Opinion
CASE NO. ED CV 12-865 SVW (SS)
11-12-2013
FRANCISCO ALANIZ GARCIA, Petitioner, v. DAVID LONG, Warden, Respondent.
ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS,
CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
JUDGE
Pending before the Court is a petition for habeas corpus relief from a conviction in the Riverside County Superior Court under California Penal Code §§ 261(a)(2) and 288(a).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the petition, the records and files herein, the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge ("R&R"), respondent's objections, and petitioner's response thereto. Having conducted a de novo review of petitioner's first ground for relief in his habeas corpus petition, the Court concurs with and accepts the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge, with the exception of footnote 7 on page 32 of the R&R, for the reasons described herein.
I. Summary of Reasons Requiring Habeas Relief
Petitioner Francisco Alaniz Garcia was interviewed while in custody by two police officers. He was first advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When asked whether he wished to talk to the officers, Garcia responded, "No." The officers then questioned Garcia about his reasons for refusing to talk to them. Garcia initially repeated that he did not want to talk to the officers and referred to his right to remain silent, but in response to more questioning, eventually agreed to hear the officers' explanation for why they had arrested him. After further conversation during which Garcia continued to refer to his right to remain silent until he had a lawyer, Garcia agreed to talk to the officers. Garcia claims that the admission of his statements at trial, which he made only after he unambiguously conveyed his right to remain silent and the officers continued to question him, violated his rights under Miranda.
The resolution of Garcia's claim requires applying clearly established Supreme Court precedents to the undisputed transcript of the custodial interview. There are no factual disputes to resolve. Although a tape recording of the interview was played for the jury, neither party has argued that resolution of Garcia's claim depends in any way on questions of tone or inflection or on any other factors that might not be captured in the transcript. Cf. Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 416 (9th Cir. 1991) (considering both tape and transcript of interview to confirm that officer's tone was "insistent").
The California Court of Appeal denied the Miranda claim because it concluded that Garcia's use of the word "No" in response to the officer's question, "Do you wish to talk to me?" was ambiguous. The state court gave two reasons for this conclusion. First, the state court explained that certain statements Garcia made during the booking process, before being advised of his Miranda rights, showed that when Garcia said "No," he "often provided additional information or changed his answer" after the detective asked him to confirm his original negative response. Second, the state court explained that statements Garcia made later in the interview, in response to continued questioning by the officers, showed his initial answer of "No" was ambiguous.
The state court's first argument rests on "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," i.e., the interview transcript. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Determining whether Garcia unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights requires "an objective inquiry" into the words he and the officers used. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010). When Garcia expanded on his initial negative response to two of the three booking questions cited by the state court, he provided additional related information that did not contradict his original answer. (See R&R at 16-17 & 29 n.6.) This shows only that Garcia was prone to provide more information when prompted by the officers. Garcia's supplemental responses, viewed objectively, do not show that his use of the word "No" was ambiguous. "The state court's labeling of [Garcia's] statements as ambiguous and characterizing the officer's response as a legitimate clarifying inquiry were unreasonable determinations of fact." Anderson v. Terhune, 516 F.3d 781, 791 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); cf. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1008 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Failure to consider key aspects of the record is a defect in the fact-finding process.").
The state court's second argument is "contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In Smith v. Illinois, the Supreme Court explained that the state courts "were able to construe Smith's request for counsel as 'ambiguous' only by looking to Smith's subsequent responses to continued police questioning and by concluding that, 'considered in total,' Smith's 'statements" were equivocal." Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97 (1984) (emphasis in original) (quoting state court opinion). The Supreme Court held: "This line of analysis is unprecedented and untenable." Id. When an arrestee's invocation of his Miranda rights is Miranda that form the basis of the reasoning in the R&R.
Nor does the vacation of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Sessoms affect the validity of the R&R. Three of the four citations to Sessoms in the R&R simply include the case as additional authority stating a principle that is also clearly enunciated in a United States Supreme Court opinion. (See R&R at 24 & 33.) Those citations are unnecessary to the R&R. The fourth citation to Sessoms occurs in footnote 7 of the R&R. (R&R at 32 n.7.) The Court does not adopt footnote 7 of the R&R, and instead adopts the R&R with the following text substituted for footnote 7:
As in Anderson, here the police officers' actual responses to petitioner's statement "showed that the interrogating officers did not believe that [petitioner's] statement was ambiguous." Anderson, 516 F.3d at 789. Detective Lenton responded to petitioner's explanation for why he was invoking his right to remain silent by acknowledging that "you don't want to talk to us because you don't know the charges," and "[y]ou just said you didn't want to talk to us because you don't know what we're gonna talk to you about." (CT 190.) He then reiterated, "You're telling [me] we can't tell you about it." (Id.) The officer's responses show he clearly understood petitioner had expressed a desire to remain silent. Cf. Hurd v. Terhune, 619 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he interrogating officers' comments show that they subjectively understood Hurd's responses as unambiguous refusals.").
III. Order
1. The petition for habeas corpus is GRANTED on the basis of Ground One.
2. Respondent shall release petitioner from custody within 90 days of the date the Judgment herein becomes final, unless the State of California grants petitioner a new trial within 90 days of the date of this order.
3. The Clerk shall serve copies of this Order and the Judgment herein by United States mail on counsel for petitioner and counsel for respondent.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
________________
STEPHEN V. WILSON
United States District Judge