making all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Court determines that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that Defendant Shields is liable for any constitutional violation that may have occurred against Plaintiff from the incident involving the Defendant Officers.
Defendant Shields' inflammatory comments about the previous rioting activities and emphasis on keeping order during the protests certainly shows that she was committed to ensuring similar criminal activity did not repeat itself. Such commitment to keeping order at all costs, however, does not reasonably lead to an inference that Defendant Shields would be deliberately indifferent to constitutional rights or that she directed the Defendant Officers to partake in unconstitutional action. Per Plaintiff's allegations, the curfew, in Defendant Shields' own words, was to distinguish between criminal and lawful activity, and would be enforced accordingly. Doc. No. [44], ¶ 25. In fact, the complaint specifically indicates that Defendant Shields only indicated "harsh" enforcement against criminal wrongdoers, not persons acting lawfully at the protests. There is no suggestion that "harsh responses" would be taken toward anything other than the "lawlessness" or "terrorist" activities. Id. ¶ 23.
As such the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff alleged Defendant Shields was deliberately indifferent to constitutional rights. Nor do Plaintiff's allegations support that she directed the police department to partake in unlawful action, or that she knew the Defendant Officers would violate protesters constitutional rights and failed to stop them. Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to allege Defendant Shields can be held liable, as the Defendant Officers' supervisor, for the constitutional violations alleged in the complaint. Accordingly, Defendant Shields' motion to dismiss is granted for failure to state a claim against her for the Section 1983 constitutional claims.
D. City of Atlanta's Municipal Liability
In its motion to dismiss, Defendant City of Atlanta argues that the claims against the City should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to assert a policy or custom for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). See Doc. No. [51-1], 10-15.
Again, because there is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983, for a municipality to be held liable, a plaintiff must show "(1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation." Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)). Furthermore, the City's custom or policy must be the "moving force" behind the constitutional violation. Id. (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)).
The City of Atlanta contends that Plaintiff has alleged no such custom or policy. Specifically, the City argues that Plaintiff's complaint states that his arrest occurred before the curfew order had taken effect, and thus he cannot show the curfew order was the moving force behind any constitutional violation. Doc. No. [51-1], 12. The City further argues that Plaintiff's singular arrest, on the first night of curfew order, is insufficient custom or policy evidence. Id. at 13-14.
The Court will assume, for purposes of resolving the City's motion to dismiss, that Plaintiff adequately asserted his constitutional rights were violated. Cf. Jackson v. City of Homewood, No. 2:12-CV-4199-KOB, 2013 WL 2352430, at *4 (N.D. Ala. May 29, 2013). The Court is also inclined to find that passing the curfew order shows a City policy for purposes of Monell liability. In fact, a sister district court has already determined as much. Hassan v. City of Atlanta, No. 1:21-CV-4629-TWT, 2022 WL 1778211, at *3 (N.D. Ga. June 1, 2022) (holding that the curfew order "meet[s] the requirements of a government policy under Monell: that is, [it was] 'officially adopted by the municipality, or created by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the municipality' " (quoting Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2005))).
The Court acknowledges, but is not persuaded by, the differences between the Hassan case and Plaintiff's allegations. First, the City's orders at issue in Hassan included both the curfew order and the subsequently entered media policy order. 2022 WL 1778211 at *3. Hassan's additional consideration of the media policy, however, has no effect on whether the curfew order itself is a City policy. Hassan also relied on cases involving the final policymaking authority theory of Monell liability, which admittedly neither Party in the instant motion to dismiss discusses. Id. Nevertheless, the Court finds Hassan's reasoning persuasive that the City's curfew order constitutes a policy or custom for Monell liability.
Plaintiff's claim against the City, however, fails on the final Monell requirement—Plaintiff has not asserted the promulgation of the curfew order was the "moving force" for the alleged constitutional violations. Per the complaint's own contentions, the curfew order was not passed to infringe the right to protest peacefully or to cause unlawful arrests. Doc. No. [44], ¶¶ 17 (distinguishing protesters seeking "peaceful change in this city" from those trying "to destroy [the] city"), 25 (indicating the purpose of the curfew was to differentiate lawful activities from violence and rioting). The complaint acknowledges the Mayor said "[w]e do not want to have to arrest your children [and] [w]e do not want to have to detain anyone" but that the City "will maintain order." Id. ¶ 18. These allegations do not support a reasonable inference that the curfew order was promulgated to violate First Amendment rights or that the City encouraged enforcing the curfew order in any way that would lead to unlawful arrests. Moreover, Defendant Shields' inflammatory statements do not support an inference that the City's leaders promulgated or enforced the curfew order in a manner causing any constitutional violation in the complaint. See supra Section (III)(C).
Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to allege the City's curfew order was the moving force behind the constitutional violations asserted. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against the City must be dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the Court so grants the City's motion.
E. Concluding Remarks About the Constitutional Violations and Qualified Immunity
In this Order, the Court has chosen not to discuss if Plaintiff's complaint has adequately alleged any constitutional violation or whether qualified immunity would be available. The Court has chosen this more restrained approach because (1) these unaddressed merits and immunity issues need not be resolved in the light of the complaint's other deficiencies that require dismissing the Movants, and (2) there are several remaining Officer Defendants who may have the same merits and immunity arguments but have not moved to dismiss the complaint. This latter point may, in some cases, favor a more thorough analysis. Cf. Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 2009) (discussing the merits in a Section 1983 analysis despite a lack of clearly established law because the merits discussion applies to other remaining defendants). Here, however, even if the Court had decided the constitutional or qualified immunity questions, it would have been reluctant to sua sponte dismiss any claims against the non-Movant Defendant Officers. Cf. generally Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 695 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1983) (disfavoring sua sponte dismissals based on the substance of a claim).
Thus, given there is no need to address these issues in resolving the instant motions and without the benefit of the remaining Defendants' briefing, the Court determines that restraint and judicial efficiency outweigh any benefit to resolving constitutional questions or immunity issues at this stage in the proceedings. The Court thereby will address these issues more completely at the appropriate time, i.e., on submission by the remaining Defendant Officers.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the three instant motions to dismiss. Doc. Nos. [50-1]; [51-1]; [73-1]. Defendants Shields, City of Atlanta, and Officers Clay and Lester are accordingly DISMISSED from this action.
Finally, the Court ORDERS that the discovery stay (Doc. No. [81]) be lifted for all remaining Officer Defendants. It appears that this case was on a 4-month discovery track, and thus the Court ORDERS that discovery must be completed within 4-months as of the day of this Order. With these amended deadlines in mind, the scheduling order (Doc. No. [71]) otherwise remains in effect.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 21st day of April, 2023.