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Gallo v. Superior Court of Contra Costa Cnty.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE
Nov 21, 2017
A152663 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2017)

Opinion

A152663

11-21-2017

LISA GALLO et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Respondent; RUDY GALLO et al., Real Parties in Interest.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. MSC16-01300) THE COURT:

Before Jones, P.J., Needham, J., and Bruiniers, J.

Petitioners Lisa Gallo, Mary Sherfey, and Denise Thompson filed this writ proceeding to challenge a portion of respondent superior court's order granting petitioners leave to amend their complaint against real parties in interest Rudy Gallo and Gina Komaroff. Having considered the petition, record, and the parties' briefs, we determine petitioners are entitled to writ relief.

We grant the petition by way of this memorandum opinion because "[t]he Courts of Appeal should dispose of causes that raise no substantial issues of law or fact by memorandum or other abbreviated form of opinion." (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)

In granting petitioners leave to amend their complaint, respondent conditioned its order on petitioners "bear[ing] all discovery costs and fees (including attorneys' fees) otherwise borne by [real parties in interest] in response to [petitioners'] discovery demands" and "resulting from [real parties'] need to defend against allegations" in the amended pleading. Additionally, respondent required petitioners to "bear the costs and fees (including attorneys' fees) stemming from discovery propounded by [real parties]."

It is undisputed that in opposing petitioners' motion to amend, real parties did not request, nor provide a predicate factual foundation for, imposition of any conditions (much less discovery expenses) upon the granting of petitioners' motion. Instead, the subject of conditions was raised by respondent, sua sponte, at the hearing on petitioners' motion and its order thereafter imposed conditions when it granted petitioners' motion. Since respondent did not proceed in accordance with due process in imposing the challenged conditions upon the granting of leave to amend, we will grant writ relief. (See Bricker v. Superior Court (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 634, 638-639.)

To the contrary, real parties admitted below that the current and proposed amended pleadings were based on the same "underlying and background factual allegations."

In accordance with our prior notification to the parties that we might do so, we will direct issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177-180.) Petitioners' right to relief is obvious, and no useful purpose would be served by issuance of an alternative writ, further briefing, and oral argument. (Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35; see Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1236-1237, 1240-1241; Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1233, 1240-1244.) In our order requesting briefing, we provided Palma notice and specifically asked that the parties address whether respondent violated petitioners' due process rights by the manner in which it imposed conditions and, if so, what the remedy should be. Real parties' opposition brief raised a host of unmeritorious objections to the granting of writ relief, and not only failed to answer the question we posed, but also did not discuss whether such conditions are permitted by case law and the underlying facts. Such briefing would have been the first airing of real parties' view on that subject, given their failure to brief the point below. Under these circumstances, we reject real parties' suggestion that we remand this matter to permit respondent to consider how to limit the scope of the conditions. (Cf. Bricker v. Superior Court, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 639 [requiring respondent to vacate its dismissal of petitioner's small claims appeals and to decide the dismissal question consistent with due process principles, where the parties' briefs and evidentiary submissions in this court discussed the merits of the dismissal issue].)

Real parties argue petitioners have an adequate remedy at law by appeal from the order under Probate Code section 1300, subdivision (e), because the order "[f]ix[ed], authoriz[ed], allow[ed], or direct[ed] payment of compensation or expenses of an attorney." Real parties have not persuasively demonstrated that section should apply to this civil proceeding or petitioners' motion to amend. Also, notwithstanding real parties' arguments to the contrary, we find the record before us, and petitioners' showing regarding the propriety of writ review, to be sufficient. --------

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior court to vacate the portion of its order filed August 31, 2017, imposing conditions upon the granting of leave to amend. In the interests of justice and to prevent further delays, this decision shall be final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).) Petitioners are entitled to recover costs. (Id., rule 8.493(a)(1)(A).)


Summaries of

Gallo v. Superior Court of Contra Costa Cnty.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE
Nov 21, 2017
A152663 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2017)
Case details for

Gallo v. Superior Court of Contra Costa Cnty.

Case Details

Full title:LISA GALLO et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE

Date published: Nov 21, 2017

Citations

A152663 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2017)