Opinion
No. 3:04-CV-693-P.
July 23, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, filed April 28, 2004. Defendant filed its Response on May 18, 2004 and Plaintiff filed its Reply on June 1, 2004. After considering the parties' arguments and briefing, and the applicable law, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
I. Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff Diane Garrett originally filed suit in the 44th Judicial District in Dallas County, Texas on March 1, 2004. (Pl.'s Mot. to Remand at 1.) In Diane Garrett v. Comcast Communications, Inc., Case No. 04-01660-B, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, her internet service provider, released her personal information to the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA"), who subsequently brought suit against Plaintiff. (Compl. at 1-2.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant's actions were in violation of its published privacy policy, which states that it will not release private information provided by its consumers unless presented with a valid subpoena, and that the subpoena issued was invalid under 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2004). (Compl. at 2-3.; Pl.'s Appendix, Ex. A, p. 3.) As a result, Plaintiff claims that she suffered a loss of privacy, loss of private use of her residential internet service, severe humiliation, embarrassment, fear, frustration, and emotional distress, and has been forced to defend herself in a lawsuit. (Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff alleged causes of action for invasion of privacy, breach of contract, false misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff is suing for actual damages in excess of $1,000, exemplary damages, post-judgment interest as provided by law, reasonable attorney's fees and costs of suit, and any other relief plaintiff is entitled to. (Compl. at 3-4.)
Defendant Comcast Communications, Inc. removed this action to the Northern District of Texas on April 2, 2004, on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2004), or, alternatively, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2004). (Def.'s Notice of Removal at 1-2; Pl.'s Mot. to Remand at 2.)
II. Motion to Remand
Removal of a state court action to federal court is proper when the complaint falls within the original subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2004). A court of the United States has original subject matter jurisdiction of a dispute if it arises under the Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also O'Quinn v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 605, 607 (5th Cir. 1985). "In determining whether a claim arises under federal law, the Court must look to the `well-pleaded complaint,' not the removal petition." Nelon v. Mitchell Energy Corp., 941 F. Supp. 73, 74 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (citing Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1988)). Federal-question jurisdiction exists where federal law creates the cause of action; however, it may also exist "where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law." Id. (quoting Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808). The burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction exists lies with the removing party. See St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Greenburg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff's claims for invasion of privacy, breach of contract, false misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are premised on her allegation that Defendant released her records without a valid subpoena, under 17 U.S.C. § 512(h). (Compl. at 2-3.) If the subpoena issued to Defendant by RIAA was valid, Defendant's actions were within the terms of its privacy policy, which clearly states that it will release customer information if presented with a valid subpoena. (Pl.'s App. at Ex. A, p. 3.) Therefore, the threshold question to be addressed by the Court is whether the subpoena is valid under 17 U.S.C. § 512(h). Because the vindication of Plaintiff's state law rights turns on the construction of a federal statute, federal question jurisdiction exists. See Nelon, 941 F.Supp. at 74 (quoting Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808).
Plaintiff claims that the subpoena was already declared invalid in Recording Indus. Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and the only remaining issues for the court to decide are Plaintiff's state law claims. (Pl.'s Memorandum in Supp. of Mot. to Remand at 2.) However, RIAA v. Verizon held that a subpoena issued under § 512(h) was valid if it was issued to an internet service provider engaged in storing on its servers material that is infringing or the subject of infringing activities. 351 F.3d at 1233. Only subpoenas issued to internet service providers acting as a conduit for data transferred between two internet users, such as persons sending e-mail or "P2P" files, were declared invalid by the D.C. Circuit Court. Id. Plaintiff has not alleged information that would allow the Court to determine which situation was present in this case. Moreover, this Court is not bound to follow the precedent of RIAA v. Verizon.
The Court does not reach the question of whether diversity jurisdiction exists in this case because it has already found federal question subject matter jurisdiction.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Defendant has satisfied its burden of establishing that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
IT IS SO ORDERED.