Galindo v. State

Full title: YJINIO GALINDO, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Eighth District, El Paso

Date published: Aug 26, 2004

No. 08-02-00341-CR (Tex. App. Aug. 26, 2004)

Opinion

No. 08-02-00341-CR

August 26, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH.

Appeal from the 168th District Court of El Paso County, Texas, (Tc# 990D02695).

Before Panel No. 3 BARAJAS, C.J., LARSEN, and CHEW, JJ.

OPINION

DAVID WELLINGTON CHEW, Justice.

Appellant Yjinio Galindo was charged by indictment with the offenses of attempted murder with a deadly weapon and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. A jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and assessed punishment at 16 years' and 9 months' imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. On appeal, Appellant raises three issues, in which he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, in admitting evidence of his post-arrest silence, and he also contends the evidence was factually insufficient to disprove his affirmative defense of insanity. We affirm.

FACTS

On April 22, 1999, Maria del Carmen Aranda was working at the YMCA in El Paso. That morning, Ms. Aranda accompanied a pest control worker upstairs to open the rooms for fumigation. When they reached room 428, Ms. Aranda knocked on the door twice and identified herself and the worker as "pest control." Appellant opened the door. Ms. Aranda recalled that Appellant gave her a "very penetrating look like he was bothered. . . ." Appellant left the room. The pest control worker stayed in the room about two minutes or less while fumigating it. After they finished fumigating, Ms. Aranda saw complainant Maria Guadalupe Rodriguez, another YMCA employee, exiting the elevator. They spoke to each other for a while before Ms. Aranda left to check on laundry in the laundry room. Ms. Rodriguez was working in the men's rest room on the second floor when a man walked in the room. The man, who Ms. Rodriguez identified as Appellant, grabbed her by the neck and pushed her against the shower wall. Ms. Rodriguez's head struck the frame of the shower. While still holding her neck, Appellant lifted his shirt and took out a knife. Appellant then began to stab Ms. Rodriguez on the left side of her chest. Appellant also cut her finger. Ms. Rodriguez was stabbed five times in the chest. When blood squirted on his face and on his shirt, Appellant let go of Ms. Rodriguez's neck. Ms. Rodriguez was able to slip down the wall and escape. As she ran away, she saw Appellant taking the elevator. Ms. Rodriguez ran downstairs to the front desk. The front desk employee yelled for Ms. Rodriguez's supervisor. The supervisor brought over three towels to cover her and an ambulance arrived shortly. That same morning, Officer John Wasmuth and his partner Officer Fred Hernandez were working plainclothes surveillance and were parked in the rear parking lot of the YMCA. They received a radio dispatch about a stabbing at the YMCA and responded to the call. When they arrived, they observed Sergeant Archer, several people standing around in the lobby, and a woman laying on the ground with her shirt torn open and blood on her upper torso. Based on information received from the victim about what had taken place, they proceeded to the laundry room in the basement to find Ms. Aranda. Ms. Aranda told them that she had not seen anyone down there. They, including Ms. Aranda, went back upstairs to the first floor. After talking to Ms. Rodriguez, Ms. Aranda and the officers went upstairs to the fourth floor to room 428. According to Officer Wasmuth, when they reached room 428, Officer Hernandez tapped on the door, but there was no response. Officer Hernandez asked Ms. Aranda for the key and she gave it to him. The officer placed the key into the tumbler of lock, but as he started to turn the knob, the door opened. Appellant was inside standing close to the door.¹ Officers Wasmuth and Hernandez identified themselves as police officers and displayed their badges. Either Officer Wasmuth or Officer Hernandez drew his firearm and pointed it at Appellant. Officer Hernandez entered the room, placed his hands on Appellant's right arm, and told Appellant to place his hands against the wall and not to move. Officer Hernandez handcuffed Appellant and escorted him out of the room. Officer Wasmuth testified that Appellant was detained and searched for any weapons. The officers found a large knife encased in a sheath on Appellant's left hip. Officer Wasmuth took the knife from Appellant's person. The knife was bloody around the hilt. Appellant was then escorted downstairs by elevator to the first floor. The officers advised Sergeant Archer that they had the subject in custody and had recovered the weapon. At the scene, Ms. Rodriguez identified Appellant as her assailant. Ms. Aranda testified that the YMCA provides about 120 rooms for housing individuals. Ms. Aranda knew Appellant on a first name basis. Ms. Rodriguez testified that she did not know Appellant's name at the time of the attack. During her testimony, Ms. Rodriguez recalled that Appellant had been living at the YMCA since November 1998. Once in November, she and her supervisor, Ms. Aranda, entered Appellant's room. Ms. Rodriguez stated that Ms. Aranda was showing her how to clean rooms and when Appellant returned and found them there he was very friendly. Ms. Rodriguez did not have any problems with Appellant between November 1998 and April 22, 1999. About three days before the stabbing, she had an encounter with Appellant, in which he confronted her and asked why she went into his room without authorization. Ms. Rodriguez agreed that it did not make sense for Appellant to attack her with a knife just because she went into his room without permission five months earlier.

DISCUSSION Motion to Suppress

In Issue One, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress tangible evidence because it was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment and his state Article 1, section 9 constitutional right, prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure. On appeal, Appellant argues that the knife was obtained pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure. Specifically, he asserts that the State provided no statutory exception to the warrant requirement, there was no evidence of exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search of his residence, no probable cause for the officers' entry into his room, no specific facts conveyed to the police prior to their entry, and that the State failed to establish an immediate need to search and arrest him.

Standard of Review

We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). In a motion to suppress hearing, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses, including what weight, if any, is to be given to their testimony. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). Consequently, the reviewing court must defer to the trial court's determination of historical facts supported by the record, especially when the trial court's findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and review the court's application of search and seizure law de novo. Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-9 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). As the trial court made no explicit findings of historical facts in this case, the evidence must be reviewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 768. We review de novo the trial court's conclusions of law and the application of those principles to the facts which do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. The trial court's ruling will be upheld if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855-56 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000).

Illegal Arrest

At trial, Appellant requested a suppression hearing regarding the officers' entry into his room without a warrant. Outside the jury's presence, Officer Wasmuth testified that within a few minutes of hearing the dispatch call, they were in the YMCA building in front of room 428.² Ms. Aranda gave Officer Hernandez the key to the room. As Officer Hernandez was turning the door, the door was opened from the inside. According to Officer Wasmuth, Officer Hernandez did not open the door because as he started to turn the door, it came open. Appellant was at the door and had it completely open. The officers identified themselves as police officers and showed their badges. Officer Hernandez stepped into the room and took Appellant by the right arm and instructed Appellant to put his hands against the wall and not to move. Officer Hernandez then handcuffed Appellant and retrieved a large knife from the sheath connected to his belt on his left side. After hearing this additional testimony from Officer Wasmuth, the trial court denied Appellant's motion. Appellant obtained a running objection on all evidence obtained pursuant to the police officers' conduct. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, sec. 9 of the Texas Constitution guarantee the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV; TEX.CONST. art. I, § 9. When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence on the basis of a Fourth Amendment violation, he bears the initial burden of rebutting the presumption that police conduct was proper. Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). The defendant rebuts this presumption by showing that the search or seizure occurred without a warrant. Id. If the State conducted a search or seizure without a warrant, the burden shifts to the State to prove that the warrantless search or seizure was reasonable. See id. at 9-10. The record in this case reflects that Appellant was taken into custody and searched without a warrant. Moreover, the State in its brief concedes that the officers entered Appellant's room to effectuate a warrantless arrest. The State contends, however, that the officers made a valid warrantless arrest because: (1) Appellant committed an offense within the officer's presence or within view; (2) Appellant was found in a suspicious place and under circumstances that reasonably show he was guilty of a felony; and (3) a felony had been committed and Appellant was about to escape.³ Generally, an arrest or search without a valid arrest warrant is unreasonable. Wilson v. State, 621 S.W.2d 799, 803-04 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981). State law, not federal law, governs the legality of a state arrest so long as that law does not violate federal constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 413 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). In Texas, warrantless arrests are authorized only in limited circumstances. Id. An officer is allowed to make a warrantless arrest only if (1) the officer has probable cause, and (2) the arrest falls within an exception listed in Chapter 14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Stull v. State, 772 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); see also Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. arts. 14.01-14.04 (Vernon 1977 Supp. 2004-05). The reviewing court looks at the totality of the circumstances to determine probable cause for a warrantless search and seizure. Torres v. State, 868 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). Probable cause to arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that a particular person has committed or is committing an offense. Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 413. In reviewing a warrantless arrest to determine the existence of probable cause, we look to the objective facts known to the officers at the time of the arrest, not subsequently discovered facts or later-acquired knowledge that bolster the claim of probable cause. Id. at 415; Torres, 868 S.W.2d at 801. The record reflects that the arresting officers knew the following information: (1) someone had been stabbed at the YMCA; (2) when they arrived, the officers observed the victim and she told them what had taken place; and (3) Ms. Aranda talked to the victim and then took the officers to room 428. In its brief, the State also asserts that the officers saw that Appellant had a large knife in a sheath attached to his belt when he opened the door. However, Officer Wasmuth's testimony indicates that they saw Appellant when he opened the door from the inside, but found the knife on Appellant's person only after Appellant was detained and searched for weapons. Therefore, the knife was later discovered evidence which cannot support the officers' probable cause to arrest Appellant. In the record before us, there is no testimony regarding the additional facts and circumstances obtained from the victim or Ms. Aranda, which would have lead the officers to identify Appellant as the particular person who committed the offense. See Amores, 815 S.W.2d at 415 (the reviewing court will not engage in conjecture as to the existence of facts which are critical to a probable cause finding, rather the facts and circumstances must be specifically articulated in record). The State had the burden to prove the existence of probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest. Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 414. A failure of proof on any fact essential to a finding of probable cause is construed against the State. Id. at n. 11. We conclude that based on the record in this case, the State failed to show probable cause existed at the time of Appellant's arrest. The knife and related evidence were seized as a result of an unlawful arrest and therefore was illegally obtained and should have been suppressed.⁴ Having found error, we must now conduct a harm analysis. See TEX.R.APP.P. 44.2(a); Villalobos v. State, 999 S.W.2d 132, 136 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.). Appellant's right to be free from an unreasonable seizure is of constitutional dimension, therefore, we must reverse unless the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that admission of the knife into evidence did not contribute to Appellant's conviction or punishment. See Villalobos, 999 S.W.2d at 136. In applying a harm analysis, we should not determine the harmfulness of an error simply by examining whether there exists overwhelming evidence to support the defendant's guilt. Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989). Rather, we should calculate as much as possible the probable impact of the error on the jury in light of the existence of the other evidence. Id. When making this determination, we consider: (1) the source of the error; (2) nature of the error; (3) whether, or to what extent, it was emphasized by the State; (4) the probable collateral implications of the error; (5) the probable weight placed on the error by the jury; and (6) whether declaring the error harmless would encourage the State to repeat it with impunity. See Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 587. In Harris, the Court of Criminal Appeals outlined the procedure for reaching this determination as follows: (1) to "isolate the error and all its effects, using the considerations set out above and any other considerations suggested by the facts of an individual case;" and (2) to "ask whether a rational trier of fact might have reached a different result if the error and its effects had not resulted." Id. at 588. Applying the above Harris factors to this case and considering the overwhelming evidence of guilt as a factor, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to Appellant's conviction or punishment. Ms. Rodriguez identified Appellant as her assailant and testified that he pulled out a knife and stabbed her repeatedly before she was able to escape. Photographs of her stab wounds were admitted into evidence without objection. Ms. Rodriguez also testified to the protracted loss of use of her hand due to the stabbing. Detective Ernest Wade observed and photographed a trail of blood, leading from the second floor to the first floor. Blood swabs taken from the bathroom doorjamb and the floor matched Ms. Rodriguez's blood test sample. The source of the error was the State, but there is nothing in the record to indicate it was attempting to taint the trial by offering inadmissible evidence. See Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 588. The State made only a few remarks about the knife in its closing arguments and these remarks were limited to testimony that was relevant for a deadly weapon finding. The probable collateral implications of the error were minimal given Appellant's asserted defense of insanity, which was not disparaged by the inadmissible evidence. Since the victim testified in detail about her attack and Appellant's use of a knife in the assault, the probable weight placed on the error by the jury was most likely minimal. Finally, we find that holding this error harmless based on the particular facts of this case, will not foster repetition of the error with impunity. After carefully reviewing the record in light of the Harris factors, we are certain that a rational trier of fact would not have reached a different result if the error and its effects had not resulted. See Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 588. Accordingly, we find beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged error did not contribute to Appellant's conviction or punishment and admission of the complained-of evidence was therefore harmless. See TEX.R.APP.P. 44.2(a). Issue One is overruled.

Post-Arrest Silence

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his post-arrest silence. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the trial court admitted evidence that he remained silent after Ms. Aranda spoke to him, which violated his due process rights under the federal and Texas constitutions privileges against self-incrimination. The accused has a right to remain silent when arrested, and the exercise of that right may not be used against the defendant as a circumstance tending to show guilt. See Sanchez v. State, 707 S.W.2d 575, 578-80 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). A comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence violates the defendant's due process right to be free from self-incrimination. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; TEX.CONST. art. I, § 10; see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 356 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). During Ms. Aranda's testimony, she stated that after the officers handcuffed Appellant and found the knife, she asked Appellant, "why he had done that to my friend." Defense counsel objected under Article 38.22 and Miranda because Appellant was in custody. The trial court sustained the objection. The State requested a hearing outside the jury's presences to determine the admissibility of Ms. Aranda's testimony. In voir dire, the following exchange occurred:

The State: What happened when the Defendant was first taken out of the room?

Ms. Aranda: What happened? They took the knife or the blade from him.

The State: And then what happened?

Ms. Aranda: That was when I told him that why he had done that to my friend.

The State: What did he say when you asked him that?

Ms. Aranda: No. he didn't answer at all.

The State: And then what happened.

Ms. Aranda: He told me in English that he was looking for me.

The State argued that the testimony was admissible because Appellant's responses were " res gestae" statements at the time he was placed into custody and that as a lay witness, Ms. Aranda's statement was not a custodial interrogation. Defense counsel argued that since Appellant was silent when asked the question, he objected on the basis of post-arrest silence. The trial court again sustained the objection. During cross-examination of Ms. Aranda, the trial court sua sponte reconsidered its ruling regarding the statement Appellant made to Ms. Aranda. Defense counsel obtained a running objection to Ms. Aranda's testimony on this subject. In redirect examination, Ms. Aranda testified that she asked Appellant why he had done that to her friend and in response, "[h]e remained quiet for a while and then he told me that he was looking for me." After that exchange, they went downstairs by elevator. It is undisputed that Appellant was in police custody when Ms. Aranda questioned Appellant and the State concedes that Appellant was under arrest. The State's inquiry, however, did not constitute a comment on Appellant's post-arrest silence. Ms. Aranda's testimony indicates that rather than remaining silent, Appellant answered her question. The evidence suggests that the period during which Appellant "remained quiet for a while" before responding to the question was momentary, therefore we conclude the trial court did not err in admitting Ms. Aranda's testimony about Appellant's post-arrest statement. Issue Two is overruled.

Insanity Defense

In Issue Three, Appellant contends the evidence was factually insufficient to disprove his affirmative defense of insanity. Specifically, he asserts that the jury's rejection of his insanity defense was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, in this case, testimony by Dr. Mariam Marvasti.

Standard of Review

In examining the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting an insanity defense, we consider all evidence relevant to the issue and determine whether the jury's implied finding against the affirmative defense is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 875 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994); Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). The question on appeal is whether the jury could have determined that the defendant failed to proved the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Love v. State, 909 S.W.2d 930, 943 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, pet. ref'd). Ultimately, this issue lies within the province of the jury, not only as to the credibility of the witnesses and weight of the evidence, but also as to the limits of the defense itself. Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 878; Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 952 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); Love, 909 S.W.2d at 943. The jury's decision will be overturned only where the fact issue is undisputed or resolved to one end of the spectrum and that fact determination is found to lie outside the realm of discretion. Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 878; Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 952 n. 3; Love, 909 S.W.2d at 943.

Legal Insanity

Under the affirmative defense of insanity, a defendant cannot be convicted of a criminal offense if he is legally insane at the time of crime. See TEX.PEN.CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 2003); Dashield v. State, 110 S.W.3d 111, 113 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd). To establish an insanity defense, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the offense, he, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong. See TEX.PEN.CODE ANN. § 8.01, 2.04(d) (Vernon 2003); Aschbacher v. State, 61 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. ref'd). At trial, the defendant has both the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion. Meraz, 785 S.W.2d at 155. The purpose of the insanity defense is to determine whether the defendant should be held responsible for the crime, or whether a mental condition excuses him from such responsibility. Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 948. Proof of a mental disease or defect alone is not sufficient to establish legal insanity. Schuessler v. State, 719 S.W.2d 320, 329 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, Patel v. State, 787 S.W.2d 410, 411 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 943. Medically, an individual may be insane from a mental disease or defect yet, legally, he is not relieved of the criminal responsibility for that crime unless his mental condition reached the point where he was unable to distinguish right from wrong and to know the nature and consequence of his act. Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 949; Love, 909 S.W.2d at 943. The insanity defense invokes legal and ethical considerations beyond the medical condition. Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 877-78; Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 948-49. Thus, in determining the ultimate issue of sanity, the jury is called upon to join the non-medical components that must be considered in deciding the ultimate issue. Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 878; Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 949. Expert witnesses, although capable of giving testimony that may aid the jury in determining the issue, do not dictate the result. Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 948-49. The circumstances of the crime are always important in determining the mental state of the accused at the time of the offense, therefore, the trier of fact may consider such evidence as lay testimony regarding the defendant's demeanor before and after the offense, attempts to conceal incriminating evidence, attempts to evade police, expressions of regret or fear of the consequences of his actions, and other possible motives for the offenses or explanations for his behavior. Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 951; Reyna v. State, 116 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.).

Insanity Defense Evidence

Defense witness Dr. Mariam Marvasti, a psychiatrist, testified that she examined Appellant on seven different occasions after the offense. Dr. Marvasti prescribed an antipsychotic medication, Mellaril, to Appellant and later changed that prescription to Risperdal, a newer generation antipsychotic medication. Based on her review of Appellant's medical records from Dr. C. Wright Anderson, Appellant's previous psychiatrist in California, Dr. Marvasti stated that Appellant is sixty-five years old and his mental illness started in the mid-to late '70s. Dr. Anderson first saw Appellant in August 1981 after Appellant was discharged from an inpatient psychiatric hospital in California. Dr. Anderson was Appellant's psychiatrist from 1981 to 1997. Dr. Anderson diagnosed Appellant with paranoid schizophrenia, chronic type, and prescribed Mellaril. Dr. Marvasti agreed with that diagnosis. She explained that paranoid schizophrenia, chronic type, means that a person suffers a chronic psychotic disorder, characterized by hallucinations, delusions, or thought process disorder, such as loosening of association, that is, the person does not make sense when he talks and does not show emotion. In addition to Appellant's medical records, Dr. Marvasti reviewed the county jail records and the police report from the incident and interviewed the arresting officer. Dr. Marvasti also reviewed Appellant's emergency room records from Providence Memorial Hospital, which indicated he had complained of feeling depressed and nervous and was prescribed Mellaril a couple of weeks before the incident.⁵ Based on reasonable medical certainty, Dr. Marvasti concluded that Appellant was insane at the time of the offense because he was suffering from schizophrenia. According to Dr. Marvasti, Appellant was under the delusion of believing that everyone was against him, especially two perople, one of whom was the one who was assaulted. Dr. Marvasti explained that Appellant believed and still believes that Ms. Rodriguez was snooping around and she and the person she brought into the hall were talking about him and were against him. On cross-examination, Dr. Marvasti conceded that chronic paranoid schizophrenia is a mental disease and that a person can have a mental disease and be sane at the time of an offense. In total, Dr. Marvasti spent approximately nine and a half hours examining Appellant over the course of their meetings. Dr. Marvasti stated that during their interviews Appellant told her that the maids were harassing him, opening closets, and snooping around. Appellant told them not to come into his room anymore and that he would clean his own room. He saw them talking to a guy in the corridor who he thought they had brought to harass him. When they were in the hall talking loud, he got angry and went out and attacked him. While Dr. Marvasti agreed that a chronic paranoid schizophrenic can get angry, act out of anger, and not be insane, she noted that a person suffering from the condition has anger out of proportion to the situation. In her opinion, if the person is acting out of his paranoid delusions, then he does not know the difference between right or wrong. Dr. Marvasti believed that if Appellant knew the difference between right and wrong and was sane, he would have run away from the YMCA instead of sitting in his room. Dr. Marvasti conceded that Appellant was not hearing voices, not under any hallucinations, and not seeing things at the time of the offense. However, he was under the delusion that the maids were harassing him. The State called Dr. Arthur Ramirez, a psychiatrist, as a rebuttal witness. Dr. Ramirez conducted an initial evaluation in February 2000. At the time, Appellant was being treated with antipsychotic medication by Dr. Marvasti. Appellant denied any previous psychiatric hospitalizations, but recalled being evaluated by other psychiatrists. Appellant denied having any medical illnesses. Dr. Ramirez noted that in the mental status examination, Appellant was very cooperative, answered all his questions, his thought processes indicated he was thinking very clearly at the time, and he had no delusional symptoms. During the evaluation, Appellant told Dr. Ramirez that he stabbed the woman because she was bothering him. Appellant told Dr. Ramirez that at the time of the offense, people were trying to hurt him. Dr. Ramirez stated that Appellant told him that he felt very nervous around people. Further, Dr. Ramirez observed that Appellant had no hallucinations, was oriented, his concentration and overall fund of knowledge was normal, he did not show any signs of mental retardation, and showed no symptoms of depression. Dr. Ramirez's diagnostic impression at that point was the possibility of an atypical psychosis with prominent paranoid features in the residual phase, meaning Appellant had begun to respond to treatment. After his initial evaluation, Dr. Ramirez reviewed police reports and prepared an addendum report in April 2000. Based on his review of the reports, Dr. Ramirez did not believe there was any clinical evidence to support the claim that Appellant was insane at the time of the offense. Dr. Ramirez testified that Appellant has a psychotic process and may even have schizophrenia, however, it was his opinion that Appellant was not impaired to the degree that he could not tell right from wrong or could not conform his behavior to the requirements of the law. Dr. Ramirez believed that Appellant had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong and the ability to make reasonable decisions. In response to a hypothetical question, Dr. Ramirez opined that if a man stabs a woman in a public restroom on the second floor and then goes to his room on the fourth floor and wipes away blood from his face, that person knows right from wrong. Dr. Ramirez explained that if a person knew he did something wrong, he would try to change things, by wiping blood off his face or clothes, because he does not want someone to know something happened. This would be contrary to a person who does not have enough decision-making ability to do such things or even leave the scene of the crime. Dr. Ramirez considered going from the second floor to the fourth floor to be leaving the scene of the crime. Dr. Ramirez's concluded that Appellant knew his conduct, stabbing Ms. Rodriguez, was wrong and in his opinion, Appellant was legally sane at the time of the offense. During cross-examination, Dr. Ramirez conceded that he had not reviewed Appellant's prior medical records from California nor was he aware that Appellant had been treated by Dr. Anderson in California for many years. Dr. Ramirez was also not aware that Appellant had been treated at Providence Hospital shortly before the incident. Dr. Ramirez agreed that Mellaril and Risperdal were antipsychotic medications used to treat paranoid schizophrenia. Dr. Ramirez admitted that when he examined Appellant he was under Dr. Marvasti's care and on medication. Dr. Ramirez stated that he would agree with the diagnosis that Appellant suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. However, Dr. Ramirez maintained that moving from one floor to the other was indicative of Appellant knowing right from wrong and his capacity to conform to the requirements of the law. Further, Dr. Ramirez stated that wiping or otherwise riding oneself of blood is some evidence that a person knows he has done something wrong. On redirect examination, Dr. Ramirez stated that Appellant was not hallucinating nor hearing voices at the time of the offense. Appellant told Dr. Ramirez that at the time of the incident he felt uneasy about his room being sprayed for insects and roaches and Dr. Ramirez observed a lot of referential-thinking on Appellant's part. Dr. Ramirez agreed that a chronic paranoid schizophrenic can act out of anger and still be sane. According to Dr. Ramirez, if a chronic paranoid schizophrenic was attempting to obtain medication it indicated to him that the person had enough insight and judgment to take medications to stay better and he responded to treatment. Those circumstances did not indicate a case of someone who is so "florally psychotic" or ill because those kinds of patients never go and get their medications and became more ill. Dr. Ramirez did not believe it was necessary to review Appellant's prior medical records in forming his opinion because Appellant had a clear history of mental illness and was struggling with medications to process things. Dr. Ramirez did not dispute that Appellant has a mental illness, but he did not believe that Appellant did not know his conduct was wrong due to his mental illness nor did he believe all people with mental illness are insane. In addition to the expert testimony, there was lay testimony from Ms. Aranda, in which she recalled that when Appellant opened his door for pest control, he gave her a very penetrating look like he was bothered, and then left his room. On cross-examination, Ms. Aranda again demonstrated the way Appellant was looking at her, and the record reflects that Ms. Aranda squinted or furrowed her eyebrows. Ms. Aranda described the look as unnatural and abnormal and she thought that Appellant did appear to be right in his mind to her. On redirect, Ms. Aranda explained that by his look, she though he was going to do something to her. Over Appellant's objection, Ms. Aranda also testified that when she asked Appellant why he had done what he did to her friend, he was quiet for a while and then told her that he was looking for her.

Analysis

On appeal, Appellant asserts the jury's rejection of his insanity defense was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, Appellant contends the State's evidence was not sufficient to rebut his evidence of insanity and that the State was unable to establish that he knew his conduct was wrong. We disagree. The expert witnesses in this case offered conflicting testimony regarding Appellant's legal sanity. Dr. Marvasti concluded that Appellant suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and was insane at the time of the offense. Based on her interviews with Appellant, Dr. Marvasti determined that Appellant was under the delusion that the maids were harassing him. According to Dr. Marvasti, if a person is acting out of his paranoid delusions, then he does not know the difference between right and wrong. Dr. Marvasti opined that if Appellant knew the difference between right and wrong and was sane, he would have run away from the YMCA instead of sitting in his room. Dr. Ramirez, however, agreed with Dr. Marvasti's diagnosis, but in his opinion there was no clinical evidence to support the claim that Appellant was insane at the time of the offense. Dr. Ramirez did not believe Appellant was so impaired that he could not tell right from wrong or could not conform his behavior to the requirements of the law. He also believed going from the second floor to one's room on the fourth floor and wiping blood from one's face indicated the person knew he did something wrong.⁶ Dr. Ramirez concluded that Appellant knew his conduct was wrong and was legally sane at the time of the offense. After reviewing the evidence in the record, we find that the fact issue was not undisputed and not resolved to one end of the spectrum nor is the implicit finding beyond the realm of the jury's discretion. See Love, 909 S.W.2d at 943. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury's rejection of Appellant's insanity defense was not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Issue Three is overruled. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's judgment.