2(b); 10–1–623(f); 10–1–814(b). But it did not do so here, leading us to conclude that it did not intend to limit the statute's reach to claims against only a certain subset of civil defendants. See Gay v. Owens , 292 Ga. 480, 481–82, 738 S.E.2d 614 (2013) (when General Assembly uses a phrase in other statutes, courts do not read that phrase into a statute that does not contain it). This case is similar to Norred, in which we overruled prior precedent to hold that OCGA § 9–3–72, which tolls the limitations period for medical malpractice case “where a foreign object has been left in a patient's body,” is not limited to cases in which the object is left unintentionally. 320 Ga.App. at 510–13 (1), 740 S.E.2d 251. As in that case, the plain language of OCGA § 9–3–99 is clear and “[t]here is no language in this Code section limiting its application” to cases in which the party sued has been criminally accused.

This is not one of the extremely rare instances in which this Court will exercise its original jurisdiction. See Gay v. Owens, 292 Ga. 480, 482-483 (2) (738 S.E.2d 614) (2013). Until Russell has pursued mandamus and prohibition relief in superior court and obtained a ruling thereon, there is no basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction. See Brown, 251 Ga. at 436-437.

This case therefore does not present one of the extremely rare instances in which this Court will exercise original mandamus jurisdiction. See Gay v. Owens, 292 Ga. 480, 482-483 (2) (738 S.E.2d 614) (2013). Rather, Patel must first pursue relief in the superior court.

Thus, except in rare instances, litigants should first petition the superior court for mandamus relief. See Id.; see also Byrd v. Robinson, 349 Ga.App. 19, 20 (825 S.E.2d 424) (2019); Gay v. Owens, 292 Ga. 480, 482-483 (2) (738 S.E.2d 614) (2013); Graham v. Cavender, 252 Ga. 123, 123 (311 S.E.2d 832) (1984).

(punctuation omitted)). Byrd, 349 Ga.App. at 20 (punctuation omitted); see Gay v. Owens, 292 Ga. 480, 482-834 (2) (738 S.E.2d 614) (2013) (explaining that a petition for writ of mandamus must be filed initially in superior court and not appellate courts when none of the "extremely rare" instances in which an appellate court's original jurisdiction is invoked) (punctuation omitted); Graham v. Cavender, 252 Ga. 123, 123 (311 S.E.2d 832) (1984)

This is not one of the extremely rare instances in which this Court will exercise original mandamus jurisdiction. See Gay v. Owens, 292 Ga. 480, 482-483 (2) (738 S.E.2d 614) (2013). Until Gregory has pursued mandamus relief in superior court and obtained a ruling thereon, there is no basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction.

Until El-Elyou has pursued mandamus relief in superior court and obtained a ruling thereon, there is no basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction. See Gay v. Owens, 292 Ga. 480, 482-483 (2) (738 S.E.2d 614) (2013); Brown, 251 Ga. at 436. Accordingly, this petition for writ of mandamus is hereby DISMISSED.

This is not one of the extremely rare instances in which this Court will exercise original mandamus jurisdiction. See Gay v. Owens, 292 Ga. 480, 482-483 (2) (738 S.E.2d 614) (2013). Although Woodard states that he has filed a mandamus petition and a habeas corpus petition in the trial court, it appears those actions remain pending.

In sum, this is not one of the extremely rare instances in which this Court will exercise original mandamus jurisdiction. See Gay v. Owens, 292 Ga. 480, 482-483 (2) (738 S.E.2d 614) (2013). Accordingly, this petition for writ of mandamus is hereby DISMISSED.

Both OCGA §§ 51-1-11 and 51-14-5 appear in the code sections governing torts. Gay v. Owens , 292 Ga. 480, 482 (1), 738 S.E.2d 614 (2013) ("Statutes are not to be construed in a vacuum, but in relation to other statutes of which they are a part.") (citation and punctuation omitted). Nothing in the Act created a new cause of action; rather, the Act set out procedural standards for bringing claims arising from asbestos exposure.