Opinion
2:20-cv-01986-TLW-MGB
09-13-2021
David Lee Garner, Plaintiff, v. Agent Jeff Rillorta; Judge William S. Duffey, Jr.; Judge Patrick Michael Duffy; Warden B. True; and Scarlett Wilson, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
David Lee Garner (“Plaintiff”), a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed in its entirety, without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
The undersigned notes at the outset that the allegations in Plaintiff's handwritten Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) and 186-page supplement (Dkt. No. 1-1) are mostly illegible and, in any event, incoherent. As a result, it is almost impossible to ascertain the true nature of Plaintiff's claims in the instant action. Based on the undersigned's most liberal interpretation, however, Plaintiff appears to be challenging his ongoing incarceration in federal prison based on a criminal conviction from 2007. More specifically, the Complaint suggests that Plaintiff was “kidnapped” and “falsely imprisoned,” such that he is now being “held hostage” by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). (Dkt. No. 1 at 4-7.) Plaintiff claims that his life is in danger and asks to be “set free immediately from captivity.” (Id. at 6.)
Court records suggest that Plaintiff was sentenced to a term of 210 months' imprisonment and 5 years' supervised release after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on May 24, 2007. See Case No. 2:04-cr-01022-PMD-1; see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites).
After reviewing these allegations, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his action was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 6.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned gave him an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified in the original pleading by filing an amended complaint with the Court within twenty-one days. The order warned Plaintiff that failure to file an amended complaint or cure the pleading deficiencies within the prescribed time period would result in summary dismissal with prejudice. (Id.)
Although Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint by the Court's deadline, he later submitted a handwritten letter that appeared to elaborate on the allegations presented in his initial pleading. (Dkt. No. 9.) The undersigned therefore accepted Plaintiff's late filing in an abundance of caution and treated it as a supplemental/amended pleading to be considered with the original Complaint. Unfortunately, most of the supplemental filing is just as illegible as the original Complaint, and the portions that are legible simply reiterate the same nonsensical statements described above. Thus, despite availing himself of the opportunity to amend his Complaint, Plaintiff's action is still subject to summary dismissal for the reasons discussed herein.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). This action has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
Any further references to the “Complaint” in this Report and Recommendation encompass both the original Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) and Plaintiff's supplemental filing (Dkt. No. 9) unless specified otherwise.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Indeed, a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) for “all civil actions”). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff's Complaint Fails to State a Coherent Claim to Relief
As noted above, the rambling, unintelligible nature of Plaintiff's Complaint makes it very difficult for this Court to identify any plausible causes of action. Indeed, the few legible statements in Plaintiff's Complaint reflect what some courts have described as “buzzwords” and “legal gibberish”-i.e., kidnapping, false imprisonment, wrongful sentencing, obstruction of justice, RICO Act conspiracy, extortion, etc.-and offer no coherent factual allegations in support. Brantley v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 9:19-cv-0490-BHH, 2020 WL 1181309, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2020). And while “a Pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obligated to ferret through a [c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:13-cv-00478-RDB, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Kraim v. Columbia Police Dep't, No. 3:18-cv-1335-MGL-PJG, 2019 WL 2058252, at *1 (D.S.C. May 7, 2019) (“Illegible words or allegations need not be considered by the court.”).
Thus, as the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff, if a complaint's lack of clarity or legibility makes it unintelligible, as is the case here, dismissal under Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., is permitted. (Dkt. No. 6 at 2.) See Green v. Sumter Court, No. 3:07-cv-JFA-BM, 2007 WL 2022199, at *2 (D.S.C. July 9, 2007); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (noting that federal courts lack the power to entertain claims that are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit”); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's suit as frivolous where allegations were conclusory and nonsensical on their face); Windham v. Graham, No. 9:08-cv-1935-PMD-GCK, 2008 WL 3833789, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2008) (noting that “a complaint is insufficient where it simply expounds a collection of legal buzzwords but fails to make any factual allegations against the defendants”). Assuming, however, that the undersigned's liberal construction is correct, and Plaintiff is in fact challenging his continued incarceration, this action is subject to summary dismissal for several additional reasons.
