Opinion
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:02-CV-1978-WBH
April 22, 2003
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss [4]. For the reasons set forth below, this motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On July 17, 2002, Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendant The Fox Theatre ("The Fox") pursuant to Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq., and the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Plaintiffs, both frequent patrons of The Fox, are physically impaired as a result of post-polio syndrome and depend on power wheelchairs for mobility. They allege that The Fox discriminates against wheelchair-bound patrons in the provision of accessible seating, ticketing, concessions, and other services. Plaintiffs have also asserted a claim under Georgia law for intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging that The Fox's discriminatory practices and policies have subjected them to severe emotional distress.
In particular, Plaintiffs allege that each time they attend an event at The Fox, they "experience severe emotional distress as a result of the physical discomfort, humiliation, stigmatization, embarrassment, ostracism, isolation, and segregation they encounter." Complaint, ¶ 50. Plaintiffs explain that they are forced to sit in dangerously sloped aisle locations and other areas that are difficult to access, and they must follow burdensome ticket-purchasing procedures that single out and humiliate them. Plaintiffs also experience inconvenience and humiliation when they must seek out theater staff to assist them in accessing bathrooms, concession stands, and elevators. Plaintiffs assert that the cumulative effect of these experiences amounts to the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Fox has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
The complaint also describes specific incidents experienced by Plaintiffs between 1995 and April 2000, For example, in 1998. an usher yelled and shook his fist at Plaintiff Bonham when she tried to sit in the aisle next to her husband, who was also in a wheelchair. In January 2000, Plaintiff Gathright-Dietrich had to ask a staff member to let her in the Spanish Room, which was closed for a private party, in order to use the only accessible restroom. Ms. Gathright-Dietrich had to make her way through the crowded party in her wheelchair and then ask the staff member to re-lock the door. The Court notes, however, that these events occurred more than two years before Plaintiffs brought this action and are thus barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Sec Smith v. Tandy Com.. 738 F. Supp. 521, 522 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (noting that the plaintiff could have brought suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress after each incident of sexual harassment).
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
A district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, Powell v. United States, 945 F.2d 374, 375 (11th Cir. 1991). In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations contained in the complaint and must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Peterson v. Atlanta Housing Auth., 998 F.2d 904. 912 (11th Cir. 1993). While the Court must weigh every inference in plaintiffs favor, however, "conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal." Oxford Asset Mgmt. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002). The "threshold of sufficiency that a complaint must meet to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is exceedingly low." Quality Foods de Centro America, S.A. v, Latin America Agribusiness Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d 989, 995 (11th Cir. 1983). Thus, a court can dismiss a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) only when a plaintiff "can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief." Martinez v. American Airlines, Inc., 74 F.3d 247, 248 (11th Cir. 1996).
B. Partial Motion to Dismiss
The Fox moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the ground that its failure to adequately accommodate wheelchair-bound patrons does not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct under Georgia law. Plaintiffs contend that The Fox's conduct should be considered extreme and outrageous because the discriminatory practices continued after Plaintiffs complained, and Plaintiffs were particularly susceptible to severe emotional distress because of their disability.
In order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Georgia law, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant engaged in intentional or reckless conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that there is a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) that plaintiffs emotional distress is severe. Yarbray v. Southern Bell Telephone Telegraph Co., 261 Ga. 703, 706 (1991). Whether a claim rises to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness is a question of law to be determined by the court. Id. Liability has been found only where the defendant's conduct was "so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society/" Kaiser v. Tara Ford, Inc., 248 Ga. App. 481, 488 (2001).
In this case, the Court concludes that The Fox's conduct cannot reasonably be characterized as extreme and outrageous. Discriminatory conduct, standing alone, is not sufficient to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Atakpa v. Perimeter OB-GYN Associates. P.C., 912 F. Supp. 1566, 1577 (NLD. Ga. 1994) (Carnes. J.) (finding no indication that the defendant's conduct, even if it were deemed to violate Title VI or the ADA, was motivated by any desire to humiliate, frighten, or anger the plaintiff). Furthermore, unlike claims brought in the employer-employee and provider-patient context, Georgia courts have not recognized any special relationship between a theater and its patrons that would give rise to "a character of outrageousness that otherwise might not exist." See Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 225 Ga. App. 636, 641 (1997) (noting that a relationship in which one person has control over another may produce such a character of outrageousness).
Accordingly, The Fox's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's partial motion to dismiss [4] is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is DISMISSED.It is so ORDERED.