Opinion
04 CV 832 (JG).
July 22, 2004
DAVID WIKSTROM, New York, New York, Attorney for Rene Garcia
PAUL BRENNER, New York, New York, Attorney for Carmen Vazquez Alvarez
STANLEY A. TEITLER, Belle Harbor, New York, Defendant Pro Se.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recently said that in films, lawyers are depicted as unethical, as "bad professionals," and that "not too many Americans even remember that our society once actually trusted and respected lawyers." She opined that "the decline of professionalism is partly responsible for this state of things." This unfortunate case is an illustration of that decline. It arises out of a pending criminal case, United States v. Rene Garcia, et al, 03 CR 1198. The defendant here, Stanley Teitler, Esq., was retained as counsel for two defendants in that case, Rene Garcia and Carmen Vazquez Alvarez, who are the plaintiffs in this action. Teitler is no longer counsel for Garcia and Alvarez because they discharged him. The instant dispute concerns whether Teitler should be ordered to return all or part of the $40,000 retainer he received to represent Garcia and Alvarez in the criminal case. For the reasons set forth below, Teitler is ordered to return $12,500 to Garcia and $27,500 to Alvarez, with interest from December 29, 2003.
Justice O'Connor made these remarks during a speech at the College of Law at the University of Wyoming. See W. Dale Nelson, O'Connor: Lawyers `unhappy lot', Casper Star-Trib., Mar. 17, 2004, available at http://www.casperstartribune.net/articles/2004/03/17/news/wyoming/ ababfb532515191d87256e5 a000caac8.txt (last visited July 20, 2004).
At my direction, our Clerk of Court docketed the instant fee dispute under a different, civil docket number for ease of administration.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
The genesis of this case was a letter by David Wikstrom, Esq., counsel for Garcia here, who succeeded Teitler as counsel for Garcia in the criminal case. In the letter, dated February 2, 2004, Wikstrom requested my intervention to resolve a fee dispute between Garcia (and Alvarez) and Teitler. Wikstrom related that he and Paul Brenner, Esq. (Alvarez's attorney in this matter and Teitler's successor as her attorney in the criminal case) had tried to resolve the issue with Teitler directly, to no avail.
I held an evidentiary hearing on March 1, 2004. The following narrative constitutes my findings of fact based on that hearing and the other evidence in the case. Teitler's testimony contradicting the findings set forth below is specifically rejected as unworthy of belief.
On October 29, 2003, Garcia and Alvarez were arrested in Norfolk, Virginia. Both were detained and ordered removed to this district, but they were not produced here by the Marshal Service until early December. The indictment charges Garcia with, inter alia, a drug conspiracy and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Alvarez, allegedly a lesser participant, is charged with conspiracy. The indictment also charges sixteen other people with participating in a large drug ring along with Garcia and Alvarez.
Beginning immediately after their arrest, arrangements for the representation of Garcia and Alvarez were begun by Rebeka Four. Four, who has had some training in criminal justice at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, has known Garcia and his family for approximately ten years. She met Alvarez approximately three years ago, when Alvarez married Garcia. A resident of the New York area, Four traveled to Virginia after the arrests to find out exactly what the charges were and what needed to be done to retain counsel in Virginia. Four discovered that the defendants were represented by appointed counsel for the brief proceedings in Virginia, so she turned her attention to obtaining representation for Garcia and Alvarez upon their return to New York.
To that end, Four interviewed three attorneys in person and a fourth by phone. On approximately November 10, 2003, she met with Teitler at a diner in Manhattan. She provided Teitler with a copy of the complaint that had been filed against Garcia and Alvarez (although the copy she gave Teitler was missing the last two pages) and discussed with Teitler the financial ability of Garcia and Alvarez to retain counsel. Specifically, she told Teitler that Garcia and his family were of moderate means, but Alvarez's family had access to an undisclosed amount of money from an insurance settlement arising out of her father's death in a car accident.