II. Release from Custody Is Unavailable in a Civil Rights Action
First, it is well established that release from prison is not a proper remedy in a civil rights case. Rather, such relief may be sought only in a habeas corpus action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that a writ of habeas corpus is the “exclusive remedy” for a prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release from that confinement); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining that a challenge to the duration of confinement falls within “the core of habeas corpus”). Here, Plaintiff raises his claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) However, the entire purpose of his Complaint-and the only legible demand for relief-appears to be immediate release from BOP's custody. Thus, as the undersigned explicitly warned Plaintiff, the Court cannot grant his request for release, and his claims of unconstitutional confinement are subject to summary dismissal. (See Dkt. No. 6 at 2.)
III. Some of Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred by the Doctrine of Judicial Immunity
Notwithstanding the above, it is also well-settled that judges have absolute judicial immunity for their judicial actions. Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985). Indeed, even if a decision is erroneous or improper, judges are not thereby deprived of immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.'”) (internal citation omitted). Moreover, absolute judicial immunity is a protection from suit, not just from damages. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to hold Judges Duffey and Duffy liable for his ongoing incarceration and/or their rulings in any of his previous cases, these Defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for judicial actions taken while presiding over Plaintiff's prior federal disputes.
Judge Patrick Michael Duffy was assigned to the criminal case that ultimately led to Plaintiff's conviction and sentence in 2007 (see Case No. 2:04-cr-01022-PMD-1), and Judge William S. Duffey, Jr. was assigned to, and eventually dismissed, several civil cases filed by Plaintiff in the Northern District of Georgia in 2007 (see Case Nos. 1:07-cv-2258-WSD, 1:07-cv-2386-WSD).
Similarly, the undersigned notes that any claims against Nineth Circuit Solicitor Scarlett Wilson in relation to her possible involvement in Plaintiff's state court history would likely be protected by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. See https://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/PublicIndex/ (limiting search to “David Lee Garner”) (last visited September 3, 2021) (showing a number of prior criminal cases involving Plaintiff that were adjudicated before the South Carolina Court of General Sessions in Charleston County). Prosecutors, when acting within the scope of their duties, are entitled to absolute immunity from personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged civil rights violations committed in the course of “activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467, 468 (4th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, while Plaintiff has failed to allege any intelligible claims against Defendant Wilson, the undersigned notes that she would likely be entitled to prosecutorial immunity all the same.
THREE STRIKES RULE
As explained above, the PLRA limits the ability of prisoners to file civil actions without prepayment of filing fees. Specifically, the PLRA contains a “three strikes” rule, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which provides:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Regardless of whether dismissal is with or without prejudice, a “strike” is based on the dismissal basis alone. Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S.Ct. 1721, 1725 (2020). Thus, “[a] dismissal of a suit for failure to state a claim counts as a strike, whether or not with prejudice.” Id. at 1727. Once a plaintiff has received three strikes, he must pay the full filing fee for almost any future non-habeas civil action unless he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 609 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Oct. 22, 2013).
This is not the first time Plaintiff has filed an unintelligible complaint seeking release from federal prison. Indeed, Plaintiff's two most recent actions before this Court raised similar frivolous claims of kidnapping and hostage-taking in an apparent attempt to challenge his incarceration. See Case Nos. 2:16-cv-00561-TLW and 2:14-cv-02243-TLW, among others. These two cases were summarily dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and likely qualify as strikes for purposes of the PLRA-although they were not expressly characterized as such. Accordingly, while the instant dismissal does not count as a strike, Plaintiff is hereby on notice that if he continues to file pleadings that are frivolous and/or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, he risks the accumulation of three strikes against him and the resulting denial of future requests for in forma pauperis status, absent exceptional circumstances.
Whether a court “rings the PLRA bell in its opinion or judgment order is immaterial,” so long as the dismissal is explicitly predicated on one of the three grounds enumerated in § 1915(g). Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Oct. 22, 2013); see also Fordham v. Bachman, No. 2:18-cv-1161-RMG, 2018 WL 4288645, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 7, 2018) (referencing Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646, 654 (4th Cir. 2011)) (explaining that the Fourth Circuit has held that courts have “discretionary authority” to deny in forma pauperis status to prisoners who have abused the privilege, even when three strikes are not present).
When a court gives a prisoner leave to amend his complaint, as the undersigned did here, the prisoner is generally not charged with a strike under the PLRA. Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S.Ct. 1721, 1724 n.4 (2020).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court dismiss this action in its entirety with prejudice. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (noting that where the district court has already afforded an opportunity to amend, the district court has the discretion to afford another opportunity to amend or can “dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order”). In light of the undersigned's conclusion, the Clerk of Court shall not issue the summons form or forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).