Ms. Gesler contends that presentation or submission to the court is not necessary to meet the requirements of an appearance and that attorney negotiations may constitute an appearance. In support of this contention, she cites three cases: (1) Gazin v. Hoy, 102 Nev. 621, 730 P.2d 436 (1986); (2) Franklin v. Bartsas Realty, Inc., 95 Nev. 559, 598 P.2d 1147 (1979); and (3) Christy v. Carlisle, 94 Nev. 651, 584 P.2d 687 (1978). Her reliance on these cases, however, is misplaced. All of these cases concern an "appearance" for the purposes of NRCP 55(b)(2). NRCP 55(b)(2) is designed to protect parties from having a default judgment entered against them; it imposes an affirmative duty on the party seeking a default judgment to notify a defendant who has "appeared" about upcoming hearings.

It was obviously fully aware of the correct procedures and on September 10, 2001, the Nevada district court merely filed an amended judgment. {¶ 35} We also cite the case of Gazin v. Hoy (1986), 102 Nev. 621, 730 P.2d 436 to reiterate our understanding that the entire judgment, upon which the November 22, 2000 filing of foreign judgment was based, was not void. In Gazin, the defendant failed to timely answer, and the clerk entered defendant's default on August 27, 1985.

When a defendant has made an appearance in an action, the failure to give the notice prescribed by NRCP 55(b)(2) renders a subsequent default judgment void. Gazin v. Hoy, 102 Nev. 621, 624, 730 P.2d 436, 438 (1986). For purposes of NRCP 55(b)(2)'s notice requirement, a formal appearance in the case is not necessary.

We believe "informal contacts" between attorneys and others should be treated with "a degree of commonsense flexibility," which we now apply in holding these settlement conferences were sufficient to create an appearance. Muniz, 739 F.2d at 701 (noting settlement negotiations sufficient for appearance under the rule); CSB Corp. v. Cadillac Creative Advertising, Inc., 136 F.R.D. 34, 35 (D.R.I. 1990) (settlement discussions constitute appearance); H.F. Livermore Corp., supra (holding negotiations between parties sufficient to constitute an appearance); Gazin v. Hoy, 102 Nev. 621, 730 P.2d 436, 438 (1986) (negotiations enough to constitute appearance); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 300 (1994) (negotiations can establish appearance). Compare Direct Mail Spec. v. Eclat Computerized Tech., 840 F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988) (while court will usually try to find an appearance, facts here not enough as parties negotiated only one day before the summons and complaint were served).

An appearance for purposes of NRCP 55(b)(2) does not require a presentation or submission to the court; indeed, a course of negotiation between attorneys is sufficient to constitute an appearance for purposes of NRCP 55(b)(2) where the defendant has indicated a clear purpose to defend the suit. Gazin v. Hoy, 102 Nev. 621, 624, 730 P.2d 436, 438 (1986) (citing Franklin v. Bartsas Realty, Inc., 95 Nev. 559, 598 P.2d 1147 (1979)). McNair contends that, under this standard, an appearance was entered by him pursuant to the correspondence exchanged between Rivera's counsel and McNair's former counsel, Roy Smith. Specifically, on May 14, 1991, Rivera's attorney, Daniel F. Polsenberg, sent the following letter to Roy E. Smith, who had represented McNair before the Medical-Legal Screening Panel:

These special rules were adopted to prevent precisely the type of mishaps presented in this case. Lutomski v. Panther Valley Coin Exchange, 653 F.2d 270, 270 (6th Cir. 1981); Turner v. Salvatierra, 580 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1978); Charlton L. Davis Co. v. Fedder Data Center, Inc., 556 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1977); Heleasco Seventeen, Inc. v. Drake, 102 F.R.D. 909, 910 (D.Del. 1984); Segars v. Hagerman, 99 F.R.D. 274, 275 (N.D.Miss. 1983); United States v. Manos, 56 F.R.D. 655, 659 (S.D.Ohio 1972); Dalminter, Inc. v. Jessie Edwards, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 491, 491 (S.D. Tex. 1961); Gazin v. Hoy, 730 P.2d 436, 437 (Nev. 1986); Simonson v. Sittner, 82 N.W.2d 78, 78 (N.D. 1957); Peterson v. McMillan, 70 S.D. 56, 14 N.W.2d 97, 97 (1944). State courts in other jurisdictions have rejected the idea that an agreement or stipulation extending time to plead or to answer constitutes an appearance for purposes of personal jurisdiction.

We note that Roma Hills would likely have only been required to serve notice of the request for a default judgment to be entered if Kendar had participated in the litigation. See NRCP 55(b)(2) (stating "[i]f the party against whom a default judgment is sought has appeared personally or by a representative, that party or its representative must be served with written notice of the application at least 7 days before the hearing"); Gazin v. Hoy, 102 Nev. 621, 624, 730 P.2d 436, 438 (1986) (explaining that "[a] plaintiff must give written notice of an application for a default judgment to any defendant that has appeared in the action"). We need not further discuss this matter in light of our disposition.

Numerous other jurisdictions have held that communications between parties or their attorneys concerning settlement of the claim are enough to trigger the requirement of notice. See, e.g., Muniz v. Vidal, 739 F.2d 699, 701 (1st Cir. 1984) (settlement negotiations sufficient for appearance under the rule); CSB Corp. v. Cadillac Creative Advertising, Inc., 136 F.R.D. 34, 35 (D.R.I. 1990) (settlement discussions constitute appearance); H.F. Livermore, 432 F.2d at 692 (negotiations between parties sufficient to constitute an appearance); Gazin v. Hoy, 730 P.2d 436, 438 (Nev. 1986) (negotiations constitute appearance); Gulf Maintenance Supply, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 543 So.2d 813, 817(Fla. 1989) (recognizing appearance in letter sent to plaintiff's counsel confirming that defendant planned to defend and desired to discuss settlement); Ragnone v. Wirsing, 367 N.W.2d 369, 370 (Mich. 1985).