Opinion
No. C 04-02124 JW.
August 26, 2004
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Carlos Gamboa ("Plaintiff") initiated this lawsuit against his former employer United Parcel Services, Inc. ("UPS") and his former UPS supervisors Dino Curtin ("Curtin") and Ed Lippi ("Lippi") (collectively, the "Individual Defendants") in Monterey County Superior Court. Plaintiff alleged four causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, (3) Employment Discrimination in Violation of CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12920-41, and (4) Violation of CAL. LAB. CODE § 6311. Defendants removed to the Northern District of California, and now moves for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action. Defendants also move, under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"), to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action. In addition, the Individual Defendants move separately to dismiss all four causes of action, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), on separate grounds.
On August 23, 2004, this Court entertained oral arguments on these motions. Based upon all papers filed to date and upon comments made at the hearing, this Court grants Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action, grants the Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Third and Fourth Causes of Action, and denies UPS's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is, by education and training, skilled in the arts of automotive mechanics and repair, with expertise in the area of mechanical maintenance and the servicing and repair of commercial vehicles. In March 1995, Plaintiff entered into an employment relationship with UPS. In 2000, Plaintiff worked in the mechanical and servicing department at UPS's business hub in Sunnyvale, California. At the time, Curtin was Plaintiff's immediate supervisor. In 2000, Curtin was promoted to fleet manager, and Lippi became Plaintiff's immediate supervisor.
Plaintiff alleges that shortly after this management change, the Individual Defendants engaged in a course of conduct and behavior designed to terminate Plaintiff's employment. For example, in late 2000 and/or early 2001, Plaintiff allegedly intended to replace a brake master cylinder on a UPS truck. Plaintiff claims that Lippi directed him not to replace it. The next day, the brake master cylinder failed and Plaintiff was cited for poor quality work. In November 2001, Plaintiff allegedly attempted to replace the fuel line of a UPS truck. Plaintiff claims that Curtin commanded him not to replace it. Two weeks later, the fuel line leaked while in operation and Plaintiff was cited for poor quality work.
Thereafter, Plaintiff contacted both UPS's Human Resources Department and its National Headquarters. National Headquarters, in turn, notified the Sunnyvale hub of Plaintiff's complaints. Plaintiff alleges that the Individual Defendants retaliated against him by assigning him significantly more work, accusing him of falsifying documents, and continuing their false accusations of poor workmanship. Plaintiff filed suit on February 5, 2004, claiming: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, (3) Employment Discrimination in Violation of CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12920-41, and (4) Violation of CAL. LAB. CODE § 6311.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this suit by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, and 1441(b) (2004) (federal question jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction, and removal).
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, governs contract disputes between employers and labor organizations that represent employees in an industry affecting commerce. At all time relevant to this action, Plaintiff was an employee represented by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, a labor organization that represents employees in an industry affecting commerce, as defined in the LMRA. Furthermore, Plaintiff was employed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.
The Ninth Circuit has held that § 301 of the LMRA completely preempts state law claims when those claims are "founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements," or when a claim based on a state law right "requires the interpretation of a collective bargaining-agreement." Hayden v. Reickerd, 957 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1991). When state law claims — such as Plaintiff's First Cause of Action (Breach of Contract) and Second Cause of Action (Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) — are completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, they are treated as claims arising under federal law for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) ("Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law. . . . The complete pre-emption [doctrine] is applied primarily in cases raising claims pre-empted by § 301 of the LMRA.").
Since this Court has original (federal question) jurisdiction over Plaintiff's First and Second Causes of action, it also has supplemental (pendent) jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
III. STANDARDS
The standards and procedures for a partial summary judgment motion are the same as for summary judgment. Namely, the movant must show that there is "no genuine issue of material fact and that [he] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided, the adverse party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings . . . [T]he adverse party's response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate shall be entered against the adverse party." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) (emphasis added).The strict standard for granting a 12(b)(6) motion is set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). A 12(b)(6) motion must not be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. at 45-56.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action
As discussed in Footnote 1, supra, § 301 of the LMRA completely preempts state law claims that involve analysis of a collective bargaining agreements. Since Plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action, which are both state claims, necessarily involve analysis of a collective bargaining agreement, they are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. Accordingly, this Court elects to read Plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action as § 301 claims.Allis-Chalmers Corp v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 ("[W]hen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of [a collective bargaining] agreement . . . that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law").
Defendants move for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action on the grounds that they are time-barred. Claims brought under § 301 of the LMRA are governed by a six-month statute of limitations. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 (1983); 897 F.2d 400, 403-04 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff alleges that UPS terminated him on August 9, 2002. Yet, Plaintiff did not file his complaint until February 5, 2004. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action are therefore time-barred. Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants' motion. This Court accordingly grants Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action.
B. Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action
Because this Court entirely disposed of Plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action in Part IV.A., supra, it need not, and does not, reach the Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss those causes of action.