When asked by Four which of the two he would represent, Teitler told her that the best legal strategy would be for him to represent both. Four inquired whether that would present a conflict of interest, especially if the government were to offer a plea bargain to one but not the other. Teitler assured her that the best way to ensure that neither defendant would go to jail would be for him to represent them both so he could have full control of the case. He cautioned that if another lawyer represented one or the other, they "would be turned one against each other . . . and they would both be in jeopardy of . . . having to go to jail." (Mar. 1, 2004 Hr'g Tr. ("Hr'g Tr.") at 71.)
After her meeting with Teitler, Four received from him a proposed retainer agreement. It stated that Teitler would represent both Garcia and Alvarez, and that Four would forward $50,000 to Teitler's firm as a retainer. The proposed agreement further stated that "[o]ur present hourly rates are $500 for partners, $200 for counsel to the firm, between $100 and $250 for associates (depending upon the attorney assigned to perform the task), and $75 for paralegal services." (Pls.' Ex. 1 at 2.) Despite this range of hourly rates, Teitler was practicing law alone at the time. He did not even have an office.
After receiving the proposed retainer agreement from Teitler, Four conferred with the Alvarez family. The family was concerned about the joint representation. Specifically, Alvarez's mother did not want any of her family's funds to cover the representation of Garcia. When concerns were expressed to Teitler, he prepared two separate proposed retainer agreements, one for each of his would-be clients. The proposed agreement with respect to Alvarez called for a $25,000 retainer, and represented that Teitler would "remain conscious" of a $75,000 limit on the amount of money the family could afford for the representation of Alvarez. (Pls.' Ex. 2 at 2.) That proposed agreement was addressed to Alvarez's brother, Edgar Vazquez, a resident of North Carolina. At the same time, Teitler sent to Four a proposed retainer agreement for Garcia. That proposed agreement also called for a $25,000 retainer. Both of the proposed retainer agreements called for a $2,500 deposit to be applied against disbursements. These proposed retainer agreements were executed, and Teitler received a total of $40,000; $12,500 on behalf of Garcia and $27,500 on behalf of Alvarez.
In the latter half of November 2003, while Garcia and Alvarez were en route to New York, Four had numerous telephone conversations with Teitler. Although those conversations touched briefly on Alvarez's prospects for bail, they consisted almost entirely of Teitler boasting about his professional accomplishments over the last thirty years.
Shortly before Garcia and Alvarez arrived in New York on December 5, 2003, Four advised Teitler that neither of his clients nor their families wanted to spend any resources litigating the question of his joint representation. Teitler responded that "there was no way he could lose on Curcio" (Hr'g Tr. at 87), that is, he would certainly be permitted to represent both clients. Indeed, Teitler assured Four that if for some reason he was wrong, and could only represent one of his clients, he would return in full the retainer paid on behalf of the one he could not represent. Teitler also reiterated to Four his view that the only chance either of his clients had of avoiding jail was if he represented both of them.
"Curcio" has become a shorthand in this circuit for situations involving actual or potential conflicts of interest. The name originated in United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1982), in which two defendants sought to be represented by the same attorney. The Second Circuit has instructed that under these circumstances, the trial court must alert the defendants to the pitfalls of being represented by an attorney who has divided loyalties, and must determine whether their waiver of conflict-free representation is knowing and intelligent. See, e.g., United States v. Velez, 354 F.3d 190, 198 (2d Cir. 2004). Specifically, at a Curcio hearing:
[T]he trial court (1) advises the defendant of his right to representation by an attorney who has no conflict of interest, (2) instructs the defendant as to the dangers arising from particular conflicts, (3) permits the defendant to confer with his chosen counsel, (4) encourages the defendant to seek advice from independent counsel, (5) allows a reasonable time for the defendant to make a decision, and (6) determines, preferably by means of questions that are likely to be answered in narrative form, whether the defendant understands the risk of representation by his present counsel and freely chooses to run them.United States v. Perez, 325 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 2003).
On December 2, 2003, a status conference was held in the criminal case. Garcia and Alvarez had not yet been produced in this district, and thus were not present. Teitler was present, however, and the prosecutor noted that he had concerns about Teitler's joint representation of two defendants in the same case. I told the parties that those concerns could only be addressed after Teitler had a chance to confer with his clients.
