Opinion
NO. 14-15-00902-CR
12-08-2016
AMANDA CHRISTINE GARZA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from County Criminal Court at Law No. 12 Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1989989
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Amanda Christine Garza was charged with Class B misdemeanor driving while intoxicated. After the trial court denied her motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood test, she pled guilty and was sentenced to 180 days in the Harris County Jail. Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the State did not satisfy its burden to establish the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Harris County Sheriff's Office received a report of a major accident involving a single vehicle at 8:53 p.m. on February 4, 2014, in Harris County, Texas. Deputy Shannon Smith arrived at the scene a few minutes later. Appellant, the driver, was unconscious and transported to Ben Taub Hospital by paramedics a few minutes after Smith arrived.
Deputy Ramon Gutierrez was informed by Smith that appellant had been taken to the hospital. Smith told Gutierrez he saw several open wine bottles in and around the car. Gutierrez drove directly to the hospital. He arrived at 9:24 p.m. and found appellant "very belligerent, cursing, yelling." Her speech was slurred. Gutierrez detected a strong odor of alcohol on her. He asked appellant if she had anything to drink, and she replied, "A lot." Based on the fact of the accident, open wine bottles at the scene, a strong odor of alcohol, appellant's slurred speech, and her admission she had "a lot" to drink, Gutierrez believed she was intoxicated. Appellant said she would not answer any more questions until she was "let off the stretcher." Gutierrez decided to wait until after the medical staff had seen to appellant's immediate needs and she was calmer before questioning her further. He did not seek a warrant while he was waiting because he planned to ask appellant to consent to a blood draw.
Hospital personnel took appellant into a trauma room where she was again belligerent and combative. The medical staff sedated and intubated her and began transfusing four pints of blood.
At that time, Gutierrez instructed the hospital staff to draw appellant's blood. He did not attempt to obtain a warrant. He knew he could seek a warrant by telephone or fax but chose not to because he believed he would not have sufficient time:
It usually takes about a couple hours to get a warrant. They had given her four units of blood, and so we were losing evidence by the minute is what I believed.Appellant's blood was drawn at 11:35 p.m.
. . .
If everything goes right, you're looking at approximately — at least an hour and a half to two hours because you have to fax it to them — or you call the District Attorney's Office and you talk to them and tell them the facts of the case. They fax it to you, you review it, and if there's nothing impersonating [sic], you sign it and you fax it back to them. And then the District Attorney you're dealing with has to walk it down there to the judge, himself; and provided there's not a P.C. court going at the time, the judge will review it. They send it back to you. And so it is time consuming.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Appellant moved to suppress the results of her blood test. At the hearing, the State admitted it did not obtain a warrant to draw appellant's blood but argued exigent circumstances excused its failure to do so. The trial court denied the motion.
ANALYSIS
I. Legal standards
A. Standard of review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The trial court is the sole finder of fact and is free to believe or disbelieve any or all of the evidence presented at a suppression hearing. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts that depend on credibility and demeanor. Id.
We review de novo the court's application of the law to the facts, because resolution of those ultimate questions does not turn on the evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. When there are no written findings of fact, as in this case, we uphold the ruling on any theory of law applicable to the case and presume the trial court made implicit findings of fact in support of its ruling so long as those findings are supported by the record. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24. If supported by the record, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will not be overturned. Mount v. State, 217 S.W.3d 716, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
When a defendant alleges a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, she must produce some evidence to rebut the presumption of proper police conduct. Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The defendant satisfies this burden by showing the search occurred without a warrant. Id. Once the lack of warrant is established, the burden shifts to the State to prove the warrantless seizure was reasonable. Id.
B. Warrantless searches
1. In general
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A search is a governmental intrusion into an area where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Richardson v. State, 865 S.W.2d 944, 948-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); see also State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 407 n.22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Needle punctures and other intrusions into the human body are searches subject to the Fourth Amendment because they implicate a person's "most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy." Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)); Cole v. State, 490 S.W.3d 918, 922-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
A search pursuant to a criminal investigation generally (1) requires a search warrant or recognized exception to the warrant requirement, and (2) must be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A search conducted without a warrant is "per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The State bears the burden to prove a warrantless search falls within one of those exceptions. See McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
While there are several recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the present case deals only with a claimed exigency based on imminent destruction of evidence. See Cole v. State, 490 S.W.3d 918, 922-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The exigent-circumstances exception operates "when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558. An exigent-circumstances analysis requires an objective evaluation of the facts reasonably available to the officer at the time of the search. Cole, 490 S.W.3d at 923. An officer's reasonable beliefs are issues of fact. Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 847 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014), rev'd on other grounds, 472 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1461 (2016). Whether law enforcement faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant calls for a case-by-case determination based on the totality of circumstances. Cole, 490 S.W.3d at 923.
