Opinion
05-22-00889-CR
06-21-2024
ALONZO GAUT, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(B)
On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F20-39098
Before Justices Molberg, Nowell, and Kennedy
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ERIN A. NOWELL JUSTICE
A jury convicted Alonzo Gaut of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. In a single issue, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. In a single cross-issue, the State requests we modify the judgment to show appellant pleaded not true to each enhancement paragraph and the trial court found each enhancement paragraph to be true. We modify the trial court's judgment and affirm as modified.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We uphold a verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. "This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655.
The finder of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655. When considering a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, we must keep in mind that the finder of fact may choose to believe or disbelieve all, some, or none of the evidence presented. Id. When faced with conflicts in the evidence, a reviewing court shall presume that the fact finder resolved those conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Id. at 656. The evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if "the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to the verdict." Id. at 655-56 (quoting Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).
As is relevant here, a person commits the offense of aggravated assault if the person commits assault and uses a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a)(2). A person commits assault if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. Id. § 22.01(a).
Margarita Tejada went to QuikTrip for gas. Appellant approached her and asked if she needed help pumping gas. Tejada replied that she did not. When Tejada got back into her car, appellant was sitting in the passenger seat. Appellant told her to start the car; she refused and instructed him to get out of her car. Appellant insisted she start the car. When Tejada continued to refuse, appellant pulled out a gun, pointed it at her, held it against her body, and insisted she start the car. Tejada continued to refuse, and appellant grabbed her leg. Tejada managed to escape from the car. Jeremiah Hamilton, a manager at QuikTrip, noticed Tejada crying in the parking lot. She said a strange man was in her car, and when she tried to get away, he hit her in the face with his gun.
Tejada was taken to the hospital, and her medical records show she suffered a minor closed-head injury, concussion, diffuse traumatic brain injury, contusions on her forehead and right ring finger, and an abrasion on her right thigh. The jury saw photos of Tejada and her injuries that were taken immediately after the assault and others taken a few days later.
The jury also heard a recorded jail call wherein appellant told an unidentified woman that he had a gun, got into someone's car, and "tried to hurt somebody."
Appellant testified in his defense. He maintained he was at the QuikTrip because he had run out of gas, and he was trying to find someone to take him back to his car. Tejada agreed to do so. After Tejada pumped her gas, she got into the car, she unlocked the passenger side door, and appellant got into the car. As he reached for his seatbelt, his gun fell out. Although Tejada looked "alarmed," appellant explained the gun was for his protection. Appellant returned the gun to his pocket, but Tejada "panicked," screamed, got out of the car, and fell as she ran away. Appellant believed Tejada's injuries were from the fall. Appellant testified they did not have any altercation in the car, he did not strike her with the gun, he did not touch her, and he had no intention of harming her.
Based on his own testimony, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to show he caused Tejada's injuries. We disagree. While appellant testified he did not touch Tejada, did not strike her with the gun, and had no intention of harming her, the jury was free to disbelieve his testimony. See Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655. In contrast to appellant's testimony, Tejada testified that appellant pointed his gun at her and touched the gun to her body. Appellant also grabbed her leg, which caused bruising. Her face was also bruised, and she suffered a concussion. Hamilton recounted that Tejada told him that appellant hit her in the face with a gun. And appellant stated in his call from the jail that he got into someone's car, had a gun, and tried to hurt somebody.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the offense, including that appellant caused bodily injury to Tejada, proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. We overrule appellant's sole issue.
MODIFICATION OF THE JUDGMENT
In a single cross-issue, the State requests we make two modifications to the trial court's judgment. We have the power to modify judgments to speak the truth when provided with the necessary information. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(B); see also McDade v. State, 613 S.W.3d 349, 358 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2020, no pet.).
The judgment includes the notation "N/A" in the sections regarding the first and second enhancement paragraphs and the trial court's findings on those paragraphs. However, the record shows appellant pleaded not true to two enhancement paragraphs, and the trial court found both enhancement paragraphs to be true. Accordingly, we modify the judgment to show appellant pleaded "Not True" to the first and second enhancement paragraphs, and the trial court found each enhancement paragraph to be "True." We sustain the State's cross-issue.
CONCLUSION
We modify the trial court's judgment to show appellant pleaded not true to each enhancement paragraph and the trial court found each enhancement paragraph to be true. We affirm the trial court's judgment as modified.
JUDGMENT
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows:
Under the heading "1st Enhancement Paragraph," we DELETE the letters "N/A" and ADD the words "Not True."
Under the heading "2nd Enhancement Paragraph," we DELETE the letters "N/A" and ADD the words "Not True."
Under the heading "Finding on "1st Enhancement Paragraph," we DELETE the letters "N/A" and ADD the word "True."
Under the heading "Finding on 2nd Enhancement Paragraph," we DELETE the letters "N/A" and ADD the word "True."
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.