On December 5, 2003, Garcia and Alvarez met their lawyer for the first time when they were arraigned on the indictment before Magistrate Judge Roanne L. Mann. Judge Mann told Garcia and Alvarez that "courts view it as a very bad idea for two defendants in the same case to be represented by the same attorney. . . .". (Dec. 5, 2003 Tr. at 4.) When Judge Mann learned that Teitler had not yet discussed the indictment with his clients, a brief adjournment was granted and Teitler conferred with Garcia and Alvarez in the holding cell adjacent to the courtroom. Teitler told his clients that the government's case was "bullshit," and that they would insist on a speedy trial. (Hr'g Tr. at 50, 54, 154, 172.) Teitler also boasted about representing gangsters. Garcia and Alvarez then returned to Judge Mann's courtroom and pleaded not guilty.
By letter dated December 8, 2003, the government sought a conference before me to address the issue of joint representation. That application was granted, and the conference occurred on December 12, 2003.
On that date, I held a Curcio hearing. Garcia and Alvarez appeared before me, represented by Teitler. During the hearing, I spoke to Garcia and Alvarez about the dangers of joint representation. I sought to determine whether they understood the significance of such joint representation, both in general and in the context of the case in which they were indicted. Familiarity with the transcript of that proceeding is assumed; suffice it to say here that Alvarez, whom I addressed first, had no idea how seriously she could be harmed by waiving the right to conflict-free representation. Teitler had simply told Garcia and Alvarez to tell the Court that they wanted the same lawyer to represent them; apart from that instruction, no conflict-related issues were discussed by Teitler with his clients. Teitler himself insisted at the hearing that his joint representation of Garcia and Alvarez in the same criminal case presented "no actual . . . [or] potential conflict of interest." (Dec. 12, 2003 Tr. at 19; see also id. at 23 ("I put my law license on the table — that at this time there is no conflict.")) I refused to accept a waiver from either of Teitler's clients, and directed Teitler to let me know within one week which of his two clients he would continue to represent, as he would not be permitted to represent both. Also on December 12, 2003, the government agreed to the release of Alvarez on certain conditions.
Within days of this ill-fated Curcio hearing, Teitler was fired by both clients. When Four delivered the news, Teitler responded by threatening that "if he was discharged, he would make . . . an application to the Court to be with[drawn] as the official counsel, and at that time, [Alvarez's] bail would be revoked and she would be rearrested." (Hr'g Tr. at 91.) When Four requested a return of the full retainer for Garcia, as Teitler had promised, he told her that he first needed to do a statement of billable hours for both defendants.
Subsequently, on December 19, 2003, Four asked to speak with the Court. In a proceeding held in camera, she complained bitterly about Teitler's conduct. She related, among other things, that Teitler had informed Edgar Vasquez, Alvarez's brother, that if Alvarez did not appeal the Curcio ruling, she would surely go to jail. He also told Four that he would not return any money and that Alvarez would be arrested again because if she did not have an attorney, the Court would revoke her bail. The transcript of that proceeding was unsealed by order dated December 30, 2003. (See Docket No. 03 CR 1198, Entry 99.)
On December 29, 2003, I held a status conference in the criminal case with the new counsel for Garcia and Alvarez. Teitler also appeared. He made a motion to be relieved as counsel for both defendants, which I granted.
After being fired, Teitler prepared a time statement in an effort to justify keeping the $40,000 he had been paid, and to try to obtain another $27,250 in additional fees. The statement is a fabrication. Many of the telephone conversations Teitler lists on it did not occur; those that did were frequently far shorter than the periods of time claimed. Teitler also charged for legal research that he did not perform. For example, he claims to have spent approximately six hours researching speedy trial issues, and 4.5 hours researching the elements of a narcotics conspiracy. When pressed as to where he conducted the latter research, Teitler testified that he examined a "six volume set of Department of Justice Regulations." (Hr'g Tr. at 244.) Many of Teitler's other claims are not coherent. I find that the billing statement is no more than a crude attempt to justify the retention of funds Teitler has not earned.