2. Blood draws
The natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not establish an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1568. Rather, it is a factor to be considered case by case in light of the totality of the circumstances. Id. Other factors include the procedures in place for obtaining a warrant, the availability of a magistrate judge, and any "practical problems of obtaining a warrant within a timeframe that still preserves the opportunity to obtain reliable evidence." Id. "Warrants inevitably take some time for police officers or prosecutors to complete and for magistrate judges to review. Telephonic and electronic warrants may still require officers to follow time-consuming formalities designed to create an adequate record . . . ." Id. at 1562. We note that, in this case, another factor considered by the officer was the transfusion of blood products into appellant's bloodstream.
II. The trial court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress.
A. The State satisfied its burden to show exigent circumstances.
The trial court was required to evaluate the facts reasonably available to Gutierrez when he asked for appellant's blood to be drawn. See Cole, 490 S.W.3d at 923 (holding exigent-circumstances analysis requires objective evaluation of facts available to officer at time of search). Gutierrez testified he was told appellant was the driver in a single-vehicle car accident, open wine bottles were found in and around the car she was driving, and she was unconscious at the scene of the accident. At the hospital, he saw that she was conscious, belligerent, combative, and able to talk, though her speech was slurred. Gutierrez smelled a strong odor of alcohol on appellant, and she told him she had "a lot" to drink that evening. Appellant also told Gutierrez she would not answer further questions until she was off the stretcher.
The hospital staff moved appellant into a trauma room for treatment. Gutierrez decided to wait for a "break in the action" before questioning appellant again. Before Gutierrez could talk to her, appellant was sedated, intubated, and receiving a blood transfusion. Gutierrez believed he could not wait 90 minutes to two hours to get a warrant for her blood because he thought evidence of her blood alcohol content was being "los[t] by the minute."
Whether Gutierrez's belief was reasonable is a question of fact. Douds, 434 S.W.3d at 847. Because the trial court granted the motion to suppress, we presume it implicitly found that Gutierrez's belief—that he did not have time to get a warrant because appellant's sudden sedation and blood transfusion required her blood to be drawn immediately to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence—was reasonable. See Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Appellant disagrees. He asserts Gutierrez had time to get a warrant because: (1) probable cause for the blood draw existed shortly after the accident occurred, (2) other officers were available to assist Gutierrez in obtaining a warrant, and (3) the streamlined DWI warrant procedure in place in Harris County allowed a warrant to be procured within one to two hours. Relying on the Texarkana Court of Appeals' opinion in Cole v. State, 454 S.W.3d 89, 102-03 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014), rev'd, 490 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016), appellant argues in effect that, because Gutierrez could have begun the warrant process shortly after the accident occurred, he should have.
After appellant filed her brief, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals' judgment in Cole:
The [Texarkana] court's [exigency analysis] in constructing a time line containing a hypothetical warrant obtained at a particular point followed by the potential timeliness of the search's results impermissibly views law enforcement action though the lens of hindsight. . . . But hindsight distorts a proper exigency analysis's focus: whether officers had a reasonable belief that obtaining a warrant was impractical based on the circumstances and information known at the time of the search.Cole, 490 S.W.3d at 925. See also Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 992 (2012) (per curiam) ("[R]easonableness must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."). Cole makes clear that the question for the trial court was not whether Gutierrez in fact had time to obtain a warrant. The question was whether Gutierrez reasonably believed he did not have time.
Appellant further argues that Gutierrez's belief that blood products administered intravenously would have an immediate impact on any blood toxicology screening was speculative because the State did not offer any scientific evidence to support it. However, the question again was not whether appellant's blood alcohol content would in fact be imminently destroyed; it is whether Gutierrez reasonably believed it would. Cole, 490 S.W.3d at 925.
