Opinion
C24-0371JLR
09-23-2024
EUGENE BRIAN GARVIE, Petitioner, v. JASON BENNETT, Respondent.
ORDER
JAMES L. ROBART, United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 5, 2024, the court adopted in its entirety United States Magistrate Judge S. Kate Vaughan's report and recommendation over pro se Petitioner Eugene Brian Garvie's objections, dismissed Mr. Garvie's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and entered judgment. (9/5/24 Order (Dkt. # 35); Judgment (Dkt. # 36); R&R (Dkt. # 31); Petition (Dkt. # 5); Objections (Dkt. # 32).) On September 20, 2024, Mr. Garvie filed his second motion for relief from that judgment. (MFR (Dkt. # 39).) The court has considered Mr. Garvie's motion, the relevant portions of the record, and the governing law. Being fully advised, the court DENIES Mr. Garvie's motion for relief from judgment.
Magistrate Judge Vaughan set forth the factual background of this case in the report and recommendation. (See R&R at 2-4; see also 9/5/24 Order (adopting the R&R).) Therefore, the court does not repeat that background here.
Mr. Garvie moves for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). (See generally MFR.) Rule 60(b) “allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005). Rule 60(b)(4) provides relief from a final judgment if that judgment is void as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4). “The list of such judgments is ‘exceedingly short,' and ‘Rule 60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.'” Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010)), aff'd, 579 U.S. 40 (2016).
Mr. Garvie argues that the judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4) based on “a procedural defect in the procur[e]ment of the judgment in civil case [sic].” (MFR at 1 (citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 539 n.1).) He asserts that the court “vi[o]lated the Magistrate's Act and Habeas Rule 8(b) by failing to conduct de novo review of MOTION REQUESTING BRADY ORDER.” (Id.) Mr. Garvie raised this same issue in his objections. (See Obj. at 1.) The court, on de novo review, agreed with Magistrate Judge Vaughan's reasons for denying Mr. Garvie's Brady motion and overruled the objection. (9/5/24 Order at 3.) Mr. Garvie does not explain how the court erred in its ruling or why the judgment is among the “exceedingly short” list of voidable judgments. Dietz, 794 F.3d at 1096. Therefore, the court DENIES Mr. Garvie's motion for relief from judgment.
To the extent Mr. Garvie's motion should be liberally construed as a motion for reconsideration of the court's September 5, 2024 ruling, that motion is also denied. Local Civil Rule 7(h)(1) provides that “[m]otions for reconsideration are disfavored” and “[t]he court will ordinarily deny such motions in the absence of a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(h)(1). Mr. Garvie's motion does not meet either standard.
The court also denies Mr. Garvie's request for a certificate of appealability. A certificate of appealability “should only issue for [an] appeal arising from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion in a [habeas] proceeding if the movant shows that (1) jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion and (2) jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the underlying [habeas] motion states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right.” United States v. Winkles, 795 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2015). Mr. Garvie has made neither showing. Accordingly, Mr. Garvie's request is DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Mr. Garvie's second motion for relief from judgment (Dkt. # 39) and DENIES his request for a certificate of appealability.