Opinion
2:23-cv-00325 WBS AC
09-19-2023
ANTHONY GALLEY, Deceased, by and through his Co-Successors in Interest, P.P. and B.P., minors, through their mother and Next Friend, Christina O'Neil, Individually and as CoSuccessors in Interest for ANTHONY GALLEY, Deceased, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, a public entity; FORMER SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF SCOTT R. JONES, in his individual capacity; Jail Commander ANTHONY PAONESSA; Jail Medical Director VEER BABU, M.D.; MAXIM HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. dba MAXIM STAFFING SOLUTIONS, a Maryland Corporation; MAXIM HEALTHCARE STAFFING SERVICES, Inc., a Maryland Corporation; ERICA WOODS, R.N.; and DOES 1-20; individually, jointly, and severally, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MEDICAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
P.P. and B.P., the minor children of decedent Anthony Galley, bring this action against the County of Sacramento, Former Sacramento County Sheriff Scott Jones, Jail Commander Anthony Paonessa, and Jail Medical Director Doctor Veer Babu (collectively the “County Defendants”), as well as Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc., Maxim Healthcare Staffing Services, Inc., and Nurse Erica Woods (collectively the “Medical Defendants”), for violations of both federal and state law in connection with Mr. Galley's death while detained in the Sacramento County Jail. (See generally First Am. Compl. (Docket No. 20).)
The court previously denied the County Defendants' motion to dismiss claims raised against them. (July 13, 2023 Order Re: Mot. to Dismiss (Docket No. 30).) The court now considers the Medical Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 39.)
The factual history is set forth in that previous order, and the court does not repeat it here.
The Medical Defendants advance two arguments: (1) plaintiffs fail to state a claim against Woods under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claim 1); and (2) plaintiffs fail to state a claim against Maxim or Woods under the Tom Bane Act (Claim 3). The court rejects both arguments.
The Medical Defendants also moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claim against Woods under Cal. Civ. Code § 845.6 (Claim 6) on the ground that Woods is not a public employee. (Mot.) In their opposition, plaintiffs agreed that the claim should be dismissed. (Opp'n (Docket No. 42) at 8.) Accordingly, the court will grant the motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Section 845 claim.
I. Section 1983 (Claim 1)
Because Mr. Galley was a pre-trial detainee, the circumstances of his confinement are properly addressed under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not under the Eighth Amendment. Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2016)). Section 1983 claims alleging violations of the right to adequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment are evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard. Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1124-25. “This differs from the inquiry under the Eighth Amendment which requires that the prison official must subjectively have a sufficiently culpable state of mind . . . . [A] pretrial detainee need not prove those subjective elements about the officer's actual awareness of the level of risk.” Id. at 1124 n.4 (citations omitted).
The objective deliberate indifference standard requires allegations that (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved -- making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 1125. At issue here is the third prong. “The mere lack of due care by a state official does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the plaintiff must prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent -- something akin to reckless disregard.” Id. at 1125 (citations omitted).
The Medical Defendants contend that Gordon's test applies only narrowly in cases where, unlike here, an affirmative choice of treatment against other alternatives is at issue. (Reply (Docket No. 43) at 3.) They misinterpret Gordon's scope. The Supreme Court in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015) held that determining whether the use of force against a pretrial detainee was excessive pursuant to a Section 1983 claim requires an objective inquiry because due process concerns implicate objective consequences of official action, not the subjective intent behind it. Id. at 397-98. The Ninth Circuit in Castro spread this holding to failure-to-protect claims, in part because the “broad wording of Kingsley . . . did not limit its holding to ‘force' but spoke to ‘the challenged governmental action' generally.” Id. at 1070 (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398). In Gordon, the Ninth Circuit extended this logic further to cover inadequate medical care claims generally. Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125. This claim falls firmly within Gordon's ambit.
Taking all of plaintiffs' allegations as true and drawing every reasonable factual inference in plaintiffs' favor, the court finds that plaintiffs plead facts sufficient to allege objective deliberate indifference. Mr. Galley had been detained repeatedly at the same jail in the past. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 24.) According to the allegations, during his detentions, Mr. Galley regularly informed jail medical staff about his alcohol dependency, withdrawal symptoms, and risk of seizures if not given proper detoxification procedures. (Id.) Because of these warnings, Mr. Galley was always placed on detoxification and withdrawal protocols, which were documented in Mr. Galley's jail medical records. (Id.) During his final detention, Mr. Galley was medically screened because of his prior medical history as reflected in his jail medical records. (Id. ¶ 23.) Further, Woods, as Mr. Galley's screening nurse, id., plausibly had access to Mr. Galley's medical records. Mr. Galley also exhibited clear signs of alcohol impairment while Woods was medically screening him. (Id.) Finally, Mr. Galley told Woods directly during the screening about his history of alcohol withdrawal and how much alcohol he had drunk earlier that day. (Id.)
Plaintiffs allege that any Registered Nurse in the circumstances equipped with this information would have been required to put Mr. Galley on immediate detoxification and alcohol withdrawal protocols. (Id. ¶ 25.) But as alleged in the complaint, Woods did not, contrary to nationally recognized clinical standards, the jail's internal policy, and even the jail's own past established practice with the same detainee. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25.) In fact, nothing suggests that Woods prescribed or provided any course of medical treatment at all.
The Medical Defendants correctly point out that “negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396. But Woods's failure to place Mr. Galley on immediate detoxification and monitoring protocols, in full context of what she allegedly knew or should have known, is enough to allege deliberate indifference to Mr. Galley's risk of being in serious medical danger. Accordingly, the court will deny the motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim as asserted against Woods.
II. Tom Bane Act (Claim 3)
To survive on a motion to dismiss, a Tom Bane Act claim must allege that an official acted with specific intent to violate their rights. Reese v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Cornell v. City & County of San Francisco, 17 Cal.App. 5th 766, 801 (1st Dist. 2017)).
However, "specific intent” may be shown by demonstrating an official's reckless disregard for a person's constitutional rights. Id. at 1045 (“[A] reckless disregard for a person's constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.”); Cornell, 17 Cal.App. 5th at 80304 (“Reckless disregard of the ‘right at issue' is all that [is]
necessary.”).
The court sees no logical reason to distinguish “reckless disregard” under Gordon from its manifestations under the Tom Bane Act. Additionally, Gordon clearly distinguishes “reckless disregard” as something different from, and strictly “less than[,] subjective intent.” Id. at 1125 (emphasis added). The court therefore applies the same objective test from Gordon to the Tom Bane Act claim here.
As applied, and as discussed in the previous section, plaintiffs plead facts sufficient to plausibly show that Woods's inaction in these circumstances rose to the level of objective reckless disregard for a grave medical risk. This is enough for the Tom Bane Act claim to survive at the pleading stage. Accordingly, the court will deny the motion to dismiss the Tom Bane Act claim as asserted against the Medical Defendants.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Medical Defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket No. 39) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED as to plaintiffs' Section 845 claim (Claim 6), and DENIED as to plaintiffs' Section 1983 and Tom Bane Act claims (Claims 1 and 3). Claim 6 is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.