Contextual evidence is admitted, not because it has any particular evidentiary purpose, but rather, because in narrating the one offense, it is impracticable to avoid mentioning the other extraneous offense. Id. at 142 (citing Mayes v. State, 816 S.W.2d 79, 86-87 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)); see alsoGarza v. State, 2 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd) (" Crimes do not occur in a vacuum, and the state is entitled to prove the circumstances surrounding the crime even though they may seem like irrelevant details." ).

or objection, jury-charge error does not require reversal unless it causes "egregious harm." Id. at 171-72. The State may offer punishment-phase evidence as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have been committed by the defendant. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07 § 3(a) (Vernon 2006 Supp. 2008); Sims v. State, 273 S.W.3d 291, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). When evidence of extraneous offenses or bad acts is admitted during the punishment phase, the trial court is usually required to instruct the jury sua sponte on the reasonable-doubt standard of proof. Huizar v. State, 12 S.W.3d 479, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). However, if the extraneous offenses constitute same-transaction contextual evidence, then the trial court is not required to instruct the jury sua sponte regarding the reasonable-doubt standard of proof for extraneous offenses and bad acts. See Garza v. State, 2 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd). Same-transaction contextual evidence imparts to the jury information essential to understanding the context and circumstances of events which, although legally separate offenses, are blended or interwoven. See Camacho v. State, 864 S.W.2d 524, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). As such, it is admissible to illuminate the nature of the crime alleged. See id. Dr. Gonsoulin testified regarding the injuries to the complainant that she observed during the autopsy of the complainant's body. Dr. Gonsoulin discussed a diagram in her autopsy report that showed the internal injuries she found during the autopsy. Dr. Gonsoulin described a fracture to the complainant's skull, and hemorrhages in the following parts of the complainant's body: in the muscles above the complainant's ears; under the complainant's scalp; and in tissue in the area of the complainant's buttocks, back, and shoulders. Dr. Gonsoulin testified that all these injuries would have been sustained within the same twenty-four-hour peri

The purpose of such evidence is to assist the jury in assessing punishment, and no reasonable doubt instruction is required at punishment regarding such evidence. Glockzin v. State, 220 S.W.3d 140, 152 (Tex. App.-Waco 2007, pet. ref'd); see also atkinson v. State, Nos. 08-00454-CR, 01-08-00455-CR, 2010 WL 143458, at *7-8 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 14, 2010, no pet. h.); Garza v. State, 2 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd) (holding instruction was not required at punishment because "same transaction contextual evidence" simply explained "the circumstances of the offense"). The testimony that Martinez asserts required a reasonable doubt instruction at punishment was testimony describing the circumstances of the offense for which appellant was convicted, not extraneous offenses.

Relying on Garza v. State, the State argues that it was not required to give notice of its intent to introduce the evidence of Wilson's resistance to being fingerprinted under 404(b) because it was "same transaction contextual evidence." 2 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd). "Same transaction contextual evidence" is a recognized exception to Rule 404(b) and refers to other offenses connected with the primary offense and is admissible when the evidence is necessary for the state to logically present evidence of the charged offense.

Relying on Garza v. State, the State argues that it was not required to give notice of its intent to introduce the evidence of Wilson's resistance to being fingerprinted under 404(b) because it was "same transaction contextual evidence." 2 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd). "Same transaction contextual evidence" is a recognized exception to Rule 404(b) and refers to other offenses connected with the primary offense and is admissible when the evidence is necessary for the state to logically present evidence of the charged offense.

"Same transaction contextual evidence" refers to other offenses connected with the primary offense and is admissible when the evidence is necessary for the state to logically present evidence of the charged offense. Garza v. State, 2 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd) (citing Lockhart v. State, 847 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)); see Sparks v. State, 935 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, no pet.). The reason for admitting such evidence is "simply because in narrating the one it is impractical to avoid describing the other, and not because the other has any evidential purpose."

Appellant's counsel cites the decision of the San Antonio Court in Garza v. State for the proposition that, because the record does not affirmatively show that the trial court's failure to admonish Gamble on the deportation consequences harmed him, we must conclude that he was not harmed by such failure. 2 S.W.3d 331, 334 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd); see also Gorham v. State, 981 S.W.2d 315, 319 n. 6 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd). In Garza, the San Antonio Court held that the defendant was not harmed by a failure to admonish on the deportation consequences because "[the defendant] did not show that she was unaware of the consequences of her plea or that she was misled or harmed."

And, because same transaction contextual evidence is not offered as evidence against a defendant within the proscription of Rule 404(b), but rather to explain the circumstances of the offense, a reasonable doubt instruction is not required. The State thus asserts that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to include such an instruction. See Camacho v. State, 864 S.W.2d 524, 535 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Garza v. State, 2 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied). We disagree with the State's characterization of this evidence.

Instead, they were "same transaction contextual evidence" for which no reasonable-doubt instruction was required.King, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS at *7-8 (citing Garza v. State, 2 S.W.3d 331, 334-35 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd) and Norrid v. State, 925 S.W.2d 342, 349 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, no pet.)). The court of appeals agreed with appellant that the trial court had, nevertheless, erred in failing to give the reasonable-doubt instruction for the last four acts listed which were separate extraneous acts.

Consequently, same transaction contextual evidence admitted or used during the punishment phase does not require a reasonable-doubt instruction under section 3(a)(1) of article 37.07 nor does the trial court err in failing to give such an instruction sua sponte. See Lopez, 515 S.W.3d at 552 (holding that reasonable-doubt instruction is not required for "same-transaction contextual evidence" admitted during punishment phase); Harper, 2017 WL 541537, at *1-3 (same); Atkinson v. State, 404 S.W.3d 567, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd) (concluding that appellant was not entitled to reasonable-doubt instruction during punishment phase for same transaction contextual evidence admitted during guilt-innocence phase); Glockzin v. State, 220 S.W.3d 140, 151-52 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. ref'd) (same); Garza v. State, 2 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd) (concluding that, since same transaction contextual evidence is offered "simply to explain the circumstances of the offense," reasonable-doubt instruction at punishment phase of trial is not required). In this case, the evidence of appellant grabbing Officer Flores's holstered firearm, although conduct forming the basis for a legally separate offense, was conduct that was blended or interwoven with the charged offense of assault on a public servant.