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Gardner v. Capital One

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Jan 23, 2023
1:23-cv-33 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2023)

Opinion

1:23-cv-33

01-23-2023

ASHLEY GARDNER, Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL ONE, Defendant.


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SALLY J. BERENS U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Ashley Gardner filed this action on January 9, 2023, against Defendant Capital One. She alleges that “Capital One violate several of [her] consumer rights and federal law causing [her] financial hardships and emotional distress.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.4.) Plaintiff seeks $75,000.00 in damages and an order enjoining Capital One from continuing to violate federal law. (Id.) Plaintiff attaches a December 29, 2022 letter to her from Capital One indicating that, although her account was charged off as unpaid on December 2, 2022, due to non-receipt of payment, the balance is still owed. The letter also explains that Capital One rejected Plaintiff's settlement offer in compromise of the outstanding balance. The letter contains a handwritten list of federal regulations and statutes. (ECF No. 1-1.)

Having granted Plaintiff's motion to proceed as a pauper (ECF No. 5), I have conducted an initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Based on this review, I conclude that Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal citations and footnote omitted).

As the Supreme Court has held, to satisfy this rule, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. If the complaint simply “pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court further observed:

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged- but it has not “show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe her pleading more liberally than is usually the case for formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). But this liberal pleading standard “is not without its limits, and does not ‘abrogate basic pleading essentials in pro se suits.'” Clark v. Johnston, 413 Fed.Appx. 804, 817 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). Stated differently, “[l]iberal construction does not require a court to conjure allegations on a litigant's behalf.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 Fed.Appx. 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001). To require otherwise “would not only strain judicial resources . . . but would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

In light of the foregoing standards, Plaintiff's complaint fails to allege a plausible claim against Defendant. The complaint contains no facts; it simply offers the bare legal conclusion that Defendant violated Plaintiff's rights under federal law. Even considering Plaintiff's pro se status, conclusory allegations, such as the statement Plaintiff sets forth in her complaint, are not enough to survive dismissal under both Twombly and Iqbal.

For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

The Court must also decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Good faith is judged objectively, Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962), and an appeal is not taken in good faith if the issue presented is frivolous, defined as lacking an arguable basis either in fact or law. See Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001). For the same reasons that I recommend dismissal of the action, I discern no good faith basis for an appeal and recommend that, should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11.

NOTICE

OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation (including any argument that leave to amend should be granted) must be filed with the Clerk of Court within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court's order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).


Summaries of

Gardner v. Capital One

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Jan 23, 2023
1:23-cv-33 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2023)
Case details for

Gardner v. Capital One

Case Details

Full title:ASHLEY GARDNER, Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL ONE, Defendant.

Court:United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

Date published: Jan 23, 2023

Citations

1:23-cv-33 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2023)