To begin, the circuit court erroneously found that County Commissions have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to the estate of a decedent. This Court, for example, has “held that a county [commission] in administering a decedent's estate does not have jurisdiction to construe a deed, will or contract[.]” Gapp v. Gapp, 126 W.Va. 874, 877–78, 30 S.E.2d 530, 532 (1944). Further, the Legislature has provided several statutes that authorize actions in circuit court involving an estate.

Under Article VIII, Section 24 of the Constitution of this State, county courts have jurisdiction and, as courts of record, are vested with judicial powers in all matters of probate, the appointment and qualification of personal representatives, guardians, committees, and curators, and the settlement of their accounts, and in all matters relating to apprentices. In re: Boggs' Estate, 135 W. Va. 288, 63 S.E.2d 497; In re: Boyce's Estate, 146 W. Va. 93, 118 S.E.2d 318; State ex rel. Remke v. Falland, 145 W. Va. 364, 115 S.E.2d 326; Furman v. Hunt, 135 W. Va. 716, 65 S.E.2d 1; In re: Will of Winzenrith, 133 W. Va. 267, 55 S.E.2d 897; Gapp v. Gapp, 126 W. Va. 874, 30 S.E.2d 530; Ritchie v. Armentrout, 124 W. Va. 399, 20 S.E.2d 474; Boone v. Boone, 123 W. Va. 696, 17 S.E.2d 790; Starcher v. South Penn Oil Company, 81 W. Va. 587, 95 S.E. 28; Tomblin v. Peck, 73 W. Va. 336, 80 S.E. 450. This Court has held that an appointment of an administrator in a county in which the intestate left no estate and did not reside at the time of his death, is not void and can not be collaterally attacked.

In re: Boggs' Estate, 135 W. Va. 288, 63 S.E.2d 497; State v. Davidson, 134 W. Va. 328, 59 S.E.2d 469; Leeson v. Smith, 132 W. Va. 715, 53 S.E.2d 412; Cost v. MacGregor, 123 W. Va. 316, 14 S.E.2d 909. Though not raised by any of the parties to this controversy, the question, being jurisdictional in character, will be considered by this Court on its own motion at any time during the pendency of the controversy. In re: Boggs' Estate, 135 W. Va. 288, 63 S.E.2d 497; Leeson v. Smith, 132 W. Va. 715, 53 S.E.2d 412; Blosser v. State Compensation Commissioner, 132 W. Va. 112, 51 S.E.2d 71; Whited v. State Compensation Commissioner, 131 W. Va. 646, 49 S.E.2d 838; Gapp v. Gapp, 126 W. Va. 874, 30 S.E.2d 530; Dawson v. Dawson, 123 W. Va. 380, 15 S.E.2d 156; Cost v. MacGregor, 123 W. Va. 316, 14 S.E.2d 909; Charleston Apartments Corporation v. Appalachian Electric Power Company, 118 W. Va. 694, 192 S.E. 294; Arnold v. Mylius, 87 W. Va. 727, 105 S.E. 920; Buskirk v. Ragland, 65 W. Va. 749, 65 S.E. 101; Thompson v. Adams, 60 W. Va. 463, 55 S.E. 668; Cresap v. Kemble, 26 W. Va. 603; Kemble v. Cresap, 26 W. Va. 603. Paragraph (a), Section 1, Article 5, Chapter 58, Code, 1931, deals with civil cases in which the matter in controversy, exclusive of costs, is of greater value or amount than $100.00 and in which there is a final judgment, decree or order.

risdiction of a county court, acting through a commissioner of accounts, to hear and determine claims against the estate of a decedent and other matters necessary and proper in the settlement and administration of such estates are In re Settlement of the Estate of Frederick F. McIntosh, Sr., 144 W. Va. 585, 109 S.E.2d 153; Furman v. Hunt, 135 W. Va. 716, 65 S.E.2d 1; In re Estate of H. B. Hauer, 135 W. Va. 488, 63 S.E.2d 853; In re Settlement of Accounts of Ed. L. Boggs, 135 W. Va. 288, 63 S.E.2d 497; State ex rel. Charlotton v. O'Brien, 135 W. Va. 263, 63 S.E.2d 512; Boone v. Boone, 123 W. Va. 696, 17 S.E.2d 790; In re Estate of John E. Brown, 123 W. Va. 504, 16 S.E.2d 801; In re Estate of Anna A. Scott, 122 W. Va. 352, 9 S.E.2d 528; Garden v. Riley, 116 W. Va. 723, 183 S.E. 46; In re F. M. Reynolds Estate, 116 W. Va. 249, 180 S.E. 6; In re Estate of John C. Gilbert, 115 W. Va. 599, 177 S.E. 529; Williams v. Moss, 114 W. Va. 488, 172 S.E. 529. The administrator cites and relies upon Gapp v. Gapp, 126 W. Va. 874, 30 S.E.2d 530, in support of his contention that the county court, through its commissioner of accounts, is without jurisdiction to hear and determine the instant claim against the estate of John A. Boyce, deceased. That case is clearly distinguishable from and is not controlling in the decision of the case at bar. The provisions of Article 2, Chapter 44, Code, 1931, as amended, do not apply to the estate of an insane person or the administration of such estate by the committee of such person and as pointed out in the opinion in the Gapp case, in which the disputed claim was an unliquidated claim, there is a difference between the powers and the duties of a committee of an insane person and the powers and the duties of a personal representative of a decedent, and the Legislature had not enacted any statute relating to the administration of the estate of an insane person or to the duties of a committee of such person which authorized a county court to adjudicate disputed and unliquidated claims aga