In Cole, the defendant caused a fatal car accident and told emergency personnel at the scene he had taken "some meth." 490 S.W.3d at 919-20. At the hospital, Cole refused to provide a blood sanple. Id. at 920. Because the officer with Cole did not know how fast methamphetamine dissipates, she was concerned evidence of Cole's methamphetamine level would be lost if she waited for a warrant. She instructed the hospital staff to draw Cole's blood without a warrant. Id. at 921. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the trial court that "the uncertainty of Cole's physical condition and the valid concern that medication administered at the hospital could affect any subsequent blood sample," among other things, created an exigency to draw Cole's blood. Id. at 921, 926-27.
Moreover, the availability of other officers who might have secured a warrant is not dispositive. The State need not prove that there was no other officer available to get a warrant before an exigency finding can be made. See id. at 926. "Requiring such a showing in every case where exigency is argued improperly injects the courts into local law-enforcement personnel management decisions and public policing strategy." Id.
Appellant further relies on four cases in which no exigency was found: our 2014 decision in Douds, 434 S.W.3d at 861; Weems v. State, 493 S.W.3d 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); State v. Ruiz, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 13-13-00507-CR, 2015 WL 5626252 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, pet. granted); and State v. Anderson, 445 S.W.3d 895 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, no pet.). Each case is distinguishable.
In Douds, the State adduced evidence of the lengthy accident investigation but offered no evidence of the time needed to obtain a warrant or why the officer did not attempt to obtain a warrant. See 434 S.W.3d at 855. We concluded the State failed to prove exigent circumstances existed because it offered no evidence concerning the delay necessary to get a warrant. Without such evidence, the trial court's findings did "not support an objectively reasonable conclusion that taking the time to obtain a warrant before drawing appellant's blood would have significantly undermined the efficacy of a blood alcohol test." Id. at 855.
The Court of Criminal Appeals employed similar reasoning in Weems. The evidence showed that the substantial delay in obtaining Weems' blood was foreseeable, suggesting the officer knew there would be time to secure a warrant. Moreover, as in Douds, there was no evidence of the procedures required to obtain a warrant or how long the process would take. 493 S.W.3d at 581.
The record in Anderson suggested a warrant could be obtained quickly. See 445 S.W.3d at 910-11. Two searches were conducted in Anderson following a suspected drunk driver's car accident: a search of the car's "black box," conducted by warrant, and a warrantless search of Anderson's blood. The accident occurred around 4:40 p.m. At 6:01 p.m., an assistant district attorney faxed a request for the black-box warrant to the magistrate, and the magistrate issued the warrant at 6:02 p.m. Id. at 899. Based on the time it took to obtain the black-box warrant, the trial court determined the police could have obtained a warrant for Anderson's blood. See id. at 911.
In Ruiz, the intoxicated defendant was hospitalized after he caused a car accident. The evidence showed it would take significant time (two to three hours) to obtain a warrant. 2015 WL 5626252, at *1. However, the only claimed exigency was the natural dissipation of alcohol during that time period, see id., which is insufficient to satisfy the exigent-circumstances exception. McNeely, 131 S. Ct. at 1568.
Unlike Douds and Weems, the record in this case contains evidence of the time it would have taken Gutierrez to get a warrant. Gutierrez testified about the procedure for obtaining a warrant in Harris County and said the procedure takes at least one and a half to two hours. See Garcia v. State, No. 14-14-00387-CR, 2015 WL 2250895, *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 12, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (distinguishing Douds because Garcia record contained evidence of procedure and time needed to obtain warrant). Unlike Anderson, the record in this case indicates the officer believed he could not obtain a warrant in time to prevent imminent destruction of evidence. And, unlike Ruiz, the exigency is this case is not due to the natural dissipation of alcohol, but is the appellant's unexpected sedation and blood transfusion.
From our review of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude Gutierrez reasonably believed that obtaining a warrant in this case would have significantly undermined the efficacy of searching appellant's blood. The circumstances surrounding the taking of appellant's blood sample demonstrate that obtaining a warrant was impractical. We therefore conclude that exigent circumstances justified appellant's warrantless blood draw.
CONCLUSION
We overrule appellant's issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
/s/ Martha Hill Jamison
Justice Panel consists of Justices Jamison, McCally, and Wise.
Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).