Garcia v. State

Full title: FRANCISCO GARCIA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, Houston

Date published: Jan 17, 2008

No. 01-06-01049-CR (Tex. App. Jan. 17, 2008)

Opinion

No. 01-06-01049-CR

Opinion issued January 17, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

On Appeal from the 232nd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1068150.

Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices JENNINGS and BLAND.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TERRY JENNINGS, Justice.

A jury found appellant, Francisco Garcia, guilty of the offense of aggravated robbery of a person 65 years of age or older.¹ After finding true the allegations in two enhancement paragraphs that appellant had two prior felony convictions, the trial court assessed his punishment at confinement for 35 years. In two points of error, appellant contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction and that he suffered egregious harm when the trial court did not limit, in the jury charge, the definitions of "intentionally" and "knowingly" to the result of appellant's conduct. We affirm.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a)(3)(A) (Vernon 2003).

Factual Background

The complainant, Mary J. Aranza, testified that on May 8, 2006, when she was eighty years old, at approximately 6:00 p.m., she and her sister-in-law, Collie Lopez, walked to a drug store in order to buy makeup after eating dinner together. Upon arriving at the entrance to the store, someone sneaked up behind her, "violent[ly]" pulled her backwards, and dragged her across the concrete sidewalk, leaving her "down on the ground facing up." She did not see the assailant, who took her purse, which contained her social security card, her "CVS" card, envelopes holding $200 in bills and quarters, her wallet, cuff links, and bracelets. Because she sustained injuries on her arm, back, knee, shoulder, wrist, and her entire left side, paramedics took the complainant by ambulance to the hospital. There, she was diagnosed with a broken leg and other injuries. After her release from the hospital, the complainant had to use a cane in order to walk and could not raise her arms all the way up. Moreover, at the time of her testimony, she was still taking medication for pain in her knee. Lopez testified that she saw a car pull up to the curb and stop as she and the complainant were about to enter the store. Lopez then saw the assailant rob the complainant and return to the car. Lopez obtained the car's license plate number and turned to see the complainant crying in pain. Houston Police Department Officer M. Condon testified that upon his arrival at the scene, Lopez told him that the assailant's car was a "blue Ford Escort" and she gave him the Escort's license plate number. Condon then learned that the store had a security camera, and the store's manager allowed Condon to view the videotape in the store's back employee office. On the videotape, he saw a "large Hispanic male come up behind the complainant, grab [her] purse[,] pull her down to the ground[,] and then drag her [about five feet] down the sidewalk."² Thirty minutes after arriving at the scene, Officer Condon left to look for the assailant's vehicle at the Northline Motel because "shady things go on there." Upon arriving at the Northline Motel, he saw a blue Ford Escort, which, except for one digit, had the same license plate number that Lopez had given him. Condon recognized appellant,³ who was inside of the car, as the same person that he saw in the videotape from the store. Condon arrested appellant and found two bracelets and a "CVS" card inside of the car. He later recovered the complainant's purse at a separate location. The complainant identified these items as belonging to her. Houston Police Department Officer T. Veliz testified that she read appellant his legal rights, appellant waived those rights, and he admitted to taking the complainant's purse.

Factual Sufficiency

In his first point of error, appellant argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to show that he committed the offense of aggravated robbery because the evidence that he acted with the intent to cause bodily injury to the complainant, or with awareness that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause her bodily injury, is so weak that it undermines confidence in the jury's verdict. In a factual sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, both for and against the finding, and set aside the verdict if the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination, i.e., that the verdict seems "clearly wrong and manifestly unjust," or the proof of guilt, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414-15 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). We note that a jury is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and we afford "due deference" to the jury's determinations. Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). A person commits the offense of robbery if "in the course of committing theft" and "with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property," the person "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003). Aggravated robbery occurs when "bodily injury" is caused to a person "65 years of age or older." Id. § 29.03(a)(3)(A) (Vernon 2003). A person acts "intentionally" with "respect to . . . a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to . . . cause the result." Id. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2003). A person acts "knowingly" with "respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." Id. § 6.03(b) (Vernon 2003). A jury may infer intent and knowledge from circumstantial evidence that tends to prove its existence, such as the acts, words, and conduct of the defendant. See Ly v. State, 943 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd). In support of his argument that the evidence that he acted with the intent to cause bodily injury to the complainant is too weak to support the jury's verdict, appellant argues that during his videotaped statement to Officer Veliz, "a tearful [a]ppellant explain[ed] that he had been smoking crack cocaine for a year, and had `a couple of hundred dollars a day habit.'" Appellant also stated to Veliz, "`It's not in me to hurt anyone.'" Appellant further added to Veliz, "`[T]o find out she was 80 years old, I would never have done that.'" He contends that this is a case of a simple "purse-snatching" made "by a man who had no intent other than to get high as quick as he could by stealing whatever was at hand." However, the complainant testified that appellant "violent[ly]" pulled her backward onto the ground and dragged her across the concrete sidewalk. Officer Condon also testified that when he viewed the store's videotape, he saw appellant drag the complainant for approximately five feet. Lopez testified that the robbery left the complainant crying in pain and the complainant had to be taken by ambulance to the hospital. The complainant now has to use a cane to walk and she can no longer raise her arms as she previously could. Viewing the evidence neutrally, we conclude that the evidence is not so obviously weak such that the jury's verdict is "clearly wrong and manifestly unjust" or that the proof of guilt is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury's implied finding that appellant intentionally and knowingly caused bodily injury to the complainant or acted with awareness that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause her bodily injury. We overrule appellant's first point of error.

Jury Charge

In his second point of error, appellant argues that he was egregiously harmed by the trial court's error in not limiting its definitions, in the jury charge, of "intentionally" and "knowingly" to the result of appellant's conduct because the error allowed the jury to convict appellant for "intending the act of grabbing [the complainant's] purse" rather than "inten[ding] to hurt [the complainant]." In its charge to the jury, the trial court defined the terms "intentionally" and "knowingly" in accordance with their statutory definitions as follows:

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

See TEX. PENAL CODE. ANN. § 6.03(a)-(b). In the application paragraph, the trial court charged,

Now, if you find that . . . [appellant] did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing theft of property owned by [the complainant] and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily injury to [the complainant], a person at least sixty-five years of age[,] by grabbing [the complainant's] purse and dragging [the complainant] to the ground, then you will find [appellant] guilty of aggravated robbery.

Appellant's trial counsel did not object to the jury charge. To obtain a conviction for robbery, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "in the course of committing theft" and "with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property," a defendant "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to another." Id. § 29.02(a)(1). Here, the State also had to prove that appellant caused bodily injury to a person 65 years of age or older. Id. § 29.03(a)(3)(A). Section 6.03 of the Texas Penal Code delineates three "conduct elements" that may be involved in an offense: (1) the nature of the conduct, (2) the result of the conduct, and (3) the circumstances surrounding the conduct.⁴ McQueen v. State, 781 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); Fields v. State, 966 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 1 S.W.3d 687 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03. An offense may contain one or more conduct elements to which a culpable mental state must apply. Ash v. State, 930 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1996, no pet.). Aggravated robbery contains all three conduct elements. Fields, 966 S.W.2d at 739; Ash, 930 S.W.2d at 195. In order to prove a defendant guilty of the offense of aggravated robbery, the State must prove that the defendant "unlawfully appropriate[s]," which refers to the nature of the conduct. Ash, 930 S.W.2d at 195; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (Vernon Supp. 2007) (stating lesser-included offense of theft). The State must also prove that the defendant "cause[d] bodily injury," which refers to the result of the conduct. Ash, 930 S.W.2d at 195. The State must further prove that the defendant caused bodily injury "in the course of committing theft," which refers to the circumstances surrounding the conduct. Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that when an offense implicates all three conduct elements, a trial court errs in not limiting the definitions to the conduct element or elements of the offense to which they apply. Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 492 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995); see Fields, 966 S.W.2d at 739; Ash, 930 S.W.2d at 195. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in not limiting the definitions of "intentionally" and "knowingly" in the jury charge to the conduct element or elements to which they apply. See Fields, 966 S.W.2d at 739; Ash, 930 S.W.2d at 195. When, as here, a defendant fails to object or states that he has no objection to a charge, we will not reverse for jury-charge error unless the record shows "egregious harm" to the defendant. Bluitt v. State, 137 S.W.3d 51, 53 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984). Under the Almanza egregious-harm standard, the record must show that a defendant has suffered actual, rather than merely theoretical, harm from jury-charge error. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174. Egregious harm consists of error affecting the very basis of the case or depriving the defendant of a valuable right, vitally affecting a defensive theory, or making the case for conviction or punishment clearly and significantly more persuasive. Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Martinez v. State, 190 S.W.3d 254, 259 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd). Egregious harm is a difficult standard to prove and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Ellison v. State, 86 S.W.3d 226, 227 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). To determine whether a defendant has sustained harm from a non-objected-to instruction, we consider (1) the entire charge, (2) the state of the evidence, (3) arguments of counsel, and (4) any other relevant information. Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). In support of his argument that he suffered egregious harm, appellant relies on Brooks v. State, 967 S.W.2d 946 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.). In Brooks, the jury was deadlocked on whether the defendant had the requisite mental state to commit the offense of assault on a public servant,⁵ i.e., specifically, a police officer. Id. at 947, 949-50. The trial court orally instructed the jury that if a person "intentionally resists arrest" and causes bodily injury to a police officer, the person is guilty of the offense of assault on a public servant regardless if the defendant had the necessary intent to actually injure the police officer. Id. at 950. The appellate court concluded that the defendant suffered egregious harm because "[t]o be guilty of assault [on a public servant], one must intend the result of the conduct, not just the conduct itself." Id. The trial court's incorrect additional oral instructions actually caused the jury to "quickly" break its deadlock. Id. at 949-50. Here, however, the jury did not have such an erroneous instruction before it. Appellant also argues that he suffered egregious harm because during voir dire, the State represented that it was not required to prove that appellant knew the complainant was over 65 years old, which served to elevate the offense from robbery to aggravated robbery. Without any substantiation, appellant asserts that "[i]t is likely that the jury also inferred from this discussion that other consequences, like any bodily injury that resulted from the purse-snatching, whether intended or not, became the responsibility of appellant." However, the application paragraph of the jury charge limited the culpable mental states to the result of appellant's conduct by specifically describing the manner and means of committing aggravated robbery, i.e., committing bodily injury by "grabbing [the complainant's] purse and dragging [the complainant] to the ground." See Fields, 966 S.W.2d at 740 (reasoning that in application paragraph of jury charge, "manner and means of committing the robbery . . . limited the definition to the result of the defendant's conduct"); Ash, 930 S.W.2d at 195 (noting that in application paragraph of jury charge, "manner and means of committing the offense . . . would tend to limit the culpable mental states to the result of [defendant's] conduct"). Also, nothing in the state of evidence shows that appellant was egregiously harmed. Again, both the complainant and Officer Condon testified that appellant "violent[ly]" dragged the complainant, which supports an implied finding that appellant intentionally and knowingly intended to cause the result of bodily injury to the complainant or acted with awareness that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause her bodily injury. Moreover, nothing in the arguments of counsel demonstrates egregious harm. The State actually argued that "intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury" refers to a person acting "knowingly with respect to his conduct when he's aware it's reasonably certain to cause a result." (Emphasis added). Finally, appellant does not present, nor does the record show, any other relevant information which demonstrates that he suffered egregious harm, i.e., an actual harm which affected the very basis of the case or deprived him of a valuable right. See Fields, 966 S.W.2d at 740 (holding that "[i]t is . . . difficult to see how the trial court's error could be considered harmful, let alone egregiously so"); Ash, 930 S.W.2d at 195 (concluding that defendant did not suffer "egregious harm from the erroneous jury charge"). Accordingly, we hold that appellant has not demonstrated that he was egregiously harmed by the complained-of jury instruction. We overrule appellant's second point of error.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.