The Individual Defendants separately move to dismiss Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action (Employment Discrimination in Violation of California Government Code §§ 12920-41) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, they argue that California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), CAL. LAB. CODE § 12900 et seq., which covers Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action, applies only to employers (such as UPS) and not to them, as individual supervisors. Plaintiff does not oppose this motion. Therefore, this Court grants the Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action.
C. The Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action
The Individual Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action (Violation of § 6311) on the ground that § 6311 applies only to employers (such as UPS) and not to them as individual supervisors. Plaintiff does not oppose this motion. Therefore, this Court grants their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action.
D. UPS's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action
Lastly, UPS moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action (Violation of CAL. LAB. CODE § 6311) on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. To prevail on its motion, UPS must prove "beyond doubt" that Plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. This Court is not persuaded that UPS has satisfied this heavy burden.
UPS cites Gutierrez v. RWD Techs., Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1227-28 (E.D. Cal. 2003), for the principle that plaintiffs who bring causes of action under CAL. LAB. CODE § 6311 (§ 6311) must first exhaust their administrative remedies. Since Plaintiff has not alleged that he exhausted his administrative remedies, UPS argues that his Fourth Cause of Action must fail.
Actually, Gutierrez stands only for the principle that CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.7 (§ 98.7), and any statutory provision that explicitly incorporates § 98.7, require administrative exhaustion. See Gutierez, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1227 n. 3. At issue in Gutierrez was CAL. LAB. CODE § 230, which explicitly incorporated § 98.7 into its text. Gutierrez, 279 F. Supp. at 1225 ("Section 230 further provides . . . that `any employee who is discharged . . . may file a complaint . . . pursuant to Section 98.7'") (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 230(f)(1)). The court held that the plaintiff was required to exhaust his administrative remedies under § 98.7 before he could bring a civil suit under CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.7 (West 2003), inter alia, sets forth remedies (including administrative remedies) available to persons allegedly discharged in violation of law.
Section 6311, the basis of Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action, does not explicitly incorporate § 98.7. UPS circumvents this fact by referring this Court to CAL. LAB. CODE § 6312 (§ 6312). Section 6312 states that "Any employee who believes that he or she has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against by any person in violation of Section 6310 or 6311 may file a complaint with the Labor Commissioner pursuant to Section 98.7." CAL. LAB. CODE § 6312 (West 2003) (emphasis added). UPS, citingGutierrez, suggest that § 6312's simultaneous reference to §§ 6311 and 98.7 amounts to an explicit incorporation by § 6311 of § 98.7. This Court disagrees.
First, Gutierrez addresses CAL. LAB. CODE § 230, not § 6311, and thus is not directly on point. Second, the reasoning inGutierrez revolved around the fact that CAL. LAB. CODE § 230 explicitly incorporated § 98.7 into its text. See Gutiererez, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1225, 1227 n. 3. Although § 6312 also incorporates § 98.7 into its text, § 6311 (the statutory provision at issue in this case) does not.
Third, the caselaw constructing § 6312 belies UPS's argument. Section 6312, which explicitly refers to §§ 6310 and 6311, see supra, has already been constructed vis-a-vis § 6310. Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290 (1982). Hentzel held that plaintiffs who sue under § 6310 may sue directly under § 6310. In other words, even though § 6312 explicitly refers to §§ 6310 and 98.7, plaintiffs who sue under § 6310 do not need to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to § 98.7. To reach this conclusion, the Hentzel court, inter alia, looked to the text of § 6310. Section 6310(b) "makes it a misdemeanor for an employer willfully to refuse to rehire, promote, or otherwise restore an employee or former employee who has been determined to be eligible for such rehiring or promotion by a grievance procedure, arbitration or hearing authorized by law.'"Hentzel, 138 Cal. App. 2d at 302 (emphasis in original). The court found this language noteworthy. "[I]f the Legislature contemplated that the section 6312 procedure would be otherwise exclusive, it seems more likely that . . . section 6310 would have referred specifically to that procedure, rather than more generally to a `hearing authorized by law.'" Id. This same logic can be applied here. Section 6311 explicitly states that "Any employee who is laid off or discharged in violation of this section . . . shall have a right of action for wages for the time the employee is without work as a result of the layoff or discharge." (Emphasis added). To what does this "right of action" refer? It could refer to procedures prescribed by § 6312. However, based on the reasoning inHentzel, it could also refer to direct cause of action under § 6311. If the Legislature contemplated that the § 6312 procedure (and, by extension, the § 98.7 procedure) would be exclusive, it seems more likely that § 6311 would have referred specifically to that procedure, rather than more generally to a "right of action." UPS has failed to satisfy the Conley standard governing motions to dismiss. Accordingly, its motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action is denied.
V. CONCLUSION
This Court grants Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's First and Second Causes of Action. Furthermore, it grants the Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Third and Fourth Causes of Action. Lastly, it denies UPS's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action.