In a long line of decisions, this Court has established the rule that it will ex mero motu take notice of lack of jurisdiction of a trial court if such is apparent upon the record before this Court. State ex rel. Hammond v. Worrell, 144 W. Va. 83, 106 S.E.2d 521; Backusv. Abbot, Assessor, 136 W. Va. 891, 69 S.E.2d 48; Grottendick v. Webber, 134 W. Va. 798, 61 S.E.2d 854; Blosser v. State Compensation Commissioner, 132 W. Va. 112, 51 S.E.2d 71; Whited v. State Compensation Commissioner, 131 W. Va. 646, 49 S.E.2d 838; Gapp v. Gapp, 126 W. Va. 874, 30 S.E.2d 530; Morris v. Gates, 124 W. Va. 275, 20 S.E.2d 118; Dawson v. Dawson, 123 W. Va. 380, 15 S.E.2d 156; Charleston Apartments Corporation v. Appalachian Electric Power Company, 118 W. Va. 694, 192 S.E. 294; Arnold v. Mylius, 87 W. Va. 727, 105 S.E. 920; Buskirk v. Ragland, 65 W. Va. 749, 65 S.E. 101; Thompson v. Adams, 60 W. Va. 463, 55 S.E. 668; Gall v. Tygart's Valley Bank, 50 W. Va. 597, 40 S.E. 390. The 3rd Syllabus Point in Charleston Apartments Corporation v. Appalachian Electric Power Company, 118 W. Va. 694, 192 S.E. 294, reads as follows: "Lack of jurisdiction may be raised for the first time in this court, when it appears on the face of the bill and proceedings, and it may be taken notice of by this court on its own motion."

As the question is jurisdictional in character, it will be considered and resolved by this Court on its own motion on this appeal. Whited v. State Compensation Commissioner, 131 W. Va. 646, 49 S.E.2d 838; Gapp v. Gapp, 126 W. Va. 847, 30 S.E.2d 530; Morris v. Gates, 124 W. Va. 275, 20 S.E.2d 118; Dawson v. Dawson, 123 W. Va. 380, 15 S.E.2d 156; Charleston Apartments Corporation v. Appalachian Electric Power Company, 118 W. Va. 694, 192 S.E. 294; Arnold v. Mylius, 87 W. Va. 727, 105 S.E. 920; Buskirk v. Ragland, 65 W. Va. 749, 65 S.E. 101; Thompson v. Adams, 60 W. Va. 463, 55 S.E. 668; Cresap v. Kemble, 26 W. Va. 603; Kemble v. Cresap, 26 W. Va. 603." To the same effect is the opinion of this Court in Grottendick v. Webber, 134 W. Va. 798, 803, 61 S.E.2d 854.

See Hall v. Wadsworth, 30 W. Va. 55, 3 S.E. 29; State ex rel. Fortney Lumber and Hardware Company v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 73 W. Va. 1, 79 S.E. 834. Jurisdictional questions may be considered and resolved by this Court on its own motion on appeal or writ of error. Blosser v. State Compensation Commissioner, 132 W. Va. 112, 51 S.E.2d 71; Whited v. State Compensation Commissioner, 131 W. Va. 646, 49 S.E.2d 838; Gapp v. Gapp, 126 W. Va. 874, 30 S.E.2d 530; Morris v. Gates, 124 W. Va. 275, 20 S.E.2d 118; Dawson v. Dawson, 123 W. Va. 380, 15 S.E.2d 156; Charleston Apartments Corporation v. Appalachian Electric Power Company, 118 W. Va. 694, 192 S.E. 294; Arnold v. Mylius, 87 W. Va. 727, 105 S.E. 920; Buskirk v. Ragland, 65 W. Va. 749, 65 S.E. 101; Thompson v. Adams, 60 W. Va. 463, 55 S.E. 668; Cresap v. Kemble, 26 W. Va. 603. In order that jurisdictional questions may be considered and determined by this Court in the first instance on appeal or writ of error, however, it is necessary that the case in which they arise is properly brought to this Court by effective appellate procedure.