Teitler was not referring to the United States Attorneys' Manual. (Hr'g Tr. at 245.)
DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
A federal court retains ancillary jurisdiction over a fee dispute arising out of a criminal case. Fermin v. Moriarty, No. 96 Civ. 3022 (MBM), 2003 WL 21787351, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2003); United States v. Weissman, No. S2 94 CR. 760 (CSH), 1997 WL 334966, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 16, 1997) (exercising ancillary jurisdiction over dispute between criminal defendant and employer concerning the payment of legal fees under indemnification agreement, after verdict but before sentencing).
I considered four factors in deciding to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over this particular fee dispute: (1) my familiarity with the subject matter of the criminal case and the work performed by the Teitler in that case; (2) my responsibility to protect officers of the court and their clients in such matters; (3) the convenience to the parties of litigating in federal court as opposed to state court; and (4) considerations of judicial economy. See Cluett, Peabody Co. v. CPC Acquisition Co., 863 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir. 1998). In addition, "courts have emphasized that, before exercising ancillary jurisdiction, `[m]ost important, [a court] must determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to provide a fair resolution of the underlying matter, and to allow the court to administer its proceedings.'" Fermin, 2003 WL 21787351, at *6 (quotingWeissman, 1997 WL 334966, at *6).
My familiarity with the criminal case places me in a better position to resolve this fee dispute than a state court judge with no connection to those proceedings. Moreover, I am mindful of the need for a swift resolution of this matter in light of the fact that the plaintiffs here may need any funds wrongfully withheld by Teitler to pay their new attorneys in their criminal case, who represent them in this ancillary civil dispute as well.See Weissman, 1997 WL 334966, at *6 ("[T]he funding of a criminal defendant's litigation expenses in an ongoing case before this Court . . . [is] precisely the sort of instance in which ancillary jurisdiction is warranted.")
Although Teitler has objected to my decision to retain jurisdiction over the fee dispute, purportedly on jurisdictional grounds, his proposal that the issue be referred to a magistrate judge suggests that he objects on narrower grounds.
B. The Legal Framework
Garcia and Alvarez urge that Teitler must return all of the monies he has taken from them — $40,000 in total — because they terminated his representation for cause. Specifically, they assert that they discharged him because "[h]e spent virtually no time discussing the facts of the case or a meaningful strategy with [them]; instead, the bulk of his efforts were expended in pursuit of a strategy of joint representation that he suggested and that was, on its face, inevitably doomed to bring harm to both of his clients." (Wikstrom's Mar. 1, 2004 Ltr. at 2.) I agree.
"Because of the uniqueness of the attorney-client relationship, traditional contract principles are not always applied to govern disputes between attorneys and clients. Thus it is well established that notwithstanding the terms of the agreement between them, a client has an absolute right, at any time, with or without cause, to terminate the attorney-client relationship by discharging the attorney." Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 43 (1990); Universal Acupuncture Pain Servs., P.C. v. Quadrino Schwartz, P.C., 370 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 2004) (same) (citing Cohen v. Grainger, Tesoriero Bell, 81 N.Y.2d 655, 658 (1993)). Under New York law, "[w]here that discharge is without cause, the attorney is limited to recovering in quantum meruit the reasonable value of the services rendered."Campagnola, 76 N.Y.2d at 44; Gurry v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 6243 (DC), 2000 WL 1702028, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2000) (same). "Where the discharge is for cause, the attorney has no right to compensation or a retaining lien, notwithstanding a specific retainer agreement."Campagnola, 76 N.Y.2d at 44; see Universal Acupuncture, 370 F.3d at 263; Casper v. Lew Lieberbaum Co., 182 F. Supp.2d 342, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). This rule respecting dismissal for cause "is well calculated to promote public confidence in the members of an honorable profession whose relation to their clients is personal and confidential." Campagnola, 76 N.Y.2d at 44.
