Opinion
No. 04 Civ. 1074 (RWS).
March 31, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Chrisha Creations Limited and Quay Richardson (collectively "Chrisha") have moved pursuant to Local Civil Rule 6.3 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) for reconsideration of the Court's February 17, 2005 memo endorsement denying Chrisha's motion, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), for certification of the Court's order of June 23, 2004. The February 15, 2005 memo endorsement stated that "[a]n appeal of the preliminary injunction based upon the June 23 order having been filed, this application is denied as duplicative."
By way of background, it should be noted that on June 23, 2004, the Court ruled invalid United States Patent No. 6,644,843 (the "843 patent"), which had been held by Gemmy. See Gemmy Industries Corp. v. Chrisha Creations Ltd., No. 04 Civ. 1074 (RWS), 2004 WL 1406075, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2004). On November 1, 2004, the Court entered a preliminary injunction ordering that Gemmy: (1) stop manufacturing, selling, and distributing goods bearing the '843 patent number, (2) conceal or remove references to the '843 patent from items in its inventory; and (3) request that retailers either return goods bearing the '843 patent number or conceal all such markings. On November 24, 2004, Gemmy noticed an appeal of the November 1, 2004 preliminary injunction to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This appeal was docketed as Appeal No. 05-1110. On March 15, 2005, the Federal Circuit ruled that in connection with Gemmy's appeal, it would exercise pendant jurisdiction to review the June 23, 2004 ruling concerning the invalidity of the '843 patent.
Chrisha argues that the February 15, 2005 memo endorsement was in error because the Federal Circuit, pursuant to its March 15, 2005 order, will not review this Court's June 23, 2004 order in its entirety.
Rule 59 provides that "[a]ny motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Local Civil Rule 6.3 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A notice of motion for reconsideration or reargument of a court order determining a motion shall be served within ten (10) days after the entry of the court's determination of the original motion, or in the case of a court order resulting in a judgment, within ten (10) days after the entry of the judgment. There shall be served with the notice of motion a memorandum setting forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked. . . .
Local Civ. R. 6.3 (emphasis in original).
Motions to alter or amend judgments under Rule 59(e) and for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3 are evaluated under the same standard. See Word v. Croce, No. 01 Civ. 9614 (LTS), 2004 WL 434038, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2004); Williams v. New York City Dep't of Corr., 219 F.R.D. 78, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Petrojam, Ltd., 72 F. Supp. 2d 365, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). On a motion made pursuant to either rule, "`the moving party must demonstrate controlling law or factual matters put before the court on the underlying motion that the movant believes the court overlooked and that might reasonably be expected to alter the court's decision.'" Word, 2004 WL 434038, at *2 (quoting Parrish v. Sollecito, 253 F. Supp. 2d 713, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)); see also Williams, 219 F.R.D. at 83. Alternatively, "`reconsideration may be granted to correct clear error, prevent manifest injustice or review the court's decision in light of the availability of new evidence.'" Word, 2004 WL 434038, at *2 (quoting Parrish, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 715).
Chrisha has failed to demonstrate that the Court overlooked any factual matters or controlling legal authority in connection with its February 15, 2005 memo endorsement. See, e.g., Yurman Design Inc. v. Chaindom Enter., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 9307 (JFK), 2000 WL 217480, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that "[reconsideration] is appropriate only where the Court has `overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion'") (quoting Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Furthermore, the Federal Circuit's March 15, 2005 order reinforces that Chrisha's application was duplicative of an appeal currently before that court. Therefore, Chrisha's motion for reconsideration is denied.
It is so ordered.