Opinion
C. A. 3:23-4758-MGL-SVH
09-27-2023
Jerome Garcia, Plaintiff, v. Richland County Treasury and Kendra L. Dove, Richland County Treasurer, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jerome Garcia (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this complaint against Richland County Treasury and Richland County Treasurer Kendra L. Dove (“Defendants”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be summarily dismissed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This action arises from Plaintiff's argument that Richland County has improperly assessed taxes on his real property that is for personal use only. [ECF No. 1]. He alleges “The state of South Carolina has a policy that uses Ad Valorem Taxation on ALL private ownership, not just commercial ownership and unlawfully apply the same tax to such private party.” [ECF No. 1 at 12]. Plaintiff attaches documents showing (1) on August 24, 2023, Richland County scheduled a delinquent tax sale on the property for November 2023 based on the failure to satisfy the 2022 taxes [ECF No. 1-1 at 5] and (2) Plaintiff paid the delinquent taxes on September 22, 2023 [ECF No. 1-1 at 1].
Plaintiff also notes he has paid the taxes in ¶ 30 of the complaint.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants' action constitutes an illegal taking and argues Defendants owe him the balance between the value of the property and the amount of the taxes. [ECF No. 1 at 15]
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
B. Analysis
Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his constitutional rights by assessing a tax on his property. The Tax Injunction Act, however, precludes this court from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. The Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, provides that “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” Id. Congress passed the Tax Injunction Act to keep federal courts from unduly interfering with state revenue collection. See Lawyer v. Hilton Head Pub. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 220 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding an action for damages under § 1983 challenging the validity of a state tax is barred in the federal courts due to principles of comity and the Tax Injunction Act); Keleher v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 947 F.2d 547 (2nd Cir. 1991) (“Tax Injunction Act creates an absolute jurisdictional bar to federal involvement in state and local revenue collection schemes; and that, as a result, a federal court may not play any role at all in tax enforcement efforts of state or local governments.”); Reed v. Dorchester Cty., No. 2:14-76-RMG, 2014 WL 3799433, at *3 (D.S.C. July 8, 2014), report and recommendation adopted as modified, No. 2:14-CV-76-RMG, 2014 WL 3799502 (D.S.C. July 31, 2014) (finding a plaintiff's attempt to set aside a delinquent tax sale is barred by the Tax Injunction Act).
Plaintiff seeks to recover damages related to the assessment of tax on his real property. However, he has available an adequate state court remedy. See Lawyer, 220 F.3d at 304-05 (noting a South Carolina tax may be challenged in state court, and finding an available remedy within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act is not inadequate because the challenger may not obtain their desired relief).
Additionally, Plaintiff has not shown there has been a taking in this case. Although Plaintiff cites Tyler v. Hennepin County, MN, 598 U.S. 631 (2023), the case does not apply to the facts at hand. In Tyler, the Supreme Court held that the State's retention of the excess value of property sold for delinquent taxes constituted violated the Takings Clause. However, under the instant facts, no tax sale has occurred, and, therefore, no excess could have been retained by Defendants.
The tax sale was not even scheduled to take place until November 2023 [ECF No. 1-1 at 5], and Plaintiff indicated he has now paid the delinquent taxes.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants should be summarily dismissed.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be summarily dismissed. Because the court lacks jurisdiction in this case, the dismissal is without prejudice to file in an appropriate court.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).