Although the New York courts have not explicitly defined "cause," the case law reflects that it means that the attorney has engaged in some kind of misconduct, has been unreasonably lax in pursuing the client's case, or has otherwise improperly handled the case. See Casper, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (describing "cause" as "misconduct"); Gurry, 2000 WL 1702028, at *2 (describing "cause" as "misconduct or improper handling of the case"); Rotker v. Rotker, 761 N.Y.S.2d 787, 789 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 2003) (describing "cause" as "attorney misconduct or the unjustifiable abandonment of the representation").
For example, dismissal for cause has been found where a law firm failed to immediately notify the client when it discovered that the wrongful death statute of limitations had passed, and when a motion to dismiss was made and ultimately granted with no opposition from the law firm. In that case, the attorneys "acknowledge[d] that they kept this hidden from their client, failing to disclose this vital information for three years while they pursued the personal injury action." In re Spatola, 763 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2003). As the court explained in that case, "[w]hen an attorney deliberately fails to disclose to a client critical information, it weakens that trust and confidence and erodes the relationship to the point that the client, indeed, has cause to discharge the attorney." Id. at 465.
Other examples of "cause" include: commencement of unnecessary litigation, see Shalom Toy, Inc. v. Each and Every One of the Members of the N.Y. Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass'n., 658 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1st Dep't 1997); engaging in unnecessary motion practice, see Katsaros v. Katsaros, 543 N.Y.S.2d 478, 479 (2d Dep't 1989); substantial delay in prosecuting a case, see Matter of Estate of Stevens, 675 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183-84 (3d Dep't 1998); and a conflict of interest,see Sokoloff v. Sokoloff, 371 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1975). See also 31 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 125, § 7 (Aug. 2003) ("[A]n examination of the appellate decisions dealing with the question of just cause for dismissal of an attorney reveals that the courts have been fairly consistent in finding just cause to exist where one or more of the following elements is present in the factual picture: (1) the attorney's failure to perform under the employment contract; (2) his lack of diligence in so performing; (3) his lack of ordinary skill or care in so performing; (4) his making of demands on the client which violate the terms or exceed the scope of the contract; (5) his taking of actions contrary to the client's interests or objectives; (6) his indulging in some sort of unprofessional conduct while handling the client's affairs; (7) his venting of personal or economic hostility toward the client; and (8) his loss of the client's trust and confidence.").
Although the New York courts have not directly confronted the question of whether an attorney's violation of the New York Code of Professional Responsibility (or "Code") constitutes "cause," one court has implicitly assumed that it could, at least where the claimant has urged violation of the Code as a ground for relief. See DeLuccia v. Village of Monroe, 580 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92-93 (3d Dep't 1992).
By contrast, "[w]here an attorney is discharged not because he or she neglected to properly represent the client but because of `personality conflicts, misunderstandings or differences of opinion having nothing to do with any impropriety by . . . the lawyer,' the discharge is not `for cause' and the attorney does not forfeit his or her fee." Gurry, 2000 WL 1702028, at *2 (quoting Klein v. Eubank, 640 N.Y.S.2d 443, 445 (1996)); see, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Nandi, 258 F. Supp. 2d 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (material differences regarding strategic and tactical issues do not constitute cause); DeLuccia v. Village of Monroe, 580 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (3d Dep't 1992) (a "general dissatisfaction with the level of contact" with one's attorney does not give rise to a dismissal for cause); Hawkins v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 526 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (2d Dep't 1988) (no cause where attorneys had prosecuted action with reasonable diligence); Koeth v. Koeth, Ind. No. 3790/96 (008/015), 2002 WL 523109, at *15 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Mar. 22, 2002) (an attorney's "failure to give [the client] the opportunity to be present at her husband's deposition was nothing more than poor attorney-client relations which do not amount to attorney misconduct triggering cause for discharge.").
