(See Am. Compl. ¶ 18.) The Court construes this as a reason why the offer would not allow Plaintiff to “enjoy the equal benefits and privileges of employment,” as required for “reasonable” employer accommodations. See Noll, 787 F.3d at 94 (quoting 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)(1)(ii), (iii)); see also Garces v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 16-CV-2811, 2017 WL 3025888, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2017) (same). Defendants recognize this argument, (see Defs' Reply 3), but do not respond to it.

whether an accommodation is reasonable is a fact-specific inquiry that is inappropriate on a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See, e.g., Garces v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 16-cv-2811 (LTS), 2017 WL 3025888, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2017) (denying motion to dismiss where the “only issue in dispute is whether [d]efendant has failed to provide [p]laintiff with a reasonable accommodation” because “[w]hether an accommodation is reasonable is a ‘fact-specific' inquiry and must be determined ‘on a case-by-case basis'” (quoting Wernick v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 385 (2d Cir. 1996)))

However, this information is outside the four-corners of the complaint and is not appropriate for consideration on a motion to dismiss. See id. (directing the reader to pp. 6-7 which provide citations to declaration exhibits not in the complaint); see Garces v. N.Y.C. Housing Auth., No. 16-cv-2811-LTS, 2017 WL 3025888 at *1, n.1 (refusing to consider evidentiary submission on a motion to dismiss because it "is outside the proper scope of the record for this motion practice.").