”); White v. Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 595 P.2d 76, 79 (Wyo.1979) ( “Parties cannot confer jurisdiction by consent.”). [¶ 28] Our decision in this case does not conflict with and should not be construed to undermine our decisions in Gurney, 899 P.2d at 55, and Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 571 (Wyo.1990). In Gurney, the divorce decree granted the parents joint custody of their child, but within fifty days after the decree was entered, the parties agreed the arrangement was not working and each parent sought primary custody.
When deciding a petition for modification, the district court's "'prime if not sole judicial objective * * * is to serve the best interests of the child.'" Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 1990). ( quoting Henson v. Henson, 384 P.2d 721, 723 (Wyo. 1963)).
"This court has always recognized that the trial court exercises a broad discretion in the execution of its revisory powers in matters involving domestic relations." Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 1990) (citing Ayling v. Ayling, 661 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Wyo. 1983); Henson v. Henson, 384 P.2d 721, 723 (Wyo. 1963)). We will not interfere with the trial court's decision absent a procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion. Gaines, 794 P.2d at 570.
In child custody modification matters the district court possesses inherent equitable powers independent of its statutory revisory power. Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 569-70 (Wyo. 1990) (citing Wardle v. Wardle, 464 P.2d 854, 856 (1970)). While the district court seeks to achieve its goal of serving the best interests of the child, it also "must strive to achieve a reasonable balance between the rights and affections of the parents."
DISCUSSION In these matters, we use an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the decisions of the district court. Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 1990) (citations omitted)). Our analysis of the issues presented in the instant case is promoted if we recognize this case does not involve the usual custody dispute, in which the court earlier awarded custody to one parent and the other is now attempting to reopen the order and change custody, asserting a substantial change of circumstances as justification for the requested reopening of the custodial order.
In this case, whether or not the district court has jurisdiction to exercise discretion in ordering the mother to send her children to Wyoming involves the court's statutory and equitable authority to enforce its own custody determination. Wyo. Stat. §§ 20-2-113(a) (1989); 20-5-103(a)(ii); and 20-5-112(b). See also Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 569 (Wyo. 1990); Wardle v. Wardle, 464 P.2d 854, 856 (Wyo. 1970); and Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 226, 73 P.2d 953, 960 (1937) (the court possesses inherent equitable powers in child custody and visitation matters). The civil contempt citation referred to in "sub-issue A" of the mother's fourth issue fails to recognize that the district court issued the contempt citation solely because of the mother's failure to appear at the June 19, 1990 show cause hearing.
Therefore, we conclude that the district court could properly clarify its earlier modification order in light of the circumstances of the parents and for the benefit of the children. See Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 1990). The husband asserts that the wife's appeal was meritless and asks this Court to so certify and to award costs and a penalty pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05.
(c) A court having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, custody and visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a material change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question and that the modification would be in the best interests of the children pursuant to W.S. 20-2-201(a). [¶ 10] We construed this provision in Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 1990), in the context of the parents' requests to modify visitation, child support and medical insurance provisions in the original divorce decree. Father filed a petition to modify the divorce decree to clarify his visitation rights, asserting that Mother had failed to allow reasonable visitation in accordance with the decree.
We have begun to question the validity of such a definition of abuse of discretion, and have suggested that "the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did." Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 1990). See also, Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Wyo. 1993).
We acknowledge that we have previously held that even in a proceeding that may have been limited to a contempt proceeding, the district court has the discretion to modify child custody matters. Ready v. Ready, 906 P.2d 382, 386 (Wyo. 1995) (citing Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 569-70 (Wyo. 1990); Wardle v. Wardle, 464 P.2d 854, 856 (Wyo. 1970) (in child custody modification matters the district court possesses inherent equitable powers independent of its statutory revisory power); and Marquiss v. Marquiss, 837 P.2d 25, 42-43 (Wyo. 1992) (the district court has the right to terminate a parent's custody based upon contempt for noncompliance with existing decree provisions for visitation)). Nevertheless, when proceeding to modify a decree, the district court cannot modify to punish the offending parent in contempt but must act to achieve its goal of serving the best interests of the child and striving to achieve a reasonable balance between the rights and affections of the parents. Ready, at 863 (citing Marquiss, at 45).