Though the question of the jurisdiction of a court of equity, by mandatory injunction, to grant the relief sought by the plaintiffs in this suit was not raised by any of the parties in the circuit court or in this Court, the defendant not having appeared or filed any brief upon this appeal, that question, having fairly arisen upon the record, will be considered and determined by this Court upon its own motion. Blosser v. State Compensation Commissioner, 112 W. Va. 132, 51 S.E.2d 71; Whited v. State Compensation Commissioner, 131 W. Va. 646, 49 S.E.2d 838; Gapp v. Gapp, 126 W. Va. 874, 30 S.E.2d 530; Morris v. Gates, 124 W. Va. 275, 20 S.E.2d 118; Dawson v. Dawson, 123 W. Va. 380, 15 S.E.2d 156; Charleston Apartments Corporation v. Appalachian Electric Power Company, 118 W. Va. 694, 192 S.E. 294; Arnold v. Mylius, 87 W. Va. 727, 105 S.E. 920; Buskirk v. Ragland, 65 W. Va. 749, 65 S.E. 101; Thompson v. Adams, 60 W. Va. 463, 55 S.E. 668; Gall v. Tygart's Valley Bank, 50 W. Va. 597, 40 S.E. 390; Cresap v. Kemble, 26 W. Va. 603; Kemble v. Cresap, 26 W. Va. 603. As a general rule equity is conversant only with matters involving property and the maintenance of civil rights and will not interfere by injunction with the duties of any department of the government except under special circumstances and when necessary to the protection of property or other rights against irreparable injury. Though a mandatory injunction may be, in some instances, an appropriate remedy to compel affirmative acts by a public officer it will be awarded only when the necessity for such relief is great and the

Pt. 2, syl., in Re Estate of Gilbert, deceased, 115 W.Va. 599, 177 S.E. 529, it was held in the syllabus inferentially that a county court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim of a child to compensation from the estate of a parent for services rendered and support furnished by the former to the latter, without proof of an express contract 'where it may be reasonably inferred, or implied, from the established facts and circumstances that pecuniary compensation was in the view of the parties at the time such services were rendered and support furnished.' And again the powers of county courts under Section 24, Article VIII of the Constitution, were considered and appraised by this Court in Boone and Boone v. Boone, 123 W.Va. 696, pt. 3, syl., 17 S.E.2d 790; and Gapp v. Gapp, 126 W.Va. 874, 30 S.E.2d 530. For an early discussion of the powers of county courts under Section 24, Article VIII of the Constitution, see the opinion of Judge Green in Dower v. Seeds, 28 W.Va. 113, 153-156.

The power conferred by Chapter 83, Acts of the Legislature, 1949, Regular Session, upon the county court to direct its clerk to issue a certificate of incorporation to a municipality and to determine that the provisions of the statute relative to the formation of such municipality have been complied with is not judicial in nature and, in exercising that power, the county court acts as an agency of or a tribunal representing the Legislature. Under Article VIII, Section 24, of the Constitution, the judicial power of county courts is limited to specified subjects, among which are mentioned all matters of probate, personal representatives, guardians, committees, curators, the settlement of their accounts, matter relating to apprentices, Haudenschilt v. Haudenschilt, 129 W. Va. 92, 39 S.E.2d 328; Gapp v. Gapp, 126 W. Va. 874, 30 S.E.2d 530; Boone v. Boone, 123 W. Va. 696, 17 S.E.2d 790; State ex rel. Nutter v. Mace, 130 W. Va. 676, 44 S.E.2d 851, and election contests involving county and district officers, State ex rel. Daugherty v. County Court of Lincoln County, 127 W. Va. 35, 31 S.E.2d 321; but in addition to that power, county courts "may exercise such other powers, and perform such other duties, not of a judicial nature, as may be prescribed by law." The power conferred upon the county courts by Chapter 83, Acts of the Legislature, 1949, Regular Session, is in its nature not judicial or quasi judicial but legislative, or administrative of a legislative, power or function and, as a county court, in exercising such power, acts "as an agency of the Legislature to determine whether or not certain preliminary requirements have been met", the present statute which authorizes the county courts so to do, is not violative of Article V or of Article VIII, Section 24, of the Constitution, but is valid and constitutional.