Opinion
No. 2:14-cv-02730 JAM-CMK
11-16-2015
DREW GARDNER, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL; CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL OFFICER J.J. FISCHER; TEHAMA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; TEHAMA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT DEPUTY INVESTIGATOR ED McCULLOUGH; KENNETH MILLER; and DOES 1 - 50, Defendants.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT ED MCCULLOUGH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant Tehama County Sheriff's Department Deputy Investigator Ed McCullough ("McCullough") filed a Motion for Reconsideration or, in the Alternative, a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #58) ("the current Motion"). The Court has denied McCullough's request for reconsideration and now turns to his alternative request for summary judgment in his favor.
This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g).
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In support of the current motion, McCullough submitted a Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. #58-1) to which Plaintiff responded (Doc. #60). Many of the underlying facts submitted by McCullough are in fact undisputed. Plaintiff submitted a Separate Statement of Disputed Material Facts (Doc. #61) to which McCullough responded (Doc. #65-1). McCullough does not dispute five of the facts submitted by Plaintiff, and although he does dispute the remaining facts, he acknowledges that the Court must take them as true for the purposes of the current motion. McCullough urges the Court to disregard those facts as immaterial to the Fourteenth Amendment claim at issue in the current motion. Below is a brief summary of the relevant facts that the Court takes as true for the purposes of the current motion only.
On January 2, 2014, Plaintiff was riding as a passenger in a Jeep Wrangler that had been reported stolen. California Highway Patrol ("CHP") Officer J.J. Fischer ("Fischer") apprehended Plaintiff and took him into custody. Soon thereafter, Plaintiff was booked into Tehama County Jail ("the Jail").
Following Plaintiff's arrest, Fischer wrote a Patrol Report. In his report, Fischer wrote that, during Plaintiff's booking, he had confiscated a "clear white baggie with a white crystalline substance" - which tested positive for methamphetamine - from Plaintiff's jacket, as well as a concealed hunting knife. Plaintiff alleges that neither of these statements was true. Plaintiff was charged with (1) unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle; (2) receiving stolen property - motor vehicle; (3) driving under the influence; (4) bringing contraband into the jail; (5) possession of a controlled substance; and (6) carrying a dirk or dagger. Plaintiff was arraigned on these charges, and the Court ordered him detained on $315,000 bail.
On January 3, 2014, the Shasta County Sheriff's Office ("Shasta SO") requested an "agency assist" from the Tehama County Sherriff's Office ("Tehama SO") regarding the incident. McCullough was tasked with conducting an investigation of this incident. McCullough interviewed Plaintiff at the Jail. Plaintiff provided McCullough with a number of leads, and McCullough told Plaintiff that he would report back on his findings and adjust the criminal charges against Plaintiff if warranted. As a result of his subsequent investigation, McCullough discovered evidence exculpating Plaintiff of the charges related to the theft and driving of the Jeep Wrangler ("the vehicle charges").
Upon discovering the exculpatory evidence, McCullough attempted to contact the point person at the Shasta SO, Deputy Meeker ("Meeker"), but was told Meeker was not on duty. On January 9th or 10th, McCullough wrote an investigation report summarizing his findings ("the Report"). McCullough forwarded the Report to the "assigned Sergeant" for approval. On January 21, McCullough discovered that the Sergeant had not yet approved or finalized the Report and immediately requested and received such approval. McCullough delivered the evidence and the Report to a detective at the Shasta SO later that day. McCullough was told the evidence and the Report would be forwarded to Meeker.
During this time and while still detained at the Jail, Plaintiff made repeated attempts to contact McCullough, through written requests for interviews and phone calls. Plaintiff submitted his third written request directly to an officer at the Jail who told him he would either personally hand it to McCullough or put it directly into McCullough's box. Plaintiff also enlisted his mother, who attempted to reach McCullough on her own and left numerous voicemails for him. McCullough never responded to either Plaintiff or his mother.
On March 12, Tehama County Deputy District Attorney James Waugh ("the District Attorney") called McCullough regarding Plaintiff's case. The District Attorney had not received the Report up to that point. McCullough delivered a copy of the Report later that day. On March 17, the District Attorney dismissed the vehicle charges. On April 3, after additional exculpatory evidence regarding the remaining charges was discovered by an official at the Jail at the urging of Plaintiff, Plaintiff was released.
On March 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") (Doc. #33) alleging fourteen causes of action against various defendants. Included therein, and relevant here, was a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§1983") alleging McCullough violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. McCullough brought a motion to dismiss (Doc. #36) the claims brought against him in the FAC. The Court granted in part and denied in part (Doc. #45) McCullough's motion. Relevant here, the Court found Plaintiff adequately stated a claim for violation of his substantive due process rights under §1983 against McCullough and that McCullough was not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim. The Court granted the motion without leave to amend as to Plaintiff's claim that his procedural due process rights were also violated.
The Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") (Doc. #52) was subsequently filed and included the same substantive due process claim against McCullough, among others. McCullough brought the current motion first requesting the Court to reconsider its Order denying the Motion to Dismiss the substantive due process claim on qualified immunity grounds. The Court found there was not good cause for reconsidering its previous Order and denied that portion of the current motion (Doc. #70). The Court now takes up the remaining portion of the current motion in which McCullough seeks summary judgment in his favor on the first cause of action in the TAC for violation of Plaintiff's substantive due process rights. The Court has included in its consideration of this motion McCullough's Statement of Recent Decision and the case referenced therein (Doc.#81).
A Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #46) was filed, but the parties stipulated to amendment (Doc. #51) to correct various errors shortly thereafter. No relevant changes were made in the TAC. --------
II. OPINION
In the current motion, McCullough contends the undisputed material facts demonstrate he is entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Plaintiff's first cause of action in the TAC, which alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right, and, therefore, the Court should grant summary judgment in McCullough's favor.
As discussed in the Court's earlier Order, in Tatum v. Moody, 768 F.3d 806, 814-15 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Tatum"), the Ninth Circuit held that a due process violation may occur when an individual is subject to "prolonged detention when the police, with deliberate indifference to, or in the face of a perceived risk that, their actions will violate the plaintiff's right to be free of unjustified pretrial detention, withhold from the prosecutors information strongly indicative of his innocence[.]" The court placed limitations on this constitutional rule, however, restricting it to "detentions of (1) unusual length, (2) caused by the investigating officers' failure to disclose highly significant exculpatory evidence to prosecutors, and (3) due to conduct that is culpable in that the officers understood the risks to the plaintiff's rights from withholding the information or were completely indifferent to those risks." Id. at 819-20. When a defense of qualified immunity is asserted, the analysis has two prongs: (1) whether the official violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights, and (2) whether the right violated was clearly established at the time of the official's conduct. Jones v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 802 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2015).
Although the Court previously rejected McCullough's qualified immunity defense, he now contends the undisputed facts establish that the key allegations in the FAC and the TAC are incomplete and incorrect. McCullough essentially argues that even if qualified immunity was not established based on the factual circumstances alleged in the FAC, the facts now before the Court are so clear that there exists no genuine issue of material fact such that he is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's due process claim. The Court disagrees.
McCullough argues that he timely completed and submitted the Report. When he discovered that the Report was not approved, he timely took steps to get that approval and deliver it to the Shasta SO. McCullough argues his failure to follow up with the Shasta SO, or directly with Meeker, or to deliver the Report directly to the District Attorney is of no consequence because he "reasonably believed that either the Shasta SO or the CHP would timely provide a copy of that report to the District Attorney." Under such circumstances, McCullough argues his conduct was reasonable and appropriate, and therefore did not violate Plaintiff's due process rights.
However, based on the evidence put forth by Plaintiff, there was strong reason for McCullough to believe that a copy of the Report was not timely provided to the District Attorney. There is evidence that numerous attempts were made by Plaintiff and his mother to contact McCullough to follow up on the matter, including interview requests that jail officials said would be relayed directly to McCullough and voicemails left for McCullough by Plaintiff's mother. Viewing this evidence and drawing inferences therefrom in the manner most favorable to Plaintiff, McCullough was on notice that Plaintiff remained detained in the Jail and should have known that the Report and the exculpatory evidence discovered by McCullough did not make it into the hands of the proper authority. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
There is no evidence that McCullough ever made direct contact with Meeker regarding the exculpatory findings or ensured that the Report was received by him. As for his belief that the CHP would timely provide the Report to the District Attorney, McCullough directly submits that when he contacted the CHP, a staff person told McCullough that they "did not want to receive a copy of the report." Taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence could support a jury finding that McCullough acted with deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for Plaintiff's due process rights. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Tatum, at 821.
McCullough also puts forth a number of arguments that were already considered and rejected by the Court in its previous Order. First, Plaintiff's claim is not based on a Brady violation so McCullough's arguments regarding the pre-condition of a criminal conviction are unpersuasive. Second, there still remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether McCullough's conduct prolonged Plaintiff's detention in jail. It appears undisputed that the receipt of the Report quickly led the District Attorney to drop the vehicle charges, which was then followed by Plaintiff being released from jail a few weeks later. Finally, the issue of whether the constitutional right was "clearly established" was sufficiently discussed in the Court's previous Order where it found that at the time of the incident "the Ninth Circuit had clearly established the 'constitutional right to be free from continued [pretrial] detention after it was or should have been known that the detainee was entitled to release.'" Order at pp. 22-23 (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2001)). The evidence provided to the Court in conjunction with the current motion does not change the nature of the right underlying Plaintiff's claim. The Court finds the violative nature of McCullough's particular conduct was clearly established to the "required degree of specificity." Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308-09 (2015). Accordingly, McCullough's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
III. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES McCullough's Motion for Summary Judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: November 16, 2015
/s/ _________
JOHN A. MENDEZ,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE