Opinion
No. 98-1990
Opinion filed February 17, 1999. JANUARY TERM, A.D. 1999
An Appeal from the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, L.T. No. 98-2762.
Gastesi Associates and David A. Wagner, for appellant.
John D. Maher, for appellee Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and COPE and FLETCHER, JJ.
Garcia was fired by his employer, a marine safety equipment manufacturer and service agency, because he had failed properly to inspect and repair a defective life raft. Contrary to the determination of the appeals referee and the Unemployment Appeals Commission, it is obvious that this single mistake does not rise to the level of the "misconduct" required to deprive a former employee of unemployment compensation benefits. See Navarrete v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, ___ So.2d ___ (Fla. 3d DCA Case no. 98-1650, opinion filed, February 3, 1999); Delaney v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 720 So.2d 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Barnes v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 717 So.2d 120 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Savage v. Macy's East, Inc., 719 So.2d 1208, 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), and cases collected at n.2. Accordingly, the order denying benefits is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to afford Garcia all of the benefits claimed. See Savage, 719 So.2d at 1208.
SCHWARTZ, C.J., and FLETCHER, J., concur.
This case has a peculiar history. The appellant-employee was discharged by the employer Viking Life-Saving Equipment America, Inc. A claims adjudicator awarded him unemployment benefits, and Viking appealed. There was an evidentiary hearing before the appeals referee at which the employee's immediate supervisor testified, as well as the station manager. The referee found that the employee was guilty of disqualifying misconduct as defined in section 443.036(26), Florida Statutes (1997).
The referee's finding is thoroughly supported by competent substantial evidence. Read in the light favorable to the testimony of the station manager and supervisor (which the referee believed), the employee failed to repair defective rubber on a life raft for an oceangoing vessel; covered up the defective area with packing powder (which is applied prior to repacking the raft into its fiberglass case) (R. 36); and failed to replace parts that the supervisor had ordered him to replace (R. 60). Had it not been detected the work failure could have exposed the customer to a risk of life raft failure, and the employer to significant financial exposure. (R. 42). The employee had been previously corrected for substandard work (R. 36, 41, 62-63).
The employee appealed the denial of benefits to the Unemployment Appeals Commission. In the meantime, the employer for whatever reason had a change of heart, and the station manager submitted the following letter to the Unemployment Appeals Commission:
Dear Appeals Commission:
Viking Life-Saving Equipment, Inc. discharged Francisco Garcia on December 31, 1997 for his failure to properly inspect and repair a particular life raft. Viking Life-Saving Equipment, Inc.'s decision to discharge Francisco Garcia was based solely on this one single act constituting unacceptable job performance. Viking Life-Saving Equipment, Inc. does not contend that Mr. Garcia's acts were deliberate or done intentionally to injure the company.
Viking Life-Saving Equipment, Inc. stipulates that the Appeals Referee's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision were not supported by competent and substantial evidence. Therefore, Viking Life-Saving Equipment, Inc. hereby stipulates to the reversal of the Appeals Referee's decision which reversed the determination of the claims adjudicator. Furthermore, Viking Life-Saving Equipment, Inc. hereby stipulates to the reinstatement of unemployment compensation benefits for the Claimant/Employee, Francisco Garcia.
Respectfully submitted by,
/s/ Poul Jensen_________________
Poul Jensen, on behalf of Viking
Life-Saving, Equipment, Inc.
(S.R. 110).
Although carefully worded, the letter does not retract any of the testimony by Mr. Jensen or the immediate supervisor at the evidentiary hearing. The Commission thus correctly concluded that the letter did not constitute newly discovered evidence which would warrant a reopening of the evidentiary proceeding.
Insofar as Viking stipulated to the reinstatement of unemployment benefits, the question whether to accept that stipulation was a matter for the decision of the Unemployment Appeals Commission. Such a stipulation would be dispositive in the case of purely private litigation. However, the Commission is charged with the administration of public funds. Notwithstanding the change of heart by the employer, the Commission was entitled to take the view that, on the evidence presented, the conduct was disqualifying. Naturally Viking may give the employee severance pay at its own expense should it so choose.
The Commission's ruling should be sustained.