Opinion
C. A. 3:24-38-MGL-SVH
04-10-2024
Jerome S. Garcia, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Public Safety; Trooper Wayne Davidson; and Robert Woods, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
Jerome S. Garcia (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the South Carolina Department of Public Safety (“SCDPS”) and Trooper Wayne Davidson (collectively “Defendants”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be summarily dismissed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges he was in a car accident on June 26, 2019.[ECF No. 12 at 10]. He alleges the driver of a white Camaro, whom he alleges was a cop, rear-ended Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims the state trooper who arrived at the accident found the Camaro driver at fault for the accident, but Plaintiff was charged with failure to have a valid driver's license or insurance. Specifically, Plaintiff states:
It appears this case may be subject to dismissal based on the statute of limitations.
[F]inally the trooper found the cop liable and at fault for the accident(assault), and damage to the Plaintiffs private property, and the cop was ticketed, and released.
The other two CPD supervisors, and the Defendant Trooper Davidson spoke privately, huddles, and seemed to devise a created situation the PD officers can have some sort of revenge for having one of their own at fault, and the Defendant decided to unlawfully detain, and arrest the plaintiff falsely for having no state insurance, or state driver's license, both state requirements being “Commerce” and both being in “Conflict” with Federal law in protection of fundamental protections.[ECF No. 12 at139].
Plaintiff further claims “The Defendants refused to produce a summons, complaint, service, or discovery in this case .... The Defendants waited from 6-26-2019, until 2-6-2023 to have a trial without notice.” Id. Plaintiff requests this court overturn the judgment against him. Plaintiff brings four claims. In Claims 1 and 4, Plaintiff argues Defendants have violated Plaintiff's constitutional right to travel by requiring him to have a license and car insurance. The second and third claims relate to his criminal charges, and argue Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure and his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
B. Analysis
1. Only Persons Can Be Sued Pursuant to § 1983
It is well-settled that only persons may act under color of state law; therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a person. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (noting that for purposes of § 1983, a person includes individuals and bodies politic and corporate). Courts have held that inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds are not considered a person and do not act under color of state law. See Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that the plaintiff failed to establish that the Lexington County Detention Center, “as a building and not a person, is amenable to suit under § 1983”). In this case, Plaintiff names SCDPS, which is a department and not a person. Because SCDPS is not a person amenable to suit under § 1983, it is subject to summary dismissal.
2. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this court may not review findings or rulings made by state courts. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (holding that a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts); Jordahl v. Democratic Party, 122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine extends not only to issues actually decided by a state court, but also to those that are “inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court.” Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997). A federal claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision if “success on the federal claim depends upon a ” Safety-Kleen, Inc. (Pinewood) v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 857-58 (4th Cir. 2001). This prohibition includes constitutional challenges. See Curley v. Adams Creek Associates, 409 Fed.Appx. 678 (4th Cir. 2011).
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005):
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.Id. at 284; see also Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Exxon requires us to examine whether the state-court loser who files suit in federal district court seeks redress for an injury caused by the statecourt decision itself. If he is not challenging the state-court decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply.”). Implicit in the doctrine is the recognition that only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction over appeals from final state court judgments. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 283; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257. To the extent the claims in Plaintiff's complaint challenge rulings made by South Carolina state courts, these claims should be summarily dismissed. Because Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief [ECF No. 4] seeks to overturn his state judgment, it is recommended it be denied.
3. Heck Bars Money Damages
To the extent Plaintiff is bringing a claim for damages related to his conviction, his claim is barred by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Court stated the following:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Id. at 486-87.
In addressing a claim for damages, “the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. To the extent Plaintiff is challenging a conviction, judgment in his favor in this case would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction. Because Plaintiff fails to demonstrate he has successfully challenged his conviction, Heck bars his claims.
4. Right to Travel
Plaintiff claims requiring him to have a driver's license and insurance is unconstitutional because it interferes with his right to travel. Such claims have been considered by courts and uniformly rejected. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that states may use their constitutionally protected police power to regulate motor vehicle operation and travel on their highways:
In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles,-those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. And to this end it may require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers, charging therefor reasonable fees graduated according to the horse-power of the engines,-a practical measure of size, speed, and difficulty of control. This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the states and essential to the preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of their citizens; and it does not constitute a direct and material burden on interstate commerce.Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915). The Court also concluded that such regulations do not “interfere with the rights of citizens of the United States to pass through the state.” Id. Other courts have affirmed that there is no “fundamental right to drive a motor vehicle,” and that the enforcement of driver's license regulations does not “unconstitutionally impede [the] right to interstate travel.” Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. summary dismissal.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be dismissed without further leave for amendment.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).