C. The Plaintiffs' Claim
I find that Teitler was dismissed by both of his clients for cause. He persisted in his efforts to represent codefendants in a criminal case despite the obvious conflict of interest that created. Perhaps because he refused to acknowledge even a potential conflict, he made no effort to ensure that his clients knowingly or, with the slightest understanding, addressed that basic issue. Teitler also spent virtually no time discussing the facts of the case or a meaningful strategy with Garcia and Alvarez, choosing instead to pronounce the government's case as "bullshit" and to demand a speedy trial, despite the fact that they were charged in a complex drug case involving over 2,000 tape-recorded conversations that Teitler had not reviewed. In short, Teitler spent his brief time on the case pursuing a strategy of joint representation that he foisted upon his clients. The strategy was doomed from its inception, harmful to both of his clients, and intended solely to increase Teitler's fee. Teitler misrepresented to his clients that: (1) the only chance that either had to avoid jail would be through joint representation; (2) there was no way he could lose the Curcio issue, either in the district court or in the court of appeals; (3) he would return one of his client's retainers if he lost theCurcio hearing; and (4) Alvarez would be rearrested and remanded if she discharged him. Thus, he is not entitled to any fee.
While my Curcio ruling did not preclude Teitler from representing one of the plaintiffs here, I construe the fact that neither plaintiff wished to retain him as a discharge by both.
Even if Teitler had not been dismissed for cause, he would have been entitled to very little, if any, of the retainer he now holds. In a quantum meruit accounting, the burden is on the attorney to establish the value of his legal services to his clients. While the lack of contemporaneous time records is not an absolute bar to recovery under New York law, courts have emphasized their significance and have reduced or denied counsel fees where no such records were produced. See, e.g., Matter of Phelan, 570 N.Y.S.2d 202, 203 (2d Dep't 1991); Schafrann v. Karam, No. 01 CIV. 0647 (KNF), 2003 WL 289620, at *6-*7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2003), aff'd, No. 03-7224, 2003 WL 22850043 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2003) (summary order); see also General Star Indem. Co. v. Custom Editions Upholstery Corp., 940 F. Supp. 645, 652-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Wong v. Michael Kennedy, P.C., 853 F. Supp. 73, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
In assessing legal fees on a quantum meruit basis, there are certain factors to be considered: "(1) the difficulty of the matter; (2) the nature and extent of the services rendered; (3) the time reasonably expended on those services; (4) the quality of performance by counsel; (5) the qualifications of counsel; (6) the amount at issue; and (7) the results obtained." Casper, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 346.
Here, Teitler's efforts to account for his work were unhelpful, and indeed fraudulent. Thus, I would be hard-pressed to award him a fee even if the dismissal was not for cause. He spent very little time on the matter, and appears to have devoted that time exclusively to an ill-advised effort to jointly represent both defendants. Thus, considering the factors listed above, Teitler would likely fare no better if he was dismissed without cause.
Because I have resolved the instant dispute based on the plaintiffs' dismissal for cause, I did not resort to the other, obvious ground for relief — violation of the New York Code of Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., In re Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litig., 317 F.3d 91, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Courts may order attorneys to return fees the client has paid pursuant to contract. To the extent that the forfeiture petition seeks to impose discipline for an alleged violation of professional responsibilities, the District Court had ancillary jurisdiction to consider exercising the `inherent power' of federal courts to discipline attorneys practicing before them.") (citations omitted); First Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati v. Pepper, 454 F.2d 626, 633 (2d Cir. 1972) ("[A]n attorney . . . guilty of professional misconduct in the handling of his client's affairs has no right to payment of fees"); In re Satin, 696 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (2d Dep't 1999) ("It is well settled that an attorney who engages in misconduct by violating the Disciplinary Rules is not entitled to legal fees for any services rendered.") (quotation marks and citation omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Teitler is directed to return $12,500 to Rene Garcia and $27,500 to Carmen Vazquez Alvarez, with interest on both amounts from December 29, 2003, the day I relieved Teitler. He shall do so by remitting two separate checks (in amounts to be calculated by the Clerk of Court and set forth in the judgment) to the Clerk of Court no later than August 20, 2004. The Clerk shall remit those monies to each plaintiff's attorney.The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment for plaintiffs consistent with this opinion, and is directed to close the case.
So Ordered.