Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2405-13T1
03-25-2015
CHRISTINE M. GATTO, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and DAK, INC., t/a DUNKIN DONUTS, Respondents.
Christine M. Gatto, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Robert M. Strang, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent DAK, Inc. has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Nugent and Manahan. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 407,639. Christine M. Gatto, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Robert M. Strang, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent DAK, Inc. has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Christine M. Gatto appeals from a final decision of the Board of Review, finding her disqualified for unemployment benefits because she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to her work. Since the Board's decision was rooted in facts in the record and consistent with relevant statutory provisions, we affirm.
Gatto worked for defendant DAK, Inc., trading as Dunkin' Donuts, for fifteen years, from September 1996 until November 1, 2011, when she left her employment. Gatto worked at the front counter, serving donuts to customers, until July 2011 when, due to numerous customer complaints, DAK moved her to the rear of the store to assist with baking and frosting donuts. According to the store owner, Gatto's position assisting in the rear of the store was created to accommodate Gatto in recognition of her long duration of employment. Gatto claimed that she was terminated on November 1, 2011; the employer asserted that she left voluntarily due to health reasons.
On October 25, 2012, the Deputy Director of the Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance determined Gatto voluntarily left her job without good cause attributable to her work, thus disqualifying her from unemployment benefits. On September 14, 2013, following a hearing, the Appeal Tribunal affirmed the Deputy's determination. On Gatto's administrative appeal, the Board agreed with the Appeal Tribunal finding Gatto left her employment due to migraines and leg spasms and DAK did not discharge her. There was no evidence that Gatto's work caused or aggravated these medical conditions for leaving.
On this appeal, Gatto argues she should have been permitted to have her husband represent her at the hearing. However, she is apparently confusing the hearing involved in this appeal with another case in which she requested that her husband be permitted to represent her. The record of the hearing involved on this appeal includes no such request.
Gatto appealed, arguing among other points that she was wrongly asked to pay back approved benefits and was not provided a fair hearing since there is no credible evidence that she voluntarily quit.
Our role in reviewing administrative agency decisions involving unemployment benefits is generally limited. See Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). We defer to factual findings where supported by sufficient credible evidence. Ibid. "'[T]he test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)).
A reviewing court will intervene only if the challenged action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or "clearly inconsistent with [the agency's] statutory mission or with other State policy." Ibid. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, the scope of appellate review is confined to determining whether the agency decision offends the State or Federal Constitution; whether such action violates legislative policies; whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the agency's factual findings; and, lastly, whether the agency, in applying legislative policies to the facts, clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made. Id. at 210-11.
Our decision is guided by fundamental principles of law governing unemployment compensation. The Unemployment Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -24.30 (the Act), is designed primarily to lessen the impact of unemployment that befalls workers without their fault. Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 212. "The public policy behind the Act is to afford protection against the hazards of economic insecurity due to involuntary unemployment." Yardville Supply Co. v. Bd. of Review, 114 N.J. 371, 374 (1989).
In this case, we conclude that the Board's decision to deny Gatto benefits is supported by substantial credible evidence. The governing statute, N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), provides that a claimant may not receive benefits if he or she "has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work." Although the statute does not define "good cause," "courts have construed the statute to mean 'cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed.'" Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Condo v. Bd. of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App. Div. 1978)).
Applying our highly deferential standard of review, we find no reason to interfere with the Board's decision. Gatto claimed she was discharged due to her physical inability to perform her work. However, the record amply supports the Board's determination that Gatto left voluntarily. An employee who leaves work for personal reasons is not deemed to have left work voluntarily with good cause. Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 213; Rider Coll. v. Bd. of Review, 167 N.J. Super. 42, 47-48 (App. Div. 1979). "Mere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute cause for leaving work voluntarily." Domenico, supra, 192 N.J. Super. at 288 (quoting Medwick v. Bd. of Review, 69 N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App. Div. 1961)). "'The decision to leave unemployment must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances . . . attributable to the work.'" Fernandez v. Bd. of Review, 304 N.J. Super. 603, 606 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Domenico, supra, 192 N.J. Super. at 288). "[I]t is the employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed." Domenico, supra, 192 N.J. Super. at 288 (citing Condo, supra, 158 N.J. Super. at 175).
Here, Gatto proffers no credible support for her discharge allegations. The conclusory statements are insufficient to support her claims. Applying our standard of review, we conclude the Board's decision was not erroneous.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION