Opinion
CIVIL 2:21-cv-00994-JD-MGB
10-28-2022
Jason L. Gainey, Plaintiff, v. Officer Matthew Barwick, Officer Willie Sweat, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 52.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion.
BACKGROUND
This action arises from Plaintiff's arrest and detention on April 3, 2020. In the unverified Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that when Defendant Officer Matthew Barwick placed him under arrest, Barwick did not “double lock[] the cuffs properly” and the handcuffs “were extremely tight, . . . pinching [Plaintiff] in pain.” (Dkt. No. 15 at 6.) Plaintiff alleges Officer Barwick ignored Plaintiff's repeated requests to loosen the cuffs and to engage the safety lock. According to Plaintiff, Officer Barwick said he would not fix the cuffs until they arrived at the “Sumter County Sheriffs Office Detention Center.” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that when he arrived at the Detention Center, Defendant Officer Sweat “was the acting officer to book [Plaintiff] in.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that after he told Officer Sweat “the handcuffs on my hands were extremely too tight, and the cuffs were in fact hurting me so bad I could barely stay calm,” Sweat told Plaintiff that “he was going to place [Plaintiff] in a holding cell with the cuffs on, because [Plaintiff] was being too obnoxious.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, he continued to ask that the handcuffs be removed and then “put . . . on right” because they were hurting him. Plaintiff alleges Officer Sweat
then walked over to me, grabbed my arm, and forced me into the cell, while the handcuffs were still behind my back. Officer Sweat then deliberately slammed the door (the door struck the unlocked handcuffs that Officer Barwick had failed to safety lock . . .) striking the unlocked, too tight handcuffs and causing the left handcuff to pass through its gears completely, almost pinching my left hand off.(Id. at 8-9.)
Plaintiff alleges that he then fell to the floor screaming that the cuffs were closed on his wrist. “Officer Sweat then came running inside the cell, they all jumped on my back trying to get the cuffs off” and Barwick, at 6'3' and over 200 pounds, “slams his knee in my ribs, while I'm screaming for help.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff alleges Officer Sweat then screamed “he's got to go to the hospital.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he was transported to the hospital with the handcuffs still behind his back, “with a closed handcuff pinching away and my hand throbbing like it was being cut off.” (Id. at 10.) According to Plaintiff, the handcuffs had to be cut off by a hospital surgeon. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendants' actions, “[t]he bone on my wrist sticks up higher now than before this incident, my hand is now altered in all of its movement, I cannot use my left hand like I could before this incident.” (Id. at 11.)
The “injuries” portion of the Amended Complaint makes allegations about Plaintiff's medical care. According to Plaintiff, after his handcuffs were removed at the hospital, Officer Barwick “told the doctor they could not x-ray [Plaintiff's] wrist or ribs at the hospital.” (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff alleges his ribs were x-rayed “over a year later” in 2021 and his wrist has never been “x-rayed or seen by an orthopedic surgeon.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that he was “not given any medication for swelling, pain, nausea, no ace bandage for my wrist, no medical attention from a trained professional at all after this incident.” (Id.)
The Amended Complaint alleges Defendants' conduct constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief. (Id. at 14-15.) On June 6, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 52.) By Order filed June 7, 2022, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), Plaintiff was advised of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. (Dkt. No.53.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on June 30, 2022 (Dkt. No. 55), to which Defendants replied on July 5, 2022 (Dkt. No. 56). On September 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed a notarized sworn declaration. (Dkt. No. 57.) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe and ready for review.
In his response brief, Plaintiff vaguely alleges a denial of his due process rights and a denial of legal access. (Dkt. No. 55.) Those allegations do not appear to be related to the claims in this action and are not considered here. “[I]t is well-established that a plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by alleging new claims in his response to a motion for summary judgment.” Smith v. Demory, No. 9:19-CV-1771-HMH-MHC, 2020 WL 8413565, at *7 (D.S.C. Dec. 15, 2020) (citing S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 18485 (4th Cir. 2013) (“It is well-established that parties cannot amend their complaint through briefing[.]”)), adopted in part, 2021 WL 222354 (D.S.C. Jan. 22, 2021), aff'd, 2022 WL 2702572 (4th Cir. July 12, 2022). However, the undersigned notes that the Court addressed similar allegations from Plaintiff in a prior Order. (Dkt. No. 50.)
STANDARDS
A. Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
B. Summary Judgment Standard
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “‘the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'” Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Defendants Barwick and Sweat argue that Plaintiff's claims against them should be dismissed because: (1) they are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment as to any claims brought against them in their official capacities; (2) while acting as employees of the Sumter County Sheriff's Department they are not considered “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) they are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) Plaintiff cannot establish any constitutional violations. (Dkt. No. 52-1.)
The undersigned considers these arguments, below.
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity and “Person” under § 1983
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's claims against them are barred because while acting in their official capacities as employees of the Sumter County Sheriff's Department, they are not considered “persons” under § 1983. (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 7.) Defendants also argue that the claims against them their official capacities should be dismissed pursuant to Eleventh Amendment immunity. (Id. at 6-7.)
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (citations omitted); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890). Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity “extends to ‘arm[s] of the State,' including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity,” Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted), because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself,” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, Eleventh Amendment immunity protects state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacity from liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
The Supreme Court has found that a suit for injunctive relief against a state officer to prevent ongoing violations of federal law is not a suit against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. More specifically, in the landmark Supreme Court decision, Ex parte Young, the Court held that, although prohibited from giving orders directly to a State, federal courts could enjoin state officials in their official capacities. 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908). “The Ex Parte Young exception is directed at ‘officers of the state [who] are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the state, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings'” to enforce an unconstitutional act against affected parties. McBurney v. Cuccinelli, II, 616 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56). “Thus, to correctly plead such a claim, the proper State official must be included as a defendant by name and identified in the body of the complaint with a specific unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice.” Smith v. City of Huntington, No. 3:17-cv-03806, 2017 WL 5180456, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 28, 2017), adopted sub nom. Smith v. City of Huntignton, 2017 WL 5180437 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 8, 2017).
Here, there is no dispute that Defendants Barwick and Sweat were employees of the Sumter County Sherriff's Department during the events at issue. Thus, any monetary claims brought against them in their official capacities should be dismissed as a matter of law. See, e.g., McClary v. Elliott, No. 2:21-cv-02626-MBS-MGB, 2022 WL 4825238, at *5 (D.S.C. May 17, 2022) (“[S]heriffs and their deputies are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits against them in their official capacity.”), adopted by, 2022 WL 4808802 (D.S.C. Oct. 3, 2022). Further, while the Amended Complaint purports to seek injunctive relief, it does not identify any ongoing unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice. Without more, the undersigned cannot find Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief satisfy the Ex Parte Young pleading standards. For these reasons, the undersigned recommends all claims brought against Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed.
However, while the Amended Complaint checks the box that Defendants are sued in their “official capacity,” liberally construing the pro se pleadings, there is reason to find that Plaintiff also intended to sue Defendants in their individual capacities. (Dkt. No. 15 at 2-3.) Specifically, the Amended Complaint does not plead that Defendants were acting according to an official policy or custom, and it requests compensatory damages. Also, Defendants assert the defense of qualified immunity in their Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 14-17.) “Because qualified immunity is available only in a personal capacity suit, . . . the assertion of that defense indicates that the defendant interpreted the plaintiff's action as being against him personally.” See Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
Weighing these factors in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned assumes for purposes of this analysis only that Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants, at least in part, in their individual capacities. See Harris v. Copeland, No. 2:11-CV-02209-GRA, 2013 WL 4504764, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 22, 2013) (factors that weigh in favor of finding that the official has been sued in his individual capacity include the plaintiff's failure to plead that the defendant acted according to official policy or custom, or the lack of indicia of such a policy or custom on the face of the complaint, and whether the plaintiff requested compensatory or punitive damages, which would be unavailable in an official capacity suit) (citing Biggs, 66 F.3d at 61). Accordingly, in their individual capacities, Defendants are considered “persons” under § 1983, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Plaintiff's claims against them.
B. Constitutional Claims
Defendants next argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to any claims asserted against them. (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 14.)
1. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity protects officers from liability for “bad guesses in gray areas” and bases liability on the violation of bright-line rules. Id. (quoting Braun v. Maynard, 652 F.3d 557, 560 (4th Cir. 2011)). “Qualified immunity provides ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.'” Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam).
In determining whether an officer is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, the court applies “a familiar two-step inquiry.” Harris v. Pittman, No. 17-7308, 2019 WL 2509240, at *10 (4th Cir. June 18, 2019) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). At step one, courts ask “whether the facts alleged or shown, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish that the police officer's actions violated a constitutional right.” Id. (quoting Meyers v. Balt. Cty., 713 F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir. 2013). “At step two, the question is whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established' at the time of the officer's conduct.” Id. (quoting Meyers, 713 F.3d at 731). “‘We do not require a case directly on point' in order to conclude that the law was clearly established so long as ‘existing precedent [has] placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.'” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011)). “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear ‘that every reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.' In other words, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.'” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741) (some internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
District court and court of appeals judges are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (2009). If a court decides in the negative the first prong it considers-i.e., the court decides the plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right or the right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation-the court need not consider the other prong of the qualified immunity analysis. See id. at 243-45.
2. Excessive Force
Here, the undersigned first considers whether Plaintiff has presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants Barwick and Sweat violated his constitutional rights. As discussed above, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Barwick violated his constitutional rights when Barwick caused him injury by placing the handcuffs on extremely tight during Plaintiff's arrest. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sweat violated his constitutional rights at the Detention Center, when Sweat caused him injury by refusing to remove the extremely tight handcuffs and slamming the cell door on Plaintiff's handcuffs.
While the Amended Complaint alleges Barwick slammed his knee into Plaintiff's ribs while Plaintiff was at the Detention Center, the Amended Complaint is not verified and so it is not considered as evidence sufficient to create an issue of material fact. See Goodman v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493, 495 (4th Cir. 2021) (“A complaint is verified if it is signed, sworn, and submitted under penalty of perjury.”) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff does not allege any injuries from this conduct, and he does not mention this allegation in his notarized declaration.
a. Standards
Whether law enforcement officers used excessive force when making an arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its “reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); see E.W. by & through T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 179 (4th Cir. 2018) (“We analyze whether an officer has used excessive force under an objective reasonableness standard.”). The Supreme Court recognized “that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Id. at 396. Further, the Court held that there is not a precise mechanical application of the standard, but “its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id.
The Graham factors “‘offer[ ] little guidance in tight handcuffing cases because police officers almost always may use handcuffs in the course of a lawful arrest, regardless of the severity of the crime, the dangerousness of the suspect, or any attempts at flight-Graham's three factors.'” Dolgos, 884 F.3d at 194 n.6 (Shedd, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888, 902 n.1 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)).
Additionally, “claims of post-arrest excessive force against an arrestee or pre-trial detainee . . . are governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits before conviction the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Sawyer v. Asbury, 537 Fed. App'x. 283, 290 (4th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). To prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim, a “pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). “In determining whether the force was objectively unreasonable, a court considers the evidence ‘from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.'” Duff v. Potter, 665 Fed. App'x. 242, No. 16-6783, 2016 WL 6518876, at *2 (4th Cir. Nov. 3, 2016) (quoting Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2473).
In determining whether an officer was acting objectively unreasonably, a court may consider many factors including the amount of force used relative to the need for force, “the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. (citing Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2473). “Because the standard is an objective one, the court is not concerned with the officers' motivation or intent.” Id. (citation omitted). Whether the force was objectively reasonable must be viewed in “full context,” because segmenting the events in analysis “misses the forest for the trees.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 2015)).
In considering a Fourth Amendment claim of tight handcuffing during the arrest process, the court in the recent case of Parsons v. Miles noted that when “‘evaluat[ing] an excessive force claim based solely on tight handcuffing'” a court may consider “‘whether: 1) the handcuffs were unreasonably tight; the defendants ignored the plaintiff's pleas that the handcuffs were too tight; and 3) the degree of injury to the wrists.'” No. 4:17-cv-00708-RBH, 2020 WL 58287, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 6, 2020) (quoting E.W. by & through T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 194 (4th Cir. 2018)).
See also Stutzman v. Krenik, 350 F.Supp.3d 366, 382 (D. Md. 2018) (“In the context of an arrest, the Fourth Circuit has never held that using handcuffs is per se reasonable. Dolgos, 884 F.3d at 180. A police officer can violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force during handcuffing. Id. at 185. In particular, courts have held that handcuffing in an excessively tight manner so as to cause injury can constitute excessive force.”); see, e.g., McCall v. Williams, 59 F.Supp.2d 556, 561 (D.S.C. 1999) (finding an officer “used excessive force in handcuffing Plaintiff too tightly” and explaining “this is not a case in which Plaintiff simply complained that the handcuffs were too tight; instead, Plaintiff has medical evidence demonstrating that he has a ‘10% impairment of his RUE as a result of the handcuffs being too tight”). In McCall, the court “specifically note[d] that its ruling in this case does not mean that every time a suspect complains that the handcuffs are too tight, a constitutional violation has occurred. Instead, a determination of whether a constitutional violation has occurred will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” 59 F.Supp.2d at 561 & n.3.
b. Evidence
Here, Defendants dispute Plaintiff's version of events. They argue that the record shows
Barwick was reasonable in using handcuffs during the arrest because Plaintiff “was actively resisting, and had no injury from the use of handcuffs, except some minor redness.” (Dkt. No. 52 1 at 8-9.) Similarly, Defendants assert that Sweat left the handcuffs on Plaintiff “for the safety and security of the staff” and deny that any officers “slammed the cell door on him or jumped on his back.” (Id. at 10.) In support, Defendants rely on their affidavits and Plaintiff's medical records. (Dkt. Nos. 52-2; 52-3; 52-4.)
In his affidavit, Barwick avers that during the events at issue, he was employed by the Sheriff of Sumter County as a senior corporal on patrol. (Dkt. No. 52-2 at 1.) Barwick avers that he was asked to transport Plaintiff to jail “based on an outstanding warrant.” (Id.) According to Barwick, Plaintiff “was moving his arms from the moment I arrived to take him to jail” and “resisted as I was placing the handcuffs on him, which made it difficult to secure the handcuffs.” (Id. at 2.) He continues,
After I was able to get the handcuffs secured, I recall Mr. Gainey complaining that the handcuffs were too tight. As a result, I checked them before placing him in the car, to make sure they were double locked and not too tight. I saw they were correctly double locked and there was room between his wrists and the handcuffs. After checking the handcuffs and placing him in my car, I transported Mr. Gainey to the Detention Center. He continued to struggle to move his arms in the car and once we arrived at the Detention Center. He was very aggressive and argumentative the whole time. At the Detention Center, I handed Mr. Gainey over to the jail staff to begin the booking process and I completed the arresting officer observation form.(Id.)
Barwick has submitted the arresting office observation form, which indicates Barwick suspected Plaintiff of “swallowing or otherwise ingesting any substance” because Plaintiff “was profusely sweating and emotional to the extreme along with hallucinations.” (Id. at 6.) Barwick denies Plaintiff's version of events at the Detention Center. He avers that because Plaintiff “was emotional and acting out, the handcuffs were kept on him. However, at no time at the jail did Mr. Gainey complain about the handcuffs being too tight.” (Id. at 2.) Barwick avers that Plaintiff continued to act out during the booking process and, as a result, “the decision was made pretty quickly to have him sent to the hospital to be mentally cleared before the jail could accept him.” (Id.) Barwick denies Plaintiff was placed in a holding cell before he was transported to the hospital.
At the hospital, Mr. Gainey was examined and ultimately cleared to be taken back to the jail. I removed one of his handcuffs so the medical staff could examine him. I handcuffed him to the bed, due to his hostile behavior, for the safety of the medical staff. I did not interfere in any way with the medical examination of Mr. Gainey while he was at the hospital. I was simply staying with him as security, since he was under arrest. I did not tell the hospital staff what they could or could not do in their treatment of Mr. Gainey, as they were in control of the treatment. The hospital staff did examine Mr. Gainey's wrist after I took the handcuffs off and noted some redness on his wrist. This was not unusual for a suspect who has been moving his arms around while in handcuffs. The hospital staff did offer Mr. Gainey a small splint/wrap for his wrist, but Mr. Gainey stated he did not need it and refused to take the splint. At no time were the handcuffs cut off of Mr. Gainey at the hospital or the jail.(Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff was placed in a holding cell on his return from the hospital. Barwick avers, “I did not see anyone close the door on Mr. Gainey, and no one jumped on Mr. Gainey to remove the handcuffs, as the handcuffs were simply unlocked and taken off of him by the jail staff and returned to me.” (Id. at 4.)
Sweat similarly denies Plaintiff's version of events at the Detention Center. His affidavit echoes Barwick's averments that Plaintiff's handcuffs were left on at the Detention Center because Plaintiff “was acting unpredictable, screaming and moving all around the booking area.” (Dkt. No. 52-4 at 2.) Likewise, Sweat avers that there was no “chance to put [Plaintiff] in a holding cell” because he was “fairly quickly” taken to the hospital to be cleared for mental issues. (Id.) On Plaintiff's return from the hospital, Plaintiff was still combative and so he “was placed in a holding cell until he was ready to cooperate.” (Id. at 3.) Sweat avers, “[o]nce he was safely in the holding cell, his handcuffs were removed. At no time did anyone jump on this inmate's back or use any force against him. The handcuffs were simply unlocked and removed from his wrists. At no time did this inmate complain to me of any problems with the handcuffs being too tight.” (Id.) Sweat further avers that he had no involvement in Plaintiff's medical care because “medical care for inmates is handled through an independent contractor, and as a result, medical staff are separate from Detention staff.” (Id.)
Medical records from the hospital show that Plaintiff was admitted on April 3, 2020 for being “combative.” (Dkt. No. 52-3 at 5.) Triage notes from the visit state, inter alia, “Patient to ED5 in forensic restraints accompanied by law enforcement. Law enforcement reports patient is combative, has been sweating profusely even in air conditioning in the car. PT becoming argumentative and verbally combative, yelling about removing handcuffs. States he is not on drugs. Wants his right hand checked out because his cuffs are too tight.” (Id. at 6.) The “nurse notes” state that Plaintiff “is refusing blood work and medication.” (Id. at 8.) Notes from this visit further state, “Splinting indicated for sprain care, splint applied to the left wrist. PT refused stating he didn't need that or any pills or anything.” (Id. at 8-9.) The hospital medical records indicate x-rays were taken of Plaintiff's left wrist showing “Moderate degenerative changes first IP joint and very minimally involving the second through fifth DIP joints. Overall no evidence for fracture or acute osseous process otherwise.” (Id. at 14.)
Relevant here, Defendants have submitted an affidavit from David B. Fulton, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon who avers that that he has reviewed Plaintiff's April 3, 2020 hospital records. (Dkt. No. 52-3 at 1.) Dr. Fulton summarizes these records as follows:
Upon examination, the hospital records indicate erythema on the left wrist, which is simply superficial reddening, but no discoloration from poor circulation, no deformity and no loss of range of motion. Superficial reddening is extremely common for anyone wearing handcuffs. The hospital records further indicate an x-ray was ordered for the left wrist of this inmate, and there was no mention of any bone or joint abnormality of the wrist. Therefore, there was no objective indication of any acute injury to the left wrist. There is also no indication in the records that this inmate's handcuffs were cut off. To the contrary, the records indicate the
medical staff was able to examine his left wrist, and x-ray the left wrist, which indicates the handcuffs likely were taken off while in the hospital, and then placed back on this inmate upon discharge. While the hospital records note that there was a diagnosis of a left wrist sprain, that would not likely have been something caused by handcuffs being too tight. A sprain is an injury often caused by a fall or abrupt movement of the wrist. It would not likely be caused by handcuffs being too tight, as alleged by this inmate. If this inmate was being aggressive and moving his arms around even after he was handcuffed, that may have caused his own injury to his wrist. This injury could also have occurred before the handcuffs were placed on this wrist, however, his claim that tight handcuffs caused a wrist sprain is unlikely. I also note that the hospital offered him a splint for the wrist, which he refused. He was also offered Motrin, and refused that as well. Based on my review of the medical records from the hospital, I do not believe any treatment this inmate received at the hospital for a wrist sprain was related in any way to his allegations that his handcuffs were too tight.(Id. at 2-3.)
Finally, Defendants have submitted portions of Plaintiff's medical record from the Detention Center. These records indicate that Plaintiff has not complained to medical staff of any issues with his hands or wrists following the events at issue. (Dkt. No. 52-3 at 6-7.)
Plaintiff has submitted a notarized sworn declaration, including what Plaintiff refers to as a “7 page original complaint.” (Dkt. No. 57.) Here, Plaintiff avers he told Barwick that “the handcuffs were too tight the moment he placed them on my wrists.” (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff avers that Barwick placed him “in the back seat with the knowledge of the unsecured handcuff” and this was a deliberate action because Plaintiff “ask[ed] Officer Barwick to simply safety lock it, not take it completely off.” (Id. at 5.) According to Plaintiff, “cameras in the booking area will show” Plaintiff being escorted by Officer Sweat where Sweat “slams the door knocking me to the floor with a handcuff securely passed through the gears on my wrist.” (Id. at 3.) He states here that “Sweat did not know that the cuffs were not safety locked until he heard me screaming it yet again. He also did not use professional measure to abate the problem either and under recorded surveillance slam the door into the unlocked cuffs being forewarned of the danger.” (Id. at 5.)
Because Plaintiff's allegations here are included in a sworn and notarized document, the undersigned considers it to be an opposing affidavit for summary judgment purposes.
Plaintiff avers that the handcuffs have caused excruciating pain to his left wrist and “to this day the wrist is hurt, the bone is sticking up, and my hand is altered in all movement.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff avers that Barwick did not allow staff to x-ray Plaintiff's hand at the hospital. (Id.) He also avers that “on several occasions after returning to the jail I was refused my rights to seek medical attention.” (Id.)
c. Analysis
Given the facts and circumstances of the events in question in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned finds there is a question of fact as to whether: (1) Defendant Barwick used excessive force in handcuffing Plaintiff too tightly; and (2) Defendant Sweat used excessive force in refusing to remove Plaintiff's extremely tight handcuffs and in slamming the door on Plaintiff's handcuffs. As an initial matter, an analysis of the Graham factors is not too helpful here. With respect to the first Graham factor, Plaintiff was arrested for an outstanding warrant. However, the record does not reveal the underlying conduct at issue in the warrant. As to the second and third Graham factors, questions of fact exist as to whether Plaintiff was combative during his arrest and subsequent detention. Plaintiff claims he was in distress from the pain of the handcuffs, and Defendants attest he was combative for no reason. Additionally, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether: (1) the handcuffs were unreasonably tight; (2) Defendants Barwick and Sweat purposely ignored Plaintiff's pleas that the handcuffs were too tight; and (3) Plaintiff was physically injured by Defendants' conduct.
More specifically, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff was physically injured by the allegedly tight handcuffing and the slamming of the door on his handcuffs. While Dr. Fulton opines that Plaintiff's treatment for a wrist sprain was not “related in any way to his allegations that his handcuffs were too tight,” his opinion does not resolve this issue of fact. The medical record, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, indicates that his wrist was sprained and he was offered a splint and medication. Other courts in this circuit have found such evidence supports denying summary judgment on an excessive force claim. See Hewitt v. Bennett, No. 6:19-cv-1927-JFA-KFM, 2020 WL 3420756, at *5 (D.S.C. June 22, 2020) (“A genuine issue of material fact does exist as to whether Plaintiff's alleged injuries were the result of the allegedly excessively tight handcuffs.... The medical records indicate that Plaintiff's left wrist was swollen, and his right wrist had as scabbed scar on it. Additionally, under ‘nursing protocol,' the nurse notated that it was a ‘sprain/strain' and advised Plaintiff to limit movement while handcuffed and take Tylenol three times daily.”); Parson v. Miles, No. 4:17-cv-00708-RBH, 2020 WL 58287, at *6 (D.S.C. Jan. 6, 2020) (finding genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff was physically injured by the allegedly tight handcuffing where . . . hospital records show[] he was diagnosed with a sprained wrist and possible carpel tunnel syndrome, given a splint, and prescribed pain and anti-inflammatory medications. Meanwhile, Defendants have submitted the results of Plaintiff's ‘unremarkable exam' from his diagnostic imaging”).
Defendants do not cite Dr. Fulton's affidavit as an expert opinion. Regardless, “the assessment of the weight to give an expert opinion is a discretionary determination committed to the factfinder.” United States v. Shea, 989 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. 2021).
In sum, the material factual disputes in this case preclude granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's excessive force claims against Barwick and Sweat. See, e.g., Hewitt, 2020 WL 3420756, at *4 (denying summary judgment on Fourteenth Amendment claim for excessively tight handcuffs during an arrest where genuine issues of material fact existed as to, inter alia, “the tightness of the handcuffs,” “whether Defendant . . . intended that Plaintiff continue to suffer by refusing to adjust the handcuffs until another officer intervened,” and “whether Plaintiff's injuries as documented by the medical records were the result of the excessively tight handcuffs”); Parson, 2020 WL 58287, at *6 (denying summary judgment on Fourth Amendment claim for excessively tight handcuffs where genuine issues of material fact existed as to, inter alia, whether defendants “handcuffed Plaintiff in an excessively tight manner,” whether defendants “acted unreasonably in not loosening or readjusting Plaintiff's handcuffs despite his verbal statements and physical movements in the patrol vehicle on the way to jail”).
Because of the above-mentioned material factual disputes, the undersigned cannot find that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Indeed, “summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is improper as long as there remains any material factual dispute regarding the actual conduct of the defendants.” Kane v. Beaufort Cty. Sheriffs Dep't, No. 9:14-cv-508-RMG, 2015 WL 404570, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2015) (quoting Vathekan v. Prince George's Cnty., 154 F.3d 173, 180 (4th Cir. 1998)) (“It would be inappropriate at this stage to find there is no dispute of the material facts as to whether Defendant Prusinowski's assessment of Plaintiff, particularly in light of the apparent size difference between the two men and Kane's immediate, tape recorded retraction of his threat, was reasonable enough as a matter of law to render the force used constitutional.”); Hewitt, 2020 WL 3420756, at *5 (“[T]he parties dispute as to whether Defendant Green excessively tightened the handcuffs and then refused to loosen them is sufficient to preclude ruling on the issue of qualified immunity at this stage.”).
For these reasons, the undersigned recommends Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity and Plaintiff's excessive force claims should not be dismissed on this basis.
3. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need
Defendants next argue that to the extent Plaintiff has alleged a claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs, such a claim fails. Plaintiff does not expressly respond to this argument.
To demonstrate that Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical treatment, the Complaint must establish that, objectively, Plaintiff had a serious medical need and, subjectively, Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to that need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225-26 (4th Cir. 2016). As to the first prong, a “serious medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). As to the second prong, a claim of deliberate indifference requires a showing that the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate's health. Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014). An assertion of mere negligence or even malpractice is not sufficient to state a constitutional violation. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs claims of inadequate medical treatment brought by pretrial detainees. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977). However, the standard of review is essentially the same as that for convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. See Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 624 (4th Cir. 2021); Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2001).
Here, the hospital records document that Plaintiff was offered a splint and medication for his alleged injuries. Further, the record refutes Plaintiff's averment that Barwick did not allow any x-rays to be taken. Defendants have submitted evidence showing x-rays were taken of Plaintiff's wrist at the hospital. (Dkt. No. 52-3 at 14.) Also, while Plaintiff generally avers that he was “refused [his] rights to seek medical attention” once back at the Detention Center, he does not specify that Barwick or Sweat refused Plaintiff medical attention.
In short, there is no evidence Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. “The fact that [Plaintiff] believe[s] he ha[s] a more serious injury or that he require[s] better treatment does not establish a constitutional violation.” Krug v. Loranth, No. 1:13-cv-01409-DCN, 2014 WL 4955365, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2014), aff'd, 599 Fed.Appx. 512 (4th Cir. 2015). Further, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that he remains in pain, “the Eighth Amendment does not require that the Plaintiff be cured.” Collins v. Mauney, No. 2:14-cv-4270-RMG-MGB, 2016 WL 805918, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2016), adopted by, 2016 WL 881962 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2016).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends Defendants are entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiff alleges a claim against them for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are “patently frivolous” and should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (Dkt. 52-1 at 18.) Section 1915(2)(B) authorizes courts to dismiss a “frivolous or malicious” action. Here, the undersigned has addressed the merits of Plaintiff's claims and has not found them to be patently frivolous. Accordingly, section 1915(2)(B) is inapplicable here.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore RECOMMENDED, for the foregoing reasons, that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 52) be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically, to the extent Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs, this claim should be dismissed. In addition, any § 1983 claims brought against Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed. However, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for excessive force should remain against Defendants in their individual capacities.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).