Opinion
No. 3D21-2144
01-12-2022
Dino Marcus GARCIA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Ana M. Davide, P.A., and Ana M. Davide, for appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.
Ana M. Davide, P.A., and Ana M. Davide, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and EMAS and BOKOR, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Dino Marcus Garcia v. State, 145 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (affirming trial court order denying postconviction relief motion raising the same grounds raised in the instant appeal). See also McCrae v. State, 437 So. 2d 1388, 1390 (Fla. 1983) (reaffirming that a motion under Rule 3.850 may "be summarily denied when it is based on grounds that have been raised in prior post-conviction motions under the rule and have been decided adversely to the movant on their merits. A ‘second or successive motion for similar relief,’ as used in Rule 3.850 has thus been interpreted to mean a motion stating substantially the same grounds as a previous motion attacking the same conviction or sentence under the Rule.") (internal citations omitted); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h)(2) (providing in pertinent part: "A second or successive motion is an extraordinary pleading. Accordingly, a court may dismiss a second or successive motion if the court finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the defendant or the attorney to assert those grounds in a prior motion constituted an abuse of the procedure or there was no good cause for the failure of the defendant or defendant's counsel to have asserted those grounds in a